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WORLD COMPETITION AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY*

OVER a long generation, both Americans and people abroad took it for granted that the dollar was as good as gold, that its soundness and safety were beyond question. This confidence in the dollar gave us elbow room to deal with our national problems as we saw fit. It was also the foundation on which much of our international political prestige rested. Of late, however, many men have begun to express doubts about the future of the dollar. This is a new and grave development.

The first small crack of confidence in the dollar occurred in 1958. As you know, Europeans have had a far more intimate experience with inflation than we have, and they are therefore apt to be sensitive even to its minor manifestations. Several events on the American scene stirred doubts in the minds of European central bankers and other financiers before 1958 ended. First of all, our wage and price levels continued to rise during the closing months of 1957 and the early months of 1958, despite a decline of production and employment. Second, our government responded to that recession by sharply increasing the money supply and undertaking extensive new expenditures. Third, it was evident by mid-1958 that, although our economy was already recovering, the preponderant part of the governmental spending inspired by the recession was yet to be carried out. Fourth, a decline of our exports during 1958 led to a considerable outflow of gold. Noting these developments, and what they might signify for our balance of international payments in the future, European bankers began to question whether the dollar was as impregnable as they had supposed.

The doubts whispered by Europeans about the management

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of our economic affairs added a new dimension to the struggle against inflation. Hitherto, thoughtful Americans had been concerned mainly over the domestic effects of inflation. Now they realized that the prospect of a huge deficit in the federal budget for fiscal year 1959 was an inflationary portent that also concerned foreign investors. For the first time since the Great Depression, we had to reckon with the possibility of a gold crisis which, besides damaging our economy, could jeopardize our political leadership of the Free World.

A reversal of domestic economic policies therefore became an urgent necessity, and it was in fact resolutely carried out during 1959. By mid-year it became clear that the government was in earnest and that a stern policy of monetary and fiscal restraints on economic expansion was being put into effect. It also appeared that business firms were more determined than they had been to resist extravagant demands of trade unions. Fears of inflation therefore subsided both here and abroad.

But the restoration of confidence was short lived. Last fall, serious doubts arose once again about the future of the dollar. This time, the crack in confidence was wider, deeper, and plainly visible to all. Apparently without any warning, the London price of gold, which had consistently been very close to $35 per ounce, rose one day last October to $36, then went still higher, and soon reached $40. News of this extraordinary price movement sped quickly around the world. It was the first intimation that the general public had that uncertainty existed in some quarters about the future of the dollar or, more specifically, about the ability of our Treasury to maintain the price at around $35.

As far as I can judge, the principal immediate cause of the speculative flurry in the London gold market was fear that our presidential election would be followed by inflationary policies. Leading financiers in European capitals, being well aware of the onset of a new recession in the United States, could not help but wonder whether it would be possible to avoid inflationary measures at such a time. Not a few of them felt that a Democratic victory at the polls was especially likely to lead to easy money policies, to substantially larger governmental spending, to the re-emergence of large budget deficits, and the restimulation of the wage-price spiral. Many Americans entertained similar views or fears. Once doubts of this sort arise, they are apt to spread through the financial community. Some individuals—surely not

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many—took their doubts seriously enough to convert dollars into gold on terms that substantially exceeded the official price of $35. Others—and they were a more numerous group—responded to the same impulse by converting dollars into foreign currencies or other foreign assets. In plain language, a flight from the dollar on a limited but not insignificant scale got under way.

Yet the fear or expectation of inflationary policies cannot of itself explain the speculation which occurred last fall and winter against the dollar. After all, expectations of inflation have in our generation been a recurring, if not a persistent, feature of American life. If such expectations led to flight from the dollar last fall, but did not do so at other times—for example, in early 1959 when expectations of inflation were as strong or stronger—the reason must be that other forces were also working against the dollar in international markets.

One of these forces, of course, was the divergence of interest rate movements that developed in the industrial countries during 1960. In the United States, economic activity leveled off in the early months of the year and interest rates began to decline. In Western Europe, on the other hand, economic activity continued to boom and interest rates rose. For example, at the beginning of 1960, the yield on three-month U.S. Treasury bills was about 4½ per cent while the yield on an equivalent British security was around 3¾ per cent. By July, the British bill rate rose to 5½ per cent while ours fell to 2½ per cent. Under these conditions, it became profitable to shift funds from New York to foreign financial markets. The outward movement of short-term funds, which assumed very large proportions toward the end of last year, doubtless played its part in exciting speculation in favor of the British pound, mark, and other foreign currencies.

Nevertheless, the outflow of short-term capital in response to interest rate differentials, large though it was, is still not a complete explanation of recent misgivings about the dollar. Such an outflow is, after all, a familiar phenomenon when currencies are freely convertible, as they have again been of late. Since business cycles in different countries are frequently out of phase, their interest rates will also behave differently and short-term funds will therefore tend to move to markets in which interest rates are relatively high. Such movements of funds, however, are usually temporary and self-limiting, if only because business-cycle expansions or contractions are themselves usually of short dura-

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tion. Hence, movements of short-term capital are not apt to be taken seriously by the financial community—unless grounds exist for believing that a country's international accounts are out of balance for reasons of a more permanent character.

This, indeed, is the real source of all the questioning about the dollar of which the recent speculative flurry in the London gold market has been merely the most conspicuous symptom. For about a dozen years now, the United States has had a deficit in its international accounts. The reason for the deficit is not that our imports have been exceeding exports. On the contrary, we have steadily enjoyed a surplus in merchandise trade as well as on service transactions. The trouble is that, while these surpluses have usually been large, they have not been large enough to finance the substantial and increasing claims against them—namely, the expenditures we make abroad to maintain our military installations, our governmental grants or loans to other countries, and our investment of private capital abroad.

These pressures on the dollar largely reflect our nation's determined effort to hold back the menacing tide of communism. When the war ended much of Europe and Japan was in ruins. We realized that the economic aid we extended, to say nothing of our military expenditures abroad, could lead to a deficit in our balance of payments. Yet we were not concerned about such a development, since our gold stocks were more than enough for our needs. By running our international accounts at a deficit, we enabled the nations of Western Europe, Japan, and other countries to rebuild their monetary reserves. This aided the revival of their economies and eventually made possible the removal of most of their quotas on imports as well as exchange controls. These gains have greatly strengthened the Western world.

At the same time, by stretching out the deficits in the balance of payments, we have created uncertainty about the dollar and thereby taken a risk of undoing much of the constructive achievement since the war. In the last few years, the industrial countries of the world, with the possible exception of Great Britain, have no longer needed large additions to their monetary reserves. Nevertheless, the deficit in our balance of payments has persisted, and in fact has become larger. From 1951 to 1957 the annual deficit averaged about $1 billion. At its largest during those years, in 1953, it amounted to $2.1 billion. But the deficit

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reached $3.5 billion in 1958, rose to $3.8 billion in 1959, and remained at that level in 1960.

Since the receipts from our sale of goods, services, and securities to foreign countries have been steadily falling short of the sums we need to pay foreign countries, we have had to settle the balances due them, partly by drawing down our stocks of gold and partly by adding to the accumulation of dollars held here by foreigners. At the beginning of 1950, our stocks of gold amounted to $24.4 billion. At the beginning of 1958, they still totaled $22.8 billion. But during 1958 alone we lost $2.3 billion of gold, a sum exceeding the entire loss of the preceding eight years. During 1959 we lost another $1.1 billion and during 1960 another $1.7 billion. Nor is this all. While our stocks of gold have been diminishing, the quick claims on dollars accumulated here by foreigners have been mounting. At the end of 1948, they came to less than $8 billion. Six years later, they amounted to about $13 billion, and six years later still, or at the beginning of this year, to over $21 billion.

Thus, the United States has lately found itself in the position of a banker whose short-term liabilities are increasing steadily and rather rapidly, while his reserves keep dwindling. The persistence of this trend, especially the large size of the deficits in our balance of payments since 1958, is the fundamental cause of all the doubts that have arisen about the ability of the United States to avoid devaluation of the dollar. Since our gold stocks are now down to $17.4 billion, it is easy to understand that large yearly deficits cannot long continue.

No one can foresee all the consequences that would flow from a devaluation of the dollar, if events ever took this fateful turn, but it may nevertheless be salutary to try to visualize them. A devaluation would at once increase the purchasing power of Russia's gold in world markets. It would in time raise our domestic price level. It would impair, if not destroy, confidence in the dollar as an international reserve currency. It would be promptly followed by devaluation in other countries, probably in many of them. It would be attended by widespread economic unsettlement in our country and abroad. It could initiate a new era of competitive depreciation of national currencies. It might serve to regenerate exchange controls and quantitative restrictions on trade in some or many parts of the world. Worst of all, it would be exploited by communists as evidence that the

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Western economic order is crumbling. Since gold and the dollar have long been great symbols of economic strength and stability, what the Russians had to say about America would this time be believed not only by the ignorant masses but also by many conservative businessmen, bankers, journalists, and public officials the world over. Confidence in American political leadership would therefore diminish and even our firmest military alliances might become insecure.

The economic and political consequences of a devaluation of the dollar at this juncture of history would probably be so serious, perhaps so disastrous, that everything possible must be done—and I believe will be done—to prevent it. Fortunately, our gold stocks are still abundant.

President Kennedy's pledge to use, if needed, all of our gold stocks as well as other international reserves to protect the external value of the dollar has proved to be a reassuring influence. The recent hectic speculation in gold has now come to an end. Its price has returned to a normal level and, since March, there has been no further outflow of gold. Sentiment has also been aided by other developments. The balance of payments improved conspicuously in the first quarter of this year, partly as a result of rising exports. The mark and guilder have been revalued upward. Our monetary authorities and those of other nations have established closer coöperation. Foreign countries, notably West Germany, appear to be more willing to provide development capital for economically backward nations. And our own government has taken some decisive steps to manage its military and economic aid programs so that they will result in larger procurement of American goods.

Nevertheless, the crack of confidence which occurred last year has been only partly repaired. Doubts about the future of the dollar linger on. Although devaluation of the dollar is a remote contingency, such a possibility is nowadays frequently discussed by bankers, businessmen, and others. To be sure, when short-term movements of capital are left out of account, as may provisionally be done in judging future prospects, it appears that the balance of our international dealings improved considerably last year. Also, the measures already taken by the government, or being considered by the Congress, should help to reduce pressure on the balance of payments in the future. It is well to bear in mind, however, that our imports shrank last year in response

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to the recession, while our exports were favored by exceptional shipments of cotton and jet airplanes as well as by a great economic boom in Western Europe and Japan. The course of business cycles in our country and abroad could, before long, prove less favorable for our balance of payments. More important still, the international political situation has become so grave that no one can be sure whether our military expenditures abroad or our economic aid programs, large though they now are, may not soon need to be still larger.

Our balance of payments therefore remains in a precarious condition. Even on a more optimistic reckoning than I have been able to make, prudence would plainly require that we strive with still greater energy to rectify our balance of payments. It is in the nature of confidence, when it has once wavered, that doubts can be stirred the more easily in the future. Hence, within the limits imposed by our world-wide political responsibilities and our national philosophy of free enterprise, we must take every practicable action to minimize the risk of another crack of confidence in the dollar.

First of all, we need to mobilize every diplomatic resource we command to persuade other friendly industrial nations, most of which have been adding to their affluence as well as their monetary reserves, to assume a larger part of the cost of maintaining our common military installations abroad, to provide capital more liberally for the underdeveloped areas of the world, to reduce agricultural tariffs, and to drop their remaining restrictions on dollar trade as well as on capital investment and travel in the United States. Second, we should support President Kennedy's recommendation to revise those provisions of our tax laws which encourage the flow of American capital to tax havens abroad. Third, if Congressional action can be taken without prolonged debates, I think the present time is appropriate to reduce or eliminate the gold reserve requirement for Federal Reserve notes and deposits. This provision of law has not really served as a check against inflation in the postwar period, and I doubt whether it will serve that function in the near future. Since the dollar has now become vulnerable to tides of sentiment, our rôle of international banker requires that we be in a position to use our gold stocks to protect the dollar against any speculative raid.

In addition to these political actions—and in the long run far

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more important than any of them—we must conduct our domestic economic affairs so that our level of costs and prices stops rising. More specifically, we need to conduct our affairs so that the excess of our exports over imports will be large enough to enable us to discharge effectively the great international responsibilities which have been forced upon us by the course of history. Protective devices for enlarging an export surplus—such as higher tariffs, import quotas, exchange controls, or export subsidies—would inevitably lead to retaliation if we resorted to them on any appreciable scale. They would therefore weaken our international political position and might aggravate our export problem instead of solving it. The only constructive path open to us is to produce the right goods and to offer them at the right prices.

However, as many of you know from direct experience, the enlargement of our exports will not prove an easy task in the present state of world competition. Let me cite a few statistics on recent trends in foreign trade.

In 1955 exports of semifinished steel were 15 per cent of the steel industry's shipments of this product, while imports were only 4½ per cent of total supply. By 1960, these percentages for exports and imports were reversed. In the case of reinforcing bars the percentage exported fell from about 3½ to less than 1 between 1955 and 1960. Meanwhile, the percentage of imports rose from 7 to 19. In the case of barbed wire, exports were negligible both in 1955 and 1960. Imports, however, rose from 35 to 53 per cent of the total supply. Similar but less dramatic shifts have occurred in the foreign trade of structural shapes, plates, and other products.

Taking all steel products together, exports, on the average, exceeded imports by about 4 million tons per year during 1946-50. In the next five years, the average excess of exports fell to about 2 million tons and, in the quinquennium which just ended, to only a little over 1 million tons. In the six months ending this March, steel exports merely equaled the imported tonnage, though in dollar terms we still had a small export surplus.

The steel industry has not been alone in feeling the pinch of foreign competition. Although the United States remains the primary exporter of manufactured goods, our leadership in world markets is nowadays being challenged steadily, widely, and often successfully. In 1950, we exported $3.63 worth of finished

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manufactures for every dollar of manufactured imports. This margin of competitive advantage fell to $3.51 in 1952, to $3.39 in 1954, to $2.89 in 1956, to $2.40 in 1958, and to $1.99 in 1960.

Of course, these summary figures cover up a great diversity of individual experience. It is worth noting, however, that the broad trend has been similar for two major categories of manufactures, first, consumer goods other than foodstuffs, second, capital equipment. In the case of consumer goods our exports exceeded imports by 30 per cent or better between 1950 and 1954. In the last four years, on the other hand, our exports have been consistently below imports, and the gap between them has widened progressively, so that by 1960 we exported only 54 cents worth for every dollar of imports. We have done much better, of course, in the case of capital equipment where our competitive advantage has remained enormous. However, while we exported $10.40 worth of capital equipment for every dollar of imported equipment in 1960, our exports per dollar of imports were as much as $16.57 in 1955 and $26.26 in 1950.

This factual recital of recent trends in the foreign trade of manufactures should help us to think realistically about the obstacles businessmen will encounter in trying, as our national interest clearly requires, to enlarge export markets. The currents of world trade have changed swiftly during the past 10 to 15 years. The nations of Western Europe and Japan, which were near collapse at the end of the war, have now rebuilt, modernized, diversified, and greatly enlarged their manufacturing capacity. Their industrial productivity has been increasing more rapidly than ours. A newly found vitality, a new spirit of enterprise, characterizes their business communities. Their business firms are now penetrating markets, including our own, from which they were practically excluded by the abnormal conditions that prevailed during the 1930's and 1940's. They are now penetrating markets which they previously did not care to cultivate or know how to cultivate, in spite of conditions of supply—especially the cost of labor—which were frequently in their favor. Moreover, some of these nations have learned to manage their economy so that their price level is reasonably stable. For all these reasons, their competitive power in world markets, including our own, has tended to grow. Not a few American businessmen, alert to the course of events, have aided this process by building plants abroad, thereby sharing in the resurgence of

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the European economy but, at the same time, also adding to the difficulties facing other American producers.

The competitive power of Western Europe and Japan has thus not only been restored to its prewar level, as we hoped it would, but it has been substantially strengthened. This too would have been to our national advantage if we had responded to the competitive challenge by keeping down our costs and prices. Instead, money wages have risen much faster than the general advance of productivity during the postwar period. The trend of prices, in both consumer and wholesale markets, has also been upward. Between 1953 and 1959, the export prices of our manufactured products apparently rose, on the average, by about 16 per cent, while the export prices of manufactured products of other industrial countries either fell, on the average, or rose much less. Relative price movements of various steel products, machinery, and transportation equipment have been especially to our nation's disadvantage during these critical years. And while it is true that our textile prices declined between 1953 and 1959, they fell still more in Japan and other textile-producing countries, although not in Great Britain.

There is a clear and simple lesson to be drawn from recent trends in world trade and prices, namely, that unless our domestic cost and price levels are kept from rising, it will be difficult to keep our export surplus even at its present level. To be sure, American businessmen have not always been sufficiently alert to the latent needs of domestic consumers, to say nothing of foreign needs, tastes, and marketing conditions. To be sure, trade fairs, overseas trade centers, more effective export credits, and promotional campaigns can contribute to the improvement of our export trade. Our government and many businesses are properly increasing effort in these directions. The decisive weapon of commerce, however, is the ability to price wares competitively. Unless American producers can do so to a greater degree, the pressure on our balance of payments is likely to continue and uncertainty about the dollar's future may spread.

I drew a grim picture earlier of the effects that a devaluation of the dollar would have on our international prestige. Let me add that, if confidence in the dollar should deteriorate—if many people in this country or abroad become fearful that the dollar will sooner or later have to be devalued—then, nothing in the world will be able to prevent the devaluation from taking place.

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The struggle against inflation must therefore go on with increased vigor and understanding. Since the passage of the Employment Act in 1946, we have elected to live, and I think rightly so, under conditions that never deviate far from full employment. Such an economy cannot benefit to any appreciable degree from the readjustments of costs and prices that occurred in earlier times during business depressions. Such an economy is always on or close to the threshold of inflation. Hence, unless the government moves prudently in increasing the money supply and its own rate of spending; unless trade union officials keep their demands for wage increases from exceeding improvements in general productivity; unless the government refrains from passing laws that raise wages or prices; unless business firms and trade unions join in efforts to remove restrictive labor practices and the featherbedding in which both executives and workers sometimes indulge; unless the government reforms our tax system in the interest of stimulating greater effort, more productive investment, and higher efficiency; unless businessmen innovate vigorously and lower prices whenever possible; unless these things are done, and a liberal policy towards imports is continued, we will not avoid new and successive rounds of inflation.

I do not know what the future will bring. But I do know that there is a widespread conviction among responsible citizens, both within and outside government, that inflation must be halted. If, in spite of this widespread concern, many government officials, trade union leaders, and businessmen continue in the ways to which they have become accustomed, they will do so only because they have not yet grasped the truth that a dollar in which people have full confidence is as vital to our national security as are planes and missiles. There is still time to learn and practice this truth.

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THE UNITED STATES AND THE ADMISSION OF COMMUNIST CHINA

IMMINENCE OF CHANGE

THE United States is alone among the nations in its commitment to defend the domain of Chiang Kai-shek. And not much longer may it hope to prevent admission of Communist China to the United Nations. Those nations willing to vote for Peking's admission have steadily grown in number from year to year. With the admission of the new African nations in the past year, a tidal wave of pro-Peking sentiment on this issue threatens to make Communist China's entry inevitable. Asian opinion already is overwhelmingly against United States policy of non-recognition and non-admission, a fact adverse to United States prestige in that continent. Even Great Britain, its staunchest ally, is abandoning the United States on this question.

Meanwhile, relations between the United States and Mainland China have been mutually and intensely hostile. Whether in Laos, the Taiwan Strait, or Korea, the danger of war between the two is real. So tempestuous is American public opinion, that those still bitterly opposed to the United Nations possibly could cause United States withdrawal from that body upon Communist China's admission, a possibility—however remote—which would doom the world organization. If, on the other hand, Mao's China remains indefinitely outside the United Nations, this too could spell the doom of that organization. Such is the dilemma in which the United States finds itself.

Imminently facing the United States, therefore, is the necessity of revising its policy toward the conflict of Chinese representation in the United Nations between Communist China and Nationalist China. Presumably, basic requisites of a changed policy would be to (1) reduce dangers inherent in the current United States posture, (2) still safeguard Western security and interests and the growing strength of the United Nations, and (3) not further alienate the uncommitted nations. Such a policy revision is the subject of the following analysis.

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BACKGROUND OF DILEMMA

Origins

Chiang's Republic of China is a charter member of the United Nations, having signed the Organization Charter at San Francisco on June 26, 1945, followed by its ratification on September 28, 1945. China is legally entitled to United Nations representation, so long as obstructive action is not taken by the Security Council, or its membership rights and privileges are not suspended under Article 5 of the Charter. From 1946 to the present, the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China has been accredited as the representative of China in the United Nations.

By the end of 1949, however, the effective control of the Nationalist Government was reduced by civil war to the island of Taiwan, the Pescadores, and a few offshore islands including Quemoy and Matsu. Thereafter, Mainland China has been controlled by the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. In the new capital of Peking, in October, 1949, the establishment of the new Republic was proclaimed by Mao Tse-tung, head of the Communist party, as "the sole legal Government representing all the people of the People's Republic of China," and he indicated willingness to establish diplomatic relations with other nations.

Bid for Admission

Shortly thereafter, November 13, 1949, Communist China made its first bid for China's seat in the United Nations, by sending a radio message to the United Nations repudiating the Nationalist delegation. This renunciation was received by United Nations officials November 18th, and was treated as a non-United Nations government message not to be circulated among member delegations except upon request of a delegation. Peking sent further telegrams demanding that the "illegal delegates of the Chinese Kuomintang reactionary clique" be expelled by the "legal delegates" of the Central People's Government.

It is to be noted that the United Nations Charter was signed for the "State of China" since only "states" may become members of the United Nations. The Communist Government of China calls itself the "Central People's Government of the

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People's Republic of China." Thus, China under this government has adopted a name different from that under which it became an original member of the world body under Article 3 of the Charter, and a permanent member of the Security Council under Article 23, paragraph 1.

In international law, a state has the right to change its name. The Charter does not restrict this right, even with respect to a permanent member of the Security Council mentioned under a definite name in Article 23 of the Charter. The mere change of title, therefore, does not necessarily involve the creation of a new Chinese state, nor does it necessarily create the status of a nonmember of the United Nations whose admission might be subject to veto in the Security Council. Prior to the Chinese question, there had not been one single instance of a challenge of credentials of a representative. And the matter was further complicated by the General Assembly's finding that Communist China itself committed aggression by directly aiding those "already committing aggression in Korea and by engaging in hostilities against the United Nations forces there."

Security Council

On January 10, 1950, the Soviet delegation submitted a resolution to the Security Council demanding that the Kuomintang representative's credentials not be recognized and that he be expelled from the Security Council. The U.S.S.R. delegation also declared its intention to withdraw from the Security Council if this were not done. At the time, the President of the Security Council was the representative of Nationalist China who ruled to have the Soviet proposal printed and considered at a special meeting. Russia then challenged his legal right to serve as President at all, but the Council President's ruling was sustained by eight votes to two with one abstention. The Soviet representative thereupon walked out. In spite of his previous threat of non-participation, he returned for subsequent meetings until his resolution was rejected by a vote of six to three with two abstentions. Again he walked out, only to return as President of the Security Council at its 480th meeting in August, 1950, shortly after the onset of the Korean War and United Nations intervention, when he moved to make another ruling to exclude the Kuomintang representative from the Council. After a short debate, this Soviet proposal also was lost, eight votes to three.

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Regardless of these initial reversals, the Soviet pressure was not without influence. At the opening of its fifth session the following month, in September, 1950, the General Assembly was confronted with four draft resolutions on the matter of Chinese representation, two proposed by the U.S.S.R., as expected, but one also proposed by India and another by Canada. And so the issue was shifted to the General Assembly where it was to remain for a decade and more.

General Assembly

The Indian draft resolution called for the recognition by the General Assembly of the Communist Government as the functioning Chinese Government. It was rejected, 33 votes to 16 with 10 abstentions. The two Soviet draft resolutions likewise failed, 37 to 11 with 8 abstentions. But the Canadian resolution met greater success. The first part of its resolution called for referring the question of Chinese representation to a special *ad hoc* committee, which was adopted, 38 to 6 with 11 abstentions. The second part resolved that the Nationalist Government retain its seat in the General Assembly pending its decision on the report of the special committee, which also was adopted, 42 to 8 with 6 nations abstaining.

The so-called Ad Hoc Political Committee reported in December, 1950, and recommended that the question of representation of a member state, in cases where more than one authority claim to be the government legally entitled to represent it, be considered "in the light of the purposes and principles of the Charter and the circumstances of each case," and that the other United Nations organs should take into account the General Assembly's attitude. But it was added that this attitude of itself should not affect the direct relations of the individual member states with the state concerned. This draft resolution was adopted, 36 to 6 with 9 abstentions. This was the end of the matter for the crucial year of 1950, the year in which the Korean War began.

On November 13, 1951, the General Assembly approved the General Committee's recommendation to postpone consideration of a Soviet bid to include the Chinese question on the agenda for the General Assembly and any further proposals to this end during its sixth regular session. It was emphasized that the time was neither opportune nor appropriate for consideration and that circumstances had not substantially changed. Obvi-

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ously, the Korean War had complicated the picture. This recommendation was adopted, 37 to 11 with 4 abstentions.

Similar proposals were adopted by the General Assembly at each of its subsequent sessions from 1952 through 1960. The voting, with abstentions indicated by parentheses, follows:

1952:	7th session—42-7	(11)
1953:	8th session—44-10	(2)
1954:	9th session—43-11	(6)
1955:	10th session—42-12	(6)
1956:	11th session—47-24	(8)
1957:	12th session—47-27	(7)
1958:	13th session—44-28	(9)
1959:	14th session—44-29	(9)
1960:	15th session—42-34	(22)

Meanwhile, Congressional opposition to admission of Communist China has remained firm. On August 17, 1959, the House of Representatives so resolved by a vote of 368 to 2 with 2 abstentions.

The question of Chinese representation has been postponed for each of the past eleven years. The General Assembly has been divided into four discernible but changing groups.

First, there are a few countries like the United Kingdom which have recognized Communist China but have deferred their support of admission pending appropriate conditions. But this group, very small to begin with, is diminishing, for early in 1961 the United Kingdom served notice that it will vote in favor of admission.

Secondly, there is a growing number of nations, principally underdeveloped nations that do not yet recognize Communist China, which have withheld their votes for considering its admission by abstaining on the question, thus avoiding for the time being alignment with either side in the "Cold War." Many, if not most of this group, numbering 22 in 1960, may well vote in favor of consideration of admission in the near future.

Thirdly, there is another growing group of nations, all but a few of which have recognized Communist China, which favors its admission. This group includes all United Nations members of the Communist bloc, plus some studiously neutral nations like India.

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And finally, there is another group of nations, including the United States, which neither recognize Mainland China nor favor its admission. While the number of nations in this group has remained remarkably stable through the past decade, its percentage of total United Nations membership has declined markedly in the past five years. Defections from this group likewise are imminent, as Brazil for one recently has given notice of such intention. Canada and some other Commonwealth nations probably will follow the new British lead on this question, while Mexico and some other Latin American countries may well follow Brazil.[1]

Legal Question

To the question who has the legal right to decide what government should represent a member state in the United Nations, two different answers are given: (1) the member state itself, and (2) the United Nations.

Argument that the member state has such a legal right is based on the premise of sovereign equality of states. That is to say, every state under international law has the right to determine who is authorized to represent it abroad and what form of government it shall have, as well as the right to change that government at will. According to this reasoning as applied to the Chinese question, the term "member state" (China) should be taken to mean the government in effective control of its people and

[1] The 1960 Roll Call of the General Assembly on the draft resolution for postponement of the question of Chinese representation: *In Favor* (42): Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China (Nationalist), Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iran, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands*, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Pakistan*, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom*, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela; *Against* (34): Afghanistan*, Albania*, Bulgaria*, Burma*, Byelorussian S.S.R.*, Cambodia*, Ceylon*, Cuba*, Czechoslovakia*, Denmark*, Ethiopia, Finland*, Ghana*, Guinea*, Hungary*, India*, Indonesia*, Iraq*, Ireland*, Mali*, Morocco*, Nepal*, Nigeria, Norway*, Poland*, Romania*, Senegal, Sudan*, Sweden*, Ukranian S.S.R.*, U.S.S.R.*, U.A.R.*, Yemen*, Yugoslavia*; *Abstentions* (22): Austria, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Cyprus, Dahomey, Federation of Malaya, Gabon, Iceland, Israel*, Ivory Coast, Laos, Libya, Madagascar, Niger, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Togo, Tunisia, Upper Volta. (Asterisks indicate those which have recognized Communist China.)

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territory (Communist Chinese Government) rather than its recognized government (Nationalist Government), because a member state in the United Nations (State of China) cannot compel other member states in that body to recognize a particular government (Communist Chinese Government). A people can express themselves in an international organization only through an organized government to which they have accorded the right to represent them abroad.

In this particular case, the member state involved is China. At the time it became a member of the United Nations, the organized government of the people of the State of China was the Nationalist Government. This government is no longer in effective control of the territory or the people of the State of China. Hence, according to this argument, the Nationalist Government no longer represents the Chinese people who constitute the State of China; it merely represents that part of the Chinese people who live in Taiwan. Therefore, as the case stands, the State of China has only nominal representation in the United Nations. There is no substantive Chinese representation in that body.

The rationale that the United Nations should decide who may represent one of its member states rests on identification of the right of a member state to representation with the right of the organs of the United Nations to approve credentials. Credentials may accredit the powers conferred by a government on its representatives. Representation is the right of a government to act on behalf of the state.

So far as the United Nations is concerned, each United Nations organ has the legal right to approve the credentials presented to it. This is essential for the integrity of these organs in the exercise of their functions. These determinations have been *pro forma,* however, which have not involved consideration of the legitimacy of constitutional or legal powers of the government of the member state granting the credentials. The right to decide who shall represent a member state in an international organization rests with the member state itself, and, in this sense, it is unsound to confuse the right of a state to representation by its government with the right of the organs of the United Nations to approve credentials. In order for the State of China, however, to have substantive, rather than nominal, representation in the United Nations, the various organs of that body must

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approve the credentials of the Communist Chinese Government while refusing the credentials of the Nationalist Government.

UNITED STATES POSITION

From the beginning of the dispute over Chinese representation, the United States relentlessly has supported postponement of the question, ostensibly until time and circumstances prove favorable for its consideration. Not content with merely casting its vote, the United States has been unflagging in taking the active initiative in securing each postponement. By assuming the leading rôle, the United States has posed itself as the major obstacle to Communist China's admission.

Major Considerations

United States policy has been strongly committed to the maximum isolation of Communist China and the full recognition of the National Government on Taiwan as the Government of China. Toward the Mainland, the core of United States policy is composed of: (1) political nonrecognition, (2) economic embargo, and (3) opposition to almost all forms of interaction between the non-Communist world and Communist China, including opposition to its admission to the United Nations. Political nonrecognition is entirely a United States or unilateral decision. Economic embargo, however, involves consideration of other nations, few of which have followed this lead. And, furthermore, opposition to all forms of interaction requires active coöperation of other nations as well as substantial international support—coöperation and support which are rapidly waning.

Numerous reasons have been given in defense of this policy, but its major themes have been set forth in a recent study prepared for the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate, as follows:

a) The recognition of Communist China in any degree or form is not in the national interest of the United States because that Government has shown implacable hostility to us, is guilty of grossly immoral actions, is dedicated to the establishment of world communism, and has given no indication of being willing to fulfill its international obligations.

b) Communist China stands condemned as an aggressor by the United Nations, and any recognition or admission to the United

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Nations would seriously damage the meaning and effectiveness of that body. Moreover, it would result in the weakening or destruction of the Republic of China to which we are committed.

c) We cannot see clearly into the future at this time. It is always possible that Communist China will collapse or that some colossal upheaval will take place. We can afford to wait.

d) If we were to shift our China policy, it would be taken as a sign of weakness or capitulation by many of the free peoples of the world, and particularly the weak nations of Asia which look to our firmness for support. By our unyielding stand, we have bolstered the Asian will to resist.

e) There is some basis for treating the Soviet Union differently from Communist China. There are signs indicating that the Soviet Union for various reasons may be interested in an accommodation with the United States, but Communist China is in an entirely different era and mood.

The underlying assumption for this China policy is that upon which all fundamentals of United States foreign policy are predicated, namely, that international "Communist imperialism" threatens the freedom of the world. Accordingly, great importance is attached to the assumed threat to the non-Communist nations of Asia which—because of their proximity to Communist China—are "peculiarly vulnerable to the Communist offensive."

To characterize United States policy so resolutely does not preclude the probability of change. Indeed, the Department of State has always been careful to emphasize that its China policy reflects "a continuing appraisal of all available facts," and that it is "not an inflexible policy which cannot be altered to meet changed situations."

That the present policy of containment through isolation faces imminent change appears a foregone conclusion, in the light of the probable admission of Communist China. Moreover, the study prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended change to a policy of "exploration and negotiation" with Communist China, after rejecting the alternative approach of "normalization of relations" as not feasible in the foreseeable future. President Kennedy already has responded —though without success—to the first proposal, recommended by the study, to initiate "stage one" of the "exploration and negotiation" approach: "an offer for the mutual exchange of journalists with Communist China."

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Response to Communist Power

Future American response to Communist China must be conditioned in part by the power which that nation generates. As Communist power increases, the more difficult becomes the United States policy of isolation and containment. Besides the obvious fact that roughly one fifth of the world's population is under control of Mao's government, economic development has been impressive. Despite current agricultural distress and inflated production claims, spectacular achievements have been recorded in grain, steel and coal production. China's increasing impact on world trade, moreover, makes the United States economic embargo less effective.

The authority of the Communist party has been supreme and unchallengeable. By use of many psychological-emotional appeals, internal opposition to the party and to communism generally is unlikely to reach challenging proportions. With the largest army in the Asian-African world, Communist forces already may have Russian rockets at their disposal. How soon Mao's China may claim nuclear capability is speculative, but the implications to the world of achievements already registered cannot be overstated. Add to these an energetic foreign policy projected beyond Asia to Africa and even Latin America, an aggressive posture along its perimeter, and a powerful ally in the Soviet Union, and the power of Communist China seems likely to produce a new response in United States foreign policy.

Criteria for Change

What, then, are the assumptions or criteria upon which a basic change in United States foreign policy must be predicated? The United States must assume that the Peking regime exercises effective control over the whole of China, with the exceptions of the islands of Taiwan, the Pescadores, Quemoy and Matsu. There is no basis for disputing its *de facto* control of China any more than for disputing the Moscow regime's control over the Soviet peoples. Neither is there sufficient evidence to assume deterioration or collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance, though obviously a transformation is taking place. American policy cannot be based on such vain hopes.

It must be assumed, of course, that the United States desires to avoid military conflict with the Communist Chinese. But

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another criterion for change is to attempt to stem the tide of Communist Chinese influence among uncommitted peoples of Asia. This does not mean that the United States must forsake Taiwan, but it does ordain recognition of these crucial facts: (1) the Nationalist military force, though more than adequate to defend Taiwan, is less than adequate to engage the Communists on the continent, and (2) the possibility of Communist China's collapse is so remote as to merit little weight in United States policy considerations. In short, any policy change by the United States must begin with this basic assumption—that Communist China is an emerging world power with which the United States must deal whether or not the United States approves of the Communist regime. So far, intermittent contacts in Warsaw and through third powers have proved unavailing.

ISSUES FOR DECISION

Any change in United States policy toward Communist China's admission requires objective and logical consideration of these basic issues: (1) Is the problem of Chinese representation in the United Nations distinguishable from the question of recognition, or—in other words—are the questions of admission and recognition separable? (2) Is a change of Chinese representation in the United Nations so likely to impair the security of the Western alliance that the alliance, including the United States, should exert every effort to prevent or delay consideration of this matter? (3) What position should the United States take toward the substantive matter of representation? (4) What procedure should the United States adopt to implement this decision?

Admission and Recognition

Is admission of Communist China to the United Nations capable of being isolated from the question of recognition of the government of that nation? Either the issue of admission can or cannot be divorced from the question of recognition.

Arguments that the issues cannot be divorced (i.e., that recognition must also be considered) are these: (1) Common criteria for both recognition of a new government and its representation in the United Nations are its ability to carry out international obligations and to maintain effective control over its national territory and population. (2) Admission to the United Nations

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constitutes an involuntary step toward recognition of a new government, because all members of that organization, regardless of whether they voted for or against its admission, are under definite obligations toward that government. (3) Approval of credentials of a representative by the General Assembly, Security Council, or any other United Nations organ necessarily implies that the respective United Nations organ considers the government which issued the credentials as the legitimate government of that member state. All members of the approving body are bound by this decision. Accordingly, they violate their United Nations Charter obligations if they refuse to consider that government as the legitimate government of the member state concerned. (4) Both representation and recognition indicate the political orientation of the grantor; both involve physical, political, legal, moral and social considerations.

Arguments that the issues of admission and recognition are separable (hence, recognition need not be considered) are these: (1) Criteria for recognition are not the same as criteria for admission to the United Nations because the former are based on political considerations whereas the latter need not be based on these considerations. (2) It is an unquestioned fact that the government of a state is separable from the state itself. Under international law, recognition of a government is not requisite for that government to represent and bind the state it purports to bind. (3) By unbroken practice, the members of the United Nations have made it clear that a member government may vote to accept a representative of a government which it does not recognize and that such a vote does not imply recognition. The Federation of Malaya has declared its intention to favor Communist China's admission to the United Nations while, at the same time, to withhold its recognition of that government. (4) Recognition is not essential for the conduct of business between member states in the United Nations. (5) Separation of the problem of representation from that of recognition, which is essentially a political question, would give the United States greater freedom of action. (6) Linking the two problems together is "unfortunate from the practical standpoint and wrong from the standpoint of legal theory."

It is our judgment that the questions of recognition and admission are separable. Should the General Assembly vote to admit Mainland China to the United Nations, no recognition

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of the Communist Chinese Government by the United States thereby is implied. Representation in the United Nations does not depend upon any numerical count of members of the General Assembly which recognize Mao's government or any government, nor does it depend upon recognition of a government by the respective councils of the United Nations. If this were so, continuing adjustments would have to be made in United Nations organs according to the recognitions, accorded by one government to other governments, which are outstanding at any given moment. Recognition of a new government of an existing state is an individual and unilateral act which a member state may or may not accord as it chooses. Any argument, therefore, which holds that recognition is a condition of admission appears inadmissible from both legal and practical considerations. The problem of Chinese representation in the United Nations should be divorced from the question of recognition and solved as a separate issue.

Western Security

A second major issue is whether change of Chinese representation in the United Nations would so impair Western security as to induce members of the Western alliance to exert every effort to delay or prevent consideration of such a change.

Arguments that consideration would jeopardize Western security and should be prevented are these: (1) Change of Chinese representation is a highly controversial issue requiring considerable time which should be devoted to other world problems. (2) Consideration of Chinese representation would not further the successful activity of the United Nations. Indeed, it would weaken that organization by widening the chasm between the Communist bloc and the Western powers; it would create difficulties and differences among the members of the Western alliance itself; and it would cause ill effects among neutral and uncommitted nations. (3) Whatever can be said in support of consideration of the issue, consideration is not yet timely; in any event "no" does not mean "never." (4) Avoiding consideration of the issue presents less risk than dealing with the substantive question of Communist China's admission concerning which existing differences are so grave, particularly between East and West, that both the United Nations and Western security would be adversely affected.

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Arguments that consideration poses less threat to Western security than does further delay or continuance of the current deadlock (hence the United States should not obstruct consideration) are these: (1) All issues considered by the General Assembly are controversial. The Assembly's prestige can ill afford further delay; neither can its attention to other pressing issues. (2) The issue will not disappear simply because the General Assembly refuses to consider it. Rejection of consideration results in postponement of an urgent issue. (3) Prevention, or further delay, of consideration provides a basis for effectively hostile propaganda against the West, particularly the United States, and thereby increases tensions in the General Assembly. (4) Avoidance of a question involving a nation of the importance of Communist China is unrealistic and detrimental to the cause of world peace. (5) Inclusion of this item on the agenda of the General Assembly will help reduce suspicion and tension. Both sides to the issue could establish their cases before the world. The substantive view of the majority would be determined. Greater delay will cause greater embarrassment to those opposing the inevitable.

Since Great Britain and other members of the Western alliance are defecting from the United States position, it appears that further avoidance of consideration of the question of Mainland China's admission can only cause a greater, rather than a lesser, threat to Western security. Accordingly, inclusion of this item on the General Assembly agenda should be permitted.

Alternatives for the United States

Assuming that the substantive question of Communist China's admission soon will be considered by the General Assembly, what should be the United States position? There appear four alternative courses of action confronting the United States. These alternatives are: First, continuation of the present policy of isolation and containment. Secondly, the United States could advocate a "two-Chinas" policy which could take one of two forms: (1) keep the Nationalist Chinese Government in the Security Council, while restricting the Communist Chinese Government merely to a seat in the General Assembly, or (2) the converse of this, through approval of the respective Chinese governments by the respective organ or council of the United Nations. Thirdly, the United States could advocate seating both Chinese

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governments in the General Assembly, while seating another Asian nation in the Security Council in the place of the Nationalist Chinese Government. Finally, the United States could permit seating the Chinese Communist Government in all organs of the United Nations, while advocating the admission of Taiwan to United Nations membership as an independent state. Each of these four alternatives merits careful evaluation.

Continuing isolation. Arguments which support continuation of present United States policy of squarely opposing admission of the Communist Government are these: (1) Opposing admission is in the national interest of the United States. Admission would not benefit the non-Communist world, but it would benefit the Peking regime by enhancing its international prestige and facilitating its influence in international affairs. (2) Having branded the Communist Government as an aggressor in Korea, its admission now would be a confession of United Nations weakness which would reduce the prospect of future United Nations actions against aggressors. (3) Should the United States disavow its opposition to admission, the Nationalist Chinese Government would be forsaken. Opposition to Peking's admission is consistent with both the Charter declaration, that only "peace-loving" nations may become United Nations members, and other United States policies as, for example, support of the Republic of Korea, not the Communist Government of North Korea; support of South Vietnam, not Communist North Vietnam; and support of the Federal Republic of Germany, not the Communist regime of East Germany. Not only those Asian nations actively supported by the United States, but also uncommitted Asian nations, likewise would be forsaken by a favorable United States policy toward Communist China's admission. (4) United States isolation of Peking serves the interests of the Chinese people, because it is a realistic response to the fact that the Communists illegally are entrenched on the Mainland—a fact which neither calls for nor warrants Peking's representation in the United Nations.

Arguments that the United States should abandon its policy of opposing admission of Mao's Government are these: (1) Admission should be considered and favored as merely a diplomatic technicality and not as an act of moral judgment. (2) By isolating Communist China, the United States isolates itself in terms of influencing the direction of that nation. With its

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admission to the United Nations, Communist China thereby will be exposed to United States influence. Negotiations of Asian disputes require an institutionalized framework of which Communist China is a part. (3) There can be no effective agreements on disarmament, arms controls, or nuclear testing unless Communist China participates in their formulation and is bound by their terms. These are major practical and moral considerations ordaining United Nations membership of Communist China which override whatever moral principles the United States can claim in support of its policy of isolation and containment. Otherwise, Communist China, with its enormous population and resources, will be free to pursue a unilateral path toward world war and catastrophe. Though its admission would involve rights, it also would involve obligations and responsibilities. (4) Asian opinion overwhelmingly is against United States opposition to admission, including Communist China, India, Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon, and Cambodia. Outside of Taiwan, the United States policy has been supported in the United Nations by only two populous nations, Pakistan and Japan, both of which are defecting, plus the smaller Asian states of Thailand and the Philippines.

It is our judgment that arguments supporting a change of United States policy outweigh those favoring continuation of United States opposition to Communist China's admission.

A "two-Chinas" policy. Should the United States advocate a "two-Chinas" policy of keeping the Nationalist Chinese Government in the Security Council and seating the Communist Government in the General Assembly, or the converse of this arrangement? Arguments that the United States should advocate such a policy are these: (1) A "two-Chinas" policy is realistic and would reduce East-West tensions. (2) Two Chinas in the United Nations would probably be acceptable to other member nations. (3) With representation in either the General Assembly or the Security Council, Communist China would be obliged to assume responsibilities of a member nation; it would not be free to pursue its objectives without regard for world opinion. (4) This policy would help ease the problem of trade relations with Mainland China. (5) Though the existence of two Chinas in the United Nations would cause complications and probably would add difficult issues to the agenda of the General Assembly,

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such issues already confront the Assembly and it is the *raison d'être* of the United Nations to solve them.

Arguments that the United States should not advocate a "two-Chinas" policy are these: (1) Seating of Communist China in the General Assembly inevitably would cause it to be seated in all organs of the United Nations, except perhaps the Security Council where possibly a veto could bar its entry. (2) Seating of Communist China in the Security Council would add another Communist veto to that body and hence impair the Council's ability to discharge its responsibilities under the Charter. (3) Whether Communist China is seated either in the General Assembly or the Security Council, Nationalist China would certainly suffer, and most member nations are likely to see little practical value in Nationalist China any longer having a seat in the Security Council. (4) Regardless of the arrangement, neither Peking nor Taipei would accept a "two-Chinas" policy. If such an accommodation were imposed on these two powers, constant friction would result, and United States-Nationalist China relations would be impaired. (5) Communist China will not accept any solution short of its admission together with expulsion of Nationalist China. (6) Communist China's admission would encourage overseas Chinese in Asia to forego any support of Taiwan and to engage in subversion of the ability and will of those Asian nations in which they live to resist Communist pressures.

It is our judgment that the United States should not advocate a "two-Chinas" policy. To have one China in the Security Council and the other in the General Assembly would cause the Nationalist Government to withdraw its participation in the United Nations or face humiliating consequences. If the Nationalist Government chose to retain its seat in the General Assembly, it would be threatened with being voted out; if it kept its seat in the Security Council, it would have retained it only by virtue of a veto. In either event, an impossibly embarrassing position would result for the Nationalist Government.

Another Asian nation. A third alternative for United States policy is to propose seating both Chinas in the General Assembly, while seating another Asian nation in the Security Council in place of China.

Arguments favoring this course of action are these: (1) A question of preference between the two Chinas for representation in

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the Security Council would be avoided. (2) Both those nations allied with the United States and uncommitted nations would find such a policy less objectionable than some other alternatives. (3) Tensions created by the deadlock on the issue of Chinese representation thereby would be eased.

Arguments against this proposal are these: (1) Keeping Communist China, with its over 600 million population, out of the Security Council would produce no tangible benefits. (2) To eliminate Chinese representation in the Security Council would require a Charter amendment which would occasion further United Nations tensions and widen East-West differences. Once the Charter undergoes consideration for any revision, moreover, opportunity is provided for the Soviet attempt to replace the office of the Secretary General with a triumvirate secretariat, a proposal opposed by the West. (3) Such a proposal easily could be defeated on a procedural basis and would be opposed by Communist bloc members. (4) Neither China, moreover, would tolerate such a solution. (5) Besides these objections, it is highly unlikely that agreement could be reached as to what other Asian nation, if any, should be seated in the Security Council. India would be a logical candidate, but such a decision would be very difficult.

A proposal for another Asian nation in China's seat in the Security Council must fail because of procedural obstacles, if for no other reason. We have already observed that for the Chinese Communist Government to be seated in the Security Council, it is necessary for the Council to accept its credentials while refusing those of the Nationalist Government. But for a permanent member state of the Security Council (now represented by the Nationalist Government in the case of China), as distinguished from a government, to cease being a permanent member, it is necessary for that state to either withdraw on its own accord or be expelled. China as a member state, however, could not be expelled except with its consent. The *number* of permanent, as well as non-permanent, members of the Security Council is determined by Article 23 of the Charter, and this number may be changed only by amendment of the Charter in conformity with amendment procedures of either Articles 108 or 109. Under Article 108, ordinary amendment requires a two-thirds vote of the members of the General Assembly including votes in favor of, or not against, amendment by all permanent members

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of the Security Council. The difficulty of attaining this majority on the Chinese question is apparent. Article 109 ordains the same procedure to obtain a general conference review of the Charter. Considering the rigid positions on the Chinese question among permanent members of the Security Council (United States, United Kingdom, France, Soviet Union, China), a proposal for another Asian state to take China's seat in the Security Council is impractical.

The State of Taiwan. A fourth alternative for United States policy is to permit the seating of the Peking Government in all organs of the United Nations as the representative of China proper, while bringing pressure for the admission of Taiwan to the United Nations as an independent member state.

Many arguments support this alternative, as follows: (1) It represents a permanent solution which could gain the support of most member nations. (2) By permitting this course of action, the United States would avoid the embarrassment of being outvoted. (3) It is a realistic solution which responds to national interests of major non-Communist Asian nations (viz., India, Indonesia). (4) It provides an institutionalized framework for dealing with Communist China. Otherwise, the United Nations would remain handicapped as a forum and mediator with respect to Asian crises. (5) Solutions to other problems would be possible, such as a plebiscite in Korea and an end to a state of war between Chiang's and Mao's regimes. (6) Taiwan could be admitted as a new member state or possibly its membership could be regarded as that of an already recognized government with a changed designation. The Communist Government's admission to all organs could be contingent upon its accepting and respecting the integrity and legitimacy of the Nationalist Government as the ruling regime of Taiwan and the Pescadores. (7) Not only might the threat of aggression cease in the Taiwan Strait, but less justification for hostile propaganda would exist, and negotiations for disarmament, arms controls, and the ending of nuclear testing would have greater opportunity for success. (8) The United States still could meet its treaty commitments in support of the integrity of Taiwan and the Pescadores, while continuing to withhold its recognition of Communist China. (9) Above all, this solution is geared to the political realities of Asia.

Arguments against such a policy are these: (1) The will and

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ability to resist communism in Asia would be further undermined. (2) South Korea, South Vietnam, and other Asian nations would be demoralized and would interpret such a solution as abandonment of their cause. (3) Dictatorships create an "illusion of permanence" because they suppress all opposition. Communist China, too, will pass like all dictatorships. The present United States policy of isolation and containment, therefore, is in the interest of the Chinese people. (4) Admission of Communist China to the United Nations would vitiate, if not destroy, the United Nations as an instrument for maintenance of world peace. The Charter would become another scrap of paper in the pile of discarded international documents. If such a regime is judged worthy of United Nations membership, then the United Nations is not worthy of its Charter and its Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

To admit Communist China to all organs while at the same time admitting the State of Taiwan to membership in the General Assembly appears the most efficacious course of action for the United Nations because it permits a political settlement in Asia which respects the integrity of Taiwan while advancing the cause of peace. A two-thirds majority of the members present and voting in the General Assembly upon recommendation of the Security Council would admit Taiwan, which Communist China would be expected to oppose. With permanent membership in the Security Council, Communist China could veto Taiwan's admission. Therefore, a condition for Communist Chinese representation should be the admission of Taiwan.

Procedure for the United States

It remains, then, to consider what procedure the United States should follow to implement this decision. Should the United States play a positive rôle by taking the initiative, or should it merely cease obstructing steps taken by other powers to effect such a result?

Arguments that the United States should take the initiative are these: (1) United States would reverse its declining prestige and influence by seizing the initiative of seating Communist China in all organs and of seating an independent Taiwan state. (2) It would dispel hostile propaganda that the United States has "imperialist intentions." (3) Such a positive rôle would improve United States relations with Communist China

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as well as other Communist bloc nations, and would dramatize the United States as the leader toward world peace. (4) The United States could demand a high price: the integrity of Taiwan.

Arguments that the United States should assume a passive rôle and not obstruct initiatives of other powers are these: (1) Such a drastic change from obstructor to initiator of Communist China's admission would confuse those nations which have supported the United States position. (2) Such a marked shift would constitute a very unwise move in terms of American prestige, and would be tantamount to a United States confession that its past policy of total isolation and containment has been wholly wrong. (3) A passive rôle would not obviate United States bargaining power with respect to Taiwan, and it would not injure United States prestige. (4) A passive rôle would ease tensions in the United Nations and would conform with United States respect for democratic principles.

Apparently, the best procedure for the United States would be to play a passive rôle. When the procedural issue of Chinese representation comes before the General Assembly, the United States should abstain on the question. It would also be well to abstain on any question of the admission of Communist China in the Security Council. Meanwhile, the United States should bargain for the admission of the State of Taiwan, which would constitute a related but separate question. Such a policy would not appear contradictory and, without causing embarrassment on an issue involving American prestige, it would free the United States from the prospect of an overwhelming defeat. Relations with Communist China would be improved, while Nationalist China would not be forsaken. And, above all, it would recognize the right of United Nations members to discuss vitally important matters which affect the peace of the world. In a sense, the seating of the Peking regime in the United Nations is less important than having that body serve as an effective world forum. By not obstructing the inclusion of this question on the agenda of the General Assembly, the United States will prepare the way—without embarrassment to itself—for the inevitable admission of Communist China.

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CONCLUSION

Arguments against the admission of Communist China to the United Nations have merit, especially to the United States. But these arguments can only be weighed and assessed against other meritorious arguments and against the realities of the current world scene. Time is rapidly running out for the United States position, and these realities indicate the imminent admission of Communist China.

Though the prestige of Communist China will be enhanced, its growing power and prestige have not depended on United Nations membership. The United States must now recognize that by continuing to isolate Communist China it weakens its own world influence. The United Nations is not a league of the pure and politically moral; it is an international forum, an area of contact, and a valuable instrument for world social development—considerations, among others, which make universal membership desirable.

The United States should consider the question of admission as separable from the question of United States recognition of the Peking government. It should acknowledge that henceforth avoidance of consideration of the question of admission poses a greater, rather than a lesser, threat to Western security. Under the circumstances, the best policy for the United States is to permit Communist China's seating in all United Nations organs, while at the same time exerting pressure for the admission of an independent Taiwan state. Though this will be a heavy blow to the National Government, the fiction that the Chiang Government is the Government of China can no longer be maintained by the United States. World opinion as registered in the General Assembly soon will strike this blow. But the United States commitment to defend Chiang's domain need not be affected.

In the United Nations, inaction rather than action should characterize the United States response. The United States should abstain on procedural and substantive questions concerning admission of Communist China. By so doing, it will not obstruct majority decision, and thus will hold to those democratic principles which the United States, itself, has forged.

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REPRESENTATIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY
DUAL PROBLEM OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS*

IN his farewell address as President, Dwight D. Eisenhower spoke of the peril to the nation as a great and growing "military-industrial complex." His warning "against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought," was all the more striking because it came from an ex-general whose civilian critics had accused him of running down the nation's defenses. To some the reference to "this conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry" conjured up visions of the Nye Committee and a particular devil theory of war, according to which the munitions makers—the Krupps, the Schneider-Creusots, the Sir Basil Zaharoffs of yesterday and the plane and missile manufacturers of today—are held responsible for war under modern industrial conditions. President Eisenhower's solemn admonition could even be twisted to give credence to Soviet charges that the American economy could not stand an end to the arms race. Yet without doubt President Eisenhower was voicing an ancient, authentic, and recurring concern in Britain and America, that security against threat from a foreign aggressor not be gained at the cost of security against threat of uncontrolled power from within.

I

Government responsive to the value preferences of the governed is representative government. If it is also responsive to changes in the conditions under which the popular mandate is to be executed, representative government can be efficient government. Nowhere has the challenge to representative government called for a more imaginative response to changed conditions

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than in the civil-military relations of Britain and America. We continue to ask that traditional liberal values be maintained, but we see that the direction from which those values are threatened has changed drastically.

Two or three generations ago the phrase "national security" did not occupy a prominent place in the vocabulary either of statesmen or of students of government. Patterns of civil-military relations in both of the great English-speaking democracies were then stabilized on the assumption that a new Cromwell was more of a threat than a new Napoleon and that neither was much of a threat.

"Security" is a word used to describe the efficiency with which the basic values of the self are protected (or are *felt* to be protected); security is not itself one of those values. It follows that "national security" refers to the efficiency with which those values which the nation-state is called upon to maintain are protected. Conventionally, the phrase is used to refer to the efficiency of protection against *external* threat.[1]

For most of the past three centuries the threat, at least in time of peace, was seen as primarily internal. The problem of civil-military relations was thus almost exclusively a problem of maintaining civilian supremacy. A high value was placed on "civil"-izing the domestic political process so that the rôle of legally authorized violence in domestic politics would be restricted to putting down the illegal use of violence.

To meet an external threat, civilian supremacy is not enough. The military, over which civilian statesmen are to be supreme, has to be strong; and civilian decisions to insure adequate strength cannot be made by ignorant or poorly informed men. These men are not free, however, to choose means to protect the nation-state against external threat which are incompatible with the basic values of the society. In a liberal state, this means that national security is not maintained if military protection of the territory of the state is gained only at the cost of individual freedom.[2] Thus, there are two aspects to the problem of civil-military relations, corresponding to the need to secure liberal values simultaneously against internal and external threats.

[1] See H. D. Lasswell and A. Kaplan, *Power and Society* (New Haven, 1950), p. 61, for a formal definition of security.

[2] See Harold D. Lasswell, *National Security and Individual Freedom* (New York, 1950).

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Perfect security against either internal or external threats is beyond reach, but the institutions of representative government in many Western countries have been effectively used to enhance individual security from cradle to grave against the hazards of illness, unemployment, ignorance, and arbitrary discrimination. Against the hazards of war and indeed of the corporal dissolution of the society of which the individual is a part, his security has in this century been decreased. What adaptations have been made in the traditional civil-military relationship to provide such security as we now enjoy against these increased hazards? To answer this question we must reconstruct the situation prevailing at the end of the nineteenth century, particularly the balance then struck between representativeness and efficiency and the image then prevailing of the rôle of organized violence in peace and war, and in domestic and world politics. Then we can ask how appropriate have been our responses to the external threat which world war, world revolution, and changes in military technology have made so great and so pervasive.

II

The United States Constitution reflected American fears of large standing armies in peace. Civilian supremacy has for 175 years been both a constitutional precept and a political dogma. This simplistic view of civil-military relations was reinforced by a magnificent unconcern for any threat from abroad. Perhaps the most extravagant assertion of this unconcern was in Abraham Lincoln's address to the Young Men's Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois, on January 27, 1838. In the course of a speech on "the perpetuation of our democratic institutions" in which he decried the growing spirit of mob rule as a potent threat to the civil order, he dismissed any external threat when he asked:

> At what point shall we expect the approach of danger? By what means shall we fortify against it? Shall we expect some transatlantic military giant, to step the ocean, and crush us at a blow? Never! All the armies of Europe, Asia, and Africa combined, with all the treasure of the earth (our own excepted) in their military chest, with a Buonaparte for a commander, could not by force, take a drink from the Ohio, or make a track on the Blue Ridge in a trial of a thousand years.
>
> At what point then is the approach of danger to be expected? I answer, if it ever reach us, it must spring up amongst us. It cannot

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> come from abroad. If destruction be our lot, we must ourselves be its author and finisher. As a nation of freemen, we must live through all time, or die by suicide.[3]

After the Civil War, the land forces of the United States promptly returned to their ante bellum status. The Army was small and it was scattered throughout the American West for the last phases of Indian fighting. Even after the Indian fighting ceased, its deployment reflected much less any fear of foreign foe than it did various Congressmen's zeal in keeping a military installation once useful against Indians from being abandoned. Low army appropriations also reflected the prevailing unconcern for military matters.

True, in the 1880's and 1890's, there was a revival of interest in the Navy; but the result was at first only a coast defense Navy, not yet excited by the visions of the great prophet of sea power, Alfred T. Mahan. Dependence on the Navy and on Coast Artillery reflected a general belief that no large standing army was necessary in peace to prevent defeat in a short war against an overseas foe; and that there would always be time to mobilize and win victory in a long war. There was no fear whatever of immediate North American neighbors.

Military affairs, in the heyday of the dogma of the virtue of a citizen militia, were hardly any more a matter for experts than was civil government.[4] They were a responsibility of citizenship to be shouldered when, as, and if needed. The democratization of arms had gone hand in hand with the democratization of suffrage, for in the prevailing military technology of the nineteenth century one man with one rifle was regarded as the basic unit of military strength. Men could "vote" with their rifles against an oppressive government almost as readily as they could vote with their ballots for a favored political party.

Events in the War of 1812 and the Mexican War which might have cast doubt on the adequacy of the militia against a foreign foe were conveniently forgotten. Indeed, so long as American security was effectively guaranteed by British sea power and the

[3] Abraham Lincoln, *Selected Speeches, Messages, and Letters,* T. Harry Williams, ed., (New York, 1957); quoted in James Reston's "Washington" column, *The New York Times,* February 16, 1958.

[4] The United States Military Academy was established because the special need for engineers was recognized. Army Engineers have, however, been almost as famous for their civil works as for their military works.

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European balance of power, there was little reason why these events should not be forgotten. As for Britain itself, as the nineteenth century wore on, that country became progressively less able to mount an offensive against a hostile United States. By the end of the century the British government had every reason to want a friendly United States.[5]

If there was little reason to make large preparations for war against a European foe in North America, it seemed absurd to prepare to fight such a foe in Europe. The logic of the policy of "no prior commitment," of never promising in advance to go to the aid of another country, seemed irrefutable. If, then, there was no danger of defeat in a short war and assured time for democratic virtue and industrial might to repel an invader in a long war, of what use would large-scale peacetime preparations for land warfare have been? This was popular doctrine in England also where the Navy was expected to protect the home islands and its small Army was fighting (and deterring) small wars throughout the whole of Britain's Asian and African empire. So long as the Army could be safely starved in time of peace and Congress was willing to vote whatever was needed to win in war, one may well ask of what use civilian statesmen with any special military competence would have been.

Rising German power in the first decade of the twentieth century caused Britain's re-entry into the high politics of the Continent via the Entente Cordiale and the Anglo-French military staff conversations. The second decade saw American intervention in the stalemated First World War. It was still possible for many Americans to believe after 1918, however, that the United States could in any future war of European origin choose to intervene or not as its interests might dictate, and that its interests would ordinarily dictate non-intervention. It was even more widely believed that a new war, in which the United States might be called upon to choose intervention, would last long enough for the choice to be made and then for the arms and men to be mobilized to gain victory.

Both world wars had a *Blitzkrieg* opening phase that fell just short of total victory. In both, a subsequent United States intervention was decisive in a war of attrition. Thus, prevailing

[5] See Lionel Gelber, *The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship, 1895-1905* (New York, 1938).

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expectations that there would always be time to mobilize, after the crisis of war had occurred, seemed to have been confirmed; but it was only by the slenderest of margins. On the other hand, the pre-1914 expectation that a mass army would never be needed except to repel an invasion on our own shores was twice confounded. So also was the forecast, frequently heard in the 1930's, that a democracy could not fight a war against a dictatorship and remain a democracy.[6]

As the genuineness and the immediacy of the threatened overturn of the European order by a fascist dictator became evident in 1940 there was less and less concern expressed that any particular level of defense mobilization was higher than was compatible with the survival of democratic institutions. Pearl Harbor stilled any remaining doubts. From December 7, 1941, on, those who were traditionally concerned about the man on horseback "taking over" had to recognize that the American problem of civil-military relations had been transformed. There had to be security against external threats to American liberties as well as security against internal threats.

Henceforth, even after victory had been won in World War II, it was not enough for civilians to be supreme and to show high politico-military competence at the moment of crisis. The Second World War was fought with weapons whose design, development, and production took years, and whose operation required the training of specialists in programs that also took years. The competence had to be demonstrated years in advance.

As World War II ended, there was ushered in a new military technology based on atomic weapons in which inter-great power war planning had to be based on the assumption of irretrievably decisive events occurring in the first hours, and a new pattern of world politics in which the non-Soviet world expected the

[6] By identifying all forms of massive rearmament with "fascism" the slogan, "You can't fight fascism with fascism," was used to justify isolation and disarmament. Pendleton Herring, *The Impact of War* (New York, 1941), argued forcefully on the eve of American participation in World War II that a democratic America could become militarily efficient. Harold D. Lasswell in *National Security and Individual Freedom,* cited above, similarly argued in 1950, when the prospect of protracted high-level mobilization had become apparent, that a militarily efficient United States could still promote individual freedom. Both men thought "representativeness" and "efficiency" were compatible, although their difference in emphasis reflects the difference between the unarmed democracy of 1940 and the armed democracy of 1950.

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United States government to assume leadership. Thus, the long time it takes to produce the new weapons (so-called "lead-time"), the expectation that a new war would be over long before any deficiency in preparedness could be made good, and the responsibility of free world leadership put an unprecedented burden on American civilian leaders during time of peace. Without being able to mobilize the energies spontaneously called forth in an actual war crisis, they had henceforth to evoke a high level of economic sacrifice, keep professional military forces fully equipped and trained in a state of constant readiness, support research on weapons system evolving with increasing speed and at astronomical cost, maintain a variety of coalition military arrangements, and orchestrate even in peace the variety of economic, psychological, strategy, and military decisions in support of current American policy. Furthermore, not only must the armed forces be in a state of constant readiness but so must the civilian leadership; for the awful decisions that might initiate a two-way thermonuclear war may have to be made and executed on extremely short notice.

III

If unnecessary wars are to be deterred or otherwise avoided, "right" decisions have to be made long before an actual war crisis. If necessary wars, necessary in the sense that the values of our liberal society would be better protected by going to war rather than by avoiding it, "right" decisions have to be made at the instant of crisis, too, but made on the basis of immediately available military power, available only because of earlier timely "right" decisions. Civilian decisions, however much they may reflect devotion to civilian liberal values, can be wrong, even catastrophically wrong, decisions if they also reflect inadequate or even delayed understanding of prevailing conditions.

How well equipped is the civilian leader to make these critical decisions? What access does he have to disinterested expert advice from persons as devoted to the protection of the basic civilian-liberal values of our society as himself? How much understanding and discriminating support can he count on from informed levels of public opinion?

We have already referred to some of the characteristics of "the civilian mind," as it existed just before the present era of

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world wars and technological revolutions, and to its preoccupation with the internal threat to our values. To what extent need the present internal threat affect a solution to the present problem of civil-military relations?

If the problem of civil-military relations has in most ways been complicated by the course of events in this century, the danger is not that an expanded military threatens civilian control simply by being large. The new military technology is not an all-purpose technology. Because it is short on manpower and long on firepower, the armed forces are not equally good for winning foreign wars and putting down domestic insurrection. The Navy was never useful in sailing its ships up on dry land to intimidate the urban populace. Today the Army, Navy, and Air Force are alike in having developed specialized instruments of violence which are singularly inefficient for police action against individuals and dissident small groups in the United States. The armed forces are, if anything, less useful than in the nineteenth century to a government bent upon suppressing domestic dissent. Furthermore, maintenance of the armed forces at present levels requires the continuing and active support of both the President and Congress. Each year tremendous appropriations must be requested by the President and voted by Congress.

The civilian control which the Founding Fathers had in mind was Congressional control. They were mindful of the charge against King George III in the Declaration of Independence that "He has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the Consent of a legislature." That today's Chief Executive finds Congress as often pressing him to ask for more rather than less funds in the name of national defense is but one indication that civilian opinion freely accepts the need for continuing high-level peacetime defense mobilization, and that the armed forces would not be the first to feel the impact of any widespread tax fatigue.[7] The internal threat of protracted high-level, peacetime defense mobilization to liberal civilian values, if there be one, lies elsewhere.

It is sometimes alleged that the militarization of American

[7] The contrast is sharp between the relatively easy acceptance by Congress of Presidential demands for funds for the armed services and the annual difficulty in winning Congressional approval for requests for funds for the foreign aid program.

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life, however unavoidable, has affected basic attitudes so that nonconformity has come to be equated with disloyalty. This may or may not be true. It is an important question and worthy of a separate and careful analysis, but it is not a matter of civil-military relations. The record does not show that it is primarily from the professional military men that have come either the intemperate utterances or the arbitrary acts that poison the atmosphere of freedom. If the freedom to "nonconform" is to be protected, as it must be if liberal institutions and values are to be maintained, it is by civilian action in the fields of law and education, not by some change in civil-military relations.

Does the internal threat then perhaps lie in the illiberal value preferences sometimes attributed to the professional soldier? Do his devotion to discipline, his respect for authority, his belief in the virtue of obedience, his frequently expressed distaste for something he calls "politics," his tendency to see critical decisions not as moral choices but as technical problems, and so on—do all these alleged traits taken together make the military expert's advice suspect? The very phrase, civil-military relations, implies that the soldier is somehow out of civil society, very much as the phrase, Soviet-American relations, implies that the Soviet Union is outside the United States. "Civil-military relations" thus almost implies that the user of the phrase would answer that the soldier's advice *is* suspect.

IV

We have already seen that the new era—in which preparedness rather than potential is the effective deterrent and preparedness before the actual crisis of war, rather than mobilization after war begins, is likely to determine the outcome and determine it in short order—requires of statesmen and discriminating opinion élites an understanding of military policy. It also requires, since soldier and statesman must now work together to elaborate national security policy in peace as well as in war, an understanding on the part of the military of the values of the civil society they are committed to try to conserve. In the exercise of their functional responsibility they must, in the language of the title of this paper, be to some extent "representative" while the civilian leadership must to some extent be "efficient." Just as the night-and-day distinction between war and peace has

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been blurred in contemporary world politics, so has the former sharp distinction of requiring representativeness from the statesman and expertness from the soldier.

The lengthened lead-times in preparedness and the critical importance of deterrent strategies in the era of possible thermonuclear war mean that for the Chief Executive to formulate politico-military policy there must be a continuous peacetime "concert of judgment" based on a triangular State-Pentagon-Bureau of the Budget relationship and on the deliberations of the National Security Council.[8] Three types of civil-military relations are involved: (1) that between the uniformed subordinates and their civilian superiors within the Department of Defense, (2) that between the officials of the Department of Defense and those of non-military departments, and (3) that between the Department of Defense and the White House. The professional military man in the Pentagon may thus find three not necessarily identical sets of civilian considerations standing between him and the making of Presidential decisions in the politico-military field.

As Executive policy in its turn runs the gauntlet of Congressional action, the approval of a fourth set of civilians with a fourth set of civilian perspectives is required. Furthermore, though there have been in the past twenty years a series of organizational changes designed to make national security policy making within the Executive branch more orderly and more rational—the creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council and the organization of the three services under a single Department of Defense—there has been no comparable adjustment of Executive-Congressional relations.

It may appear at first sight strange that in spite of this the most dramatic evidences of friction between the civilian and the military have been within the Executive branch.[9] Several explanations are possible. The President is responsible for "whole" policy and the professional soldier is expert in but one of the means, the military, to the attainment of but one of the

[8] The phrase "concert of judgment" is the title of the first chapter of Arthur Macmahon's *Administration in Foreign Affairs* (Mobile, Ala., 1953). and the first chapter describes the triangular relationship.

[9] See Matthew Ridgway, *Soldier* (New York, 1956); James M. Gavin, *War and Peace in the Space Age* (New York, 1958); and Maxwell Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet* (New York, 1959).

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objectives of national policy, national security. Executive-Congressional relations are "civil-civil" relations no matter how uncivil they may be. Congressional committees invite the expert testimony of the soldier and then urge him to lay bare the dissatisfactions and frustrations he feels as a result of rejected recommendations and reduced budgetary requests. Some military men, possibly dissatisfied with the action taken by their civilian superiors, may find natural allies in various Congressmen, especially on committees dealing with military policy and military appropriations, and possibly also dissatisfied with Executive policy. Thus even though the main choices have already been made within the Executive branch,[10] any Congressional uncoöperativeness in ratifying these choices inevitably appears as a friction in the civil-military relationship.

We have already emphasized that under modern conditions of continuing high-level external threat the public interest will not be served by viewing the civil and the military as natural enemies. Only if inaction and delay were still tolerable alternatives could one be content with such a relationship. Performance of the security function must rest on the acceptance all round of functional responsibility.[11] There is nothing wrong with civilian-military disagreement if that disagreement is rooted in the particular responsibilities of the contending parties, for the disagreement then clarifies choice and after its resolution positive action can be taken.

Reactions based on some obsolete attitudes do not, however, lead either to a rational integration of military and non-military means or a rational shaping of military means to over-all national policy objectives. Belief by the military, for example, that "politics" is inherently dirty or belief by the civilian that

[10] See S. P. Huntington, "Strategic Planning and the Political Process," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (January, 1960), pp. 285-299.

[11] In the terminology of S. P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, 1957), "functional responsibility" would be described as "objective control," as the control of the military which automatically results from its professional ethic requiring the support of the civilian values of the society which it is professionally serving. I have followed the earlier language of Carl J. Friedrich, "Responsible Government Service Under the Constitution," in *Problems of the American Public Service* (New York, 1935), because I wished to emphasize the need for positive action rather than for "control" to prevent undesired action.

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"the high brass" is straining to "take over" are only gross examples of inherited perspectives which are outdated under contemporary conditions of enforced collaboration.

Under prevailing conditions of total diplomacy and possible total war the soldier's indispensable expertise is recognized as never before in peacetime in the English-speaking world. At the same time, a new partner in the making of national security policy, the scientist, has won his place in the highest councils of government. As the J. Robert Oppenheimer hearings dramatically and poignantly illustrated,[12] the relation between the politician and the expert in matters of national security is by no means exhausted when one has studied the politician-soldier relationship. The professionalization of the military has made it possible for the responsible senior military officer offering politico-military advice to distinguish in his own mind between the technical military considerations whose relevance he is uniquely equipped to evaluate and his personal political preferences which may or may not be identical with those of his civilian superior. As a professional military man he sees his professional military responsibility as being to clarify the choices of the politician, not to make those choices for him.

On questions of scientific policy with military implications the problem of balancing representativeness and efficiency may be more difficult. Civilian ignorance of new developments in science is even more profound, and prior experience on the part of the professional scientist in making clear when he is "speaking strictly from a scientific point of view" and when he is airing his own policy preference is much less extensive. The case of the scientist, however, throws into relief the transformation of the problem of civil-military relations under twentieth century conditions of persisting external threat.

Purely constitutional solutions of the problem were satisfactory only so long as the external short-run threat was minimal and a deterrent diplomacy could be based on presumed war potential. Now that national security requires the peacetime harnessing and coördination of the resources of the whole soci-

[12] United States Atomic Energy Commission, *In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer*, Transcript of Hearings before Personnel Security Board, April 12-May 6, 1954 (Washington, 1954). See W. R. Schilling, "The H-Bomb Decision: How to Decide Without Actually Choosing," POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, LXXVI, No. 1 (March 1961), pp. 24-46.

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ety, there can be no solution which is not based on civilian understanding of military problems and a self-conscious awareness by the professional military man of the policy implications of each of the courses of his action which he might plausibly support on wholly technical grounds. The evolution of the curricula in the nation's war colleges reflects this growing awareness and the steps taken to communicate this awareness at least to the group of officers capable of rising to the most critical positions of politico-military responsibility.[13]

However successfully the war colleges and the armed forces' educational and training programs generally have prepared the professional soldier for the new civilian-military relationship, the problem is more complex on the civilian side. There is not, and ought not to be, a single, authoritative source of civilian insight on politico-military problems in our pluralistic society. Our decentralized system of research, education, and journalism ought to continue to produce a variety of points of view. Only informed civilians can make discriminating response to technically well-founded military recommendations, whether they be the soldier's civilian superiors in the Executive branch or the Congressmen with key rôles in various Congressional committees. And these, in turn, must act with the support of disinterested opinion élites across the country whose attitudes have been formed on the basis of a sophisticated treatment of questions of national security policy in the nation's universities and in the nation's press.

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[13] See J. W. Masland and L. I. Radway, *Soldiers and Scholars* (Princeton, 1957).

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THE FRENCH ARMY RE-ENTERS POLITICS 1940–1955

> Nous autres, on ne pense à nous que quand il pleut.
> —Marshal Saxe

I

THE tensions of accommodation to an inferior position by a nation which has been accustomed to lead or to share world leadership have had very unsettling consequences throughout the French body politic. The process of adjustment has been both confused and exacerbated by France's commitment to two colonial wars. One of the most striking effects of this conjuncture has been to throw into relief the political attitudes of military leaders concerning their country's mission, internal organization, and stake in the threatened civilization of the West. In no other Western country has this crisis been so severe. The severity is due both to France's soul-searching over the last decade and a half and to the nature of military groups in general. This essay will investigate the intellectual premises for the French Army's *rentrée à la politique,* showing how these premises had been clearly stated, if not codified, before the full impact of the Algerian war had made itself felt.

It is surely no secret that the peacetime rôle of the military forces has always been somewhat anomalous in the modern democratic state. The complexity of twentieth-century Western society, its pluralism of interests, its absence of sharp divisions of function and command have prevented the easy absorption or accommodation of a professional element whose rules of life seem medieval, hierarchical, over-simplified by comparison with those of civilians. The regular military society has, most often, lived to itself and by its own peculiar values in enclaves half cut off from the temptations and bewilderments of the wider world. Yet, paradoxically, in time of danger it has been called upon to lead in the defense of an order which its training has taught it to distrust and to understand very imperfectly.

To be sure, in recent times, the Army has found itself linked with the civilian world by a thousand new bonds; and its leaders have accepted these new relationships with reasonably good grace.

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In the conditions of modern total war, they have seen the conventional Army almost swamped or pushed into the background by men who came from civilian pursuits to take a leading part in forging a military instrument that would have been doomed to defeat by relying exclusively on the old, time-honored skills and crafts. To maintain the vitality of their *métier*, they have recognized the enormous qualitative changes in the art of war brought about by the scientific revolution. So far as their intellectual training made possible they have studied these changes and their effects.

These concessions have been essential, but they have also been uncomfortable to make. Nor have they succeeded in bringing the soldier and the civilian as close together as might be expected. For the *rapprochement* of outlook of military man and civilian in a society faced by the conditions of total war never came about fast enough to keep up with technological advance and with the resulting changes in ideology that were especially uncongenial to the traditional military mind.

An Army has been accustomed to regard itself as an instrument of force at the service of politics. Since World War I it has gradually grown aware of the dangerous possibility that it might be expected to become a blind and docile instrument, serving not broad national interests that appeal to all patriotic men but the interests of pressure groups or the demands of doctrines that are global in scope rather than expressive of the historical reality of the Nation. To see armies reduced from their proper concerns in this way was very troubling to those whose conception of armed combat was more old-fashioned and removed from ideology. In the twentieth century when an Army has been led to engage in propaganda on its own behalf, this has not been an attempt to reassess its function in the state as an abstract exercise. Rather it has been an attempt to defend itself against the erosion of its traditional place and privilege.

II

In some political systems the military forces play a direct part in government by making laws, administering justice, and so on. We shall not concern ourselves with any of these systems, but will describe only the political-military equilibrium that is found in those Western nations with liberal institutions. In these

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nations armies have sworn allegiance and promised protection to a community that is essentially civilian and "pacific" in character. They have accepted a limited rôle in this community.

The problems posed by the relationship between military and civilian and by the special tensions produced in the military mind when it finds itself in a civilian milieu exist in many countries. In some, however—the Anglo-Saxon countries, a half-dozen north European nations, and Switzerland—they rarely provoke debate or deep anxiety. They are more serious, however, along the Mediterranean and wherever Mediterranean civilization has spread, and in the politically unstable center of Europe. France exhibits both some of the restraints of the first group (because of her long, if troubled, career as a democratic state) and much of the turbulence of the second group. Much of the sympathetic impulsion behind the recent activities of the French Army has come from a trans-Mediterranean population. Nevertheless, geography here is only a method of description, and the more valid reasons for the contemporary tension between State and Army in France must be sought in historical development and in the complex psychology of the postwar period.

In a country renowned as the inventor of the "democratic Army," the *levée en masse,* and other military techniques that heralded a new age of surface warfare grounded in new concepts, the Army has never felt entirely comfortable in the service of "radical" democratic institutions. In the past this was a social rather than a political problem; those at the top of the military hierarchy had little but contempt for a bourgeois class that was making a commercial operation out of governing. Still, despite a series of rude shocks in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Army made its uneasy peace with the state apparatus, on which it came increasingly to depend, and sought non-political outlets for its superfluous energy. Of these, colonial adventure was the most conspicuous and profitable. At the same time, the State recognized the need for maintaining fighting forces adequate not only to defend the national territory and enlarge its interests abroad, but even one day to execute the long-awaited *revanche* on Germany. Even among the militant Left of the turn of the century (who harbored deep suspicions of military prerogatives) there were few thoroughgoing pacifists where the national interest was concerned. Pacifism as such would not flourish until the 1920's.

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Jaurès himself hoped to see the transformation of the Army into a new and revitalized organism that would act in the socialist perspective for "the organization of national defense and the organization of international peace." He may also have been the first to suggest authoritatively that there must be a close correspondence between the technical rôle and equipment of an army and the international policy that the nation as a whole was prepared to follow.[1] For Jaurès, naturally, there was no doubt that both missions should be construed defensively. Later, Paul Reynaud was to use the same argument in the opposite sense when he claimed that France's active policy of alliances (Great Britain, Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, later Soviet Russia) demanded the construction of an élite motorized striking force to act offensively.[2]

However trenchantly it was argued before 1939 that there was an essential connection between diplomatic action and military preparation, almost no concerted effort was made to act as if they were connected. For this dissociation was itself a consequence of the "depolitization" of the Army, its explicit alienation from the productive political energies of the nation and scission from the governing class. Collaboration in theory between the two jurisdictions was unlikely where the practical divorce was so extreme. This accounts in part for the archaism of military strategy which was to lead to the disaster of June, 1940. Cut off from the influence of rapidly changing political and social factors, the Army high command transformed itself into an impregnable citadel and clung to doctrines that had been serviceable in bygone times. Barred from healthy communications with other national elements, the military leaders asserted their own primacy in a specialized field. Somewhat mystified by military affairs in any case and well content to leave matters as they were, the politicians of the Third Republic hastened to agree with them.

The alternative to this sterile escapism—which the young de Gaulle and others tried to surmount on a purely technical plane—would have been the reinvigoration of strategic thought through immersion in, and comprehension of, the wider range of problems posed by the complexities of interwar Europe and the

[1] Jean Jaurès, *L'Armée nouvelle,* in *Oeuvres* (Paris, 1931-1939).

[2] Paul Reynaud, *Au Coeur de la Mêlée* (Paris, 1951), pp. 149-157.

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challenges of industrialization and invention. This could have taken place only through the development of military cadres whose training would be more spacious and more subtle than before, and free from obsolete conventions of the past. Jaurès had recommended for his "new Army" an education based on high intellectual values and civic spirit that would transform the military force into an instrument for the propagation of democracy rather than a reflex against it. But if any re-education was going to take place, it was much more likely that it would ignore all appeals to socialist principles. Although "depolitized," the Army as a whole deeply disapproved of the Left, which it equated with the government itself and held responsible for the weakening of the national sinew and the venality of political life. "Repolitization," if encouraged, would probably come in a form that transgressed against the convictions and inner harmony of the bourgeois Republic. Therefore there was implicit agreement in political circles that the intellectual modernization of the armed forces was best avoided altogether. The high command was, in a sense, a hostage for the perpetuation of this immobility; for the leading generals recognized that they could be deposed or exalted in the measure that they antagonized or served the government of the day. This is not to say that they abandoned professional principle lightly, but they showed little inclination to venture down new paths and they imposed sanctions on those of their subordinates who were not so cautious.

The Army, if psychologically hostile to the Third Republic, salved its conscience by the exercise of viceregal prerogatives throughout the French "Empire." It played its rôle of *grande muette* to perfection. If there was a profound distrust between the politician and the soldier, neither really invaded the other's realm according to the long-established rules of the Third Republic game. In fact, much of the mutual abuse and recrimination was simply *pro forma*.

The average Republican politician had always betrayed an excited nervousness at the hierarchical structure of France's Army and a deep suspicion at any signs of a *putsch*. *La République en péril* had been a consistent and convenient rallying-cry of the Left, and, in particular, of the schizophrenic *Parti radical et radical socialiste*, whose policies were often respectably conservative despite professional protestations of *gauchisme*. The

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Army, whether guilty or not of such charges, was a traditional scapegoat for these strictures, since it was universally recognized that armies, by their nature, have little in common with the sacred features of parliamentary democracy. However, in spite of this irresistible demagogis tendency, fed by postwar pacifism, the French Army under the leadership of such men as Pétain, Weygand, and Gamelin could still bask in the sun of its gallant victories at the Marne and Verdun and repose on a reputation for courage and general infallibility. Nothing the politicians might transiently say in an election could effectively tarnish this bright shield of the nation or convince a very large number of persons (at least outside the industrial proletariat) that what had so shortly before been their salvation could now be their danger. Furthermore, the popular reaction was basically sound. For a number of very specific reasons the "repolitization" of the Army, when it finally came, years after an intervening national catastrophe, was to be the work of the "colonial" rather than the "metropolitan" branch. And for the time being, as a logical consequence of the heroism of the War of 1914-1918, it was the "metropolitans" with whom the spirit of the Army was inevitably associated and it was they who held the positions of command. The distinction we make here between the two groups is by no means trivial, for it continues to exist today and deeply affects the extent of the Army's commitment to a political rôle.

Despite the ever-increasing power of disaffected veterans' organizations such as the Croix de Feu, the appearance of the sinister Cagoule,[3] and the penetration of the ranks of the serving Army by swelling anti-republican sentiment during the 1930's, the period actually saw much close, if not devoted, collaboration between leading politicians (mainly the Radicals, who were a part of every combination) and a good many military chiefs. This was done for the self-interest of both groups, as a means of career advancement, and as a part of the complex *quid pro quo* of Third Republic politics. If there was a danger of military discontent, it was not genuinely grave or well-articulated. General Gamelin could write in his memoirs: "I was definitely classed by certain people as the military chief who would never let himself

[3] It is established, with some doubt, that there were connections between the Cagoule and the aging Marshal Franchey d'Espérey. The retired heroes of France were characteristically more dangerous to the regime than the serving ones.

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be dragged into an elaborate combination against the legal government: they wanted to bar my access to the supreme post or get rid of me at the earliest occasion."[4] But Gamelin never conjectures how powerful the "certain people" might have been, and his own career and friendly association with M. Daladier show that his analysis was on the gloomy side. Even Weygand, the *alter ego* of the French Army during the period, though obviously out of sympathy with the political institutions of the country, seems never to have had a close relationship with any groups that were inclined toward a coup d'état and, according to the best evidence, was even unaware of the confused political planning that preceded the Right-wing riots of February 6, 1934.[5] Pétain owed much of his political strength and prestige to the mistaken notion that he was a "Republican general." And when Colonel de Gaulle and his political ally, Paul Reynaud, as "Young Turks," fought their losing battle for the élite mechanized corps—and the implications of such a step—they were stopped by the combined opposition of M. Daladier and the General Staff. Politicians of any importance had their collaborators somewhere in the upper military echelons, and the fortunes of the latter followed those of the former with a fairly rigorous consistency.

In short, far from playing dangerously with anti-republican politics, the higher echelons of the French Army were, in the closing days of the Third Republic, irrevocably committed to the traditional political game. Even the outsiders, the rebels, those to whom the system was effectively closed, if they might rally disaffected thousands into ex-servicemen's clubs, if they might rent halls and hold mass meetings where violence was shouted, mounted no real political action and did not enjoy the active sympathy of the military mandarins, who owed their distinguished places to the system.

III

This stable but stultifying equilibrium was destined to last no longer than any of the other institutionalized forms that came

[4] Maurice Gamelin, *Servir* (Paris, 1946), Vol. II, p. 109.

[5] See Maxime Weygand, *Mémoires* (Paris, 1957), Vol. II, *Mirages et Réalité*, p. 409. Also, Max Beloff, "The Sixth of February," in *St. Antony's Papers*, No. 5 (New York, 1959), p. 32.

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crashing down after the defeat by the Germans and the birth of the Vichy regime. It had done great disservice to France not only by choking off those new and salutary ideas that could have raised the quality of thought among the military leaders, but by obscuring the military catastrophe of 1940 through the excuse of loyalism and the orderly and constitutional transfer of power, which Laval's rigged assembly was held to have achieved. For some years after June, 1940, leading French military figures—perhaps best exemplified by Weygand—shielded themselves casuistically from the effects of the intense injury that their organization had suffered. But neither the causes nor the extent of the wound could be so lightly overlooked. The Allied landings in North Africa in November, 1942, resurrected the question vividly for all those who, loyal to the Marshal in 1940, had sat in numb but guilty meditation during the intervening years. Survivors of the defeat then began to troop back in increasing numbers to the tricolor, on which was now embossed the Cross of Lorraine, some bearing the ghost of the old attitude (of which Giraud's "Moi, je suis militaire; je ne fais pas de politique" may be considered the classic example); but their shaky preference for the old way of doing business would not ultimately commend itself to a new Army forged piece by piece out of the shattered remnants of the old and wedded to the political consequences of its origin.

This new Army, heroic in its achievements and dear to its creator, General de Gaulle, was nevertheless a crazy, patchwork thing. As the reader will recall, the prestige of Pétain, Weygand, and others, combined with the unmistakable social and political orientation of the officer caste of the period, had been sufficient to associate the bulk of the leadership with the side of defeat and betrayal. Although a certain number of these leaders—of whom by no means all were in sympathy with the political initiatives of Vichy, but who in great majority had approved the Marshal's action in taking France out of the war—were rehabilitated by incorporation in the Free French forces after the North African landings, many others who waited too long, either through conviction or caution, were quietly retired from service at the close of hostilities. The missing ranks were filled by Gaullist promotions and by the prudent assimilation of elements of the F.F.I. and other *maquisards*. The latter were first politically weakened by dispersed integration, and later, when the

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"cold war" began, systematically kept out of the higher echelons of the regular forces.[6]

Even before it had had time to consider its position in a peacetime situation, the new Army was gnawed by second-thoughts about its legitimacy, its function in the new France, and its relations with Frenchmen at large. Basically colonial rather than metropolitan in command and inspiration, it reacted uneasily toward the civilian population and especially toward the irregular guerrilla forces of the French Underground. Frequently it misconstrued the aims of the Resistance (which would have preferred to see an Army refashioned along the lines of Jaurès), and, in turn, was distrusted and misunderstood by it. The feeling of isolation that the Gaullist Army was already experiencing is nowhere better evoked than in the passage where de Gaulle describes his tour of the front in late 1944 and his communication with General (later Marshal) de Lattre:

> The commander of the 1st Army reported to me that depression was infecting the minds of his subordinates. He attributed this crisis less to losses, fatigue, or the harshness of the winter than to the moral separation from the nation. "From one end of the command to the other," he wrote, "especially among the officers, the general impression is that the nation is ignoring and abandoning them." De Lattre went on: "Certain people even go so far as to imagine that the regular Army from overseas is being expressly sacrificed." He added: "The profound reason for this *malaise* lies in the failure of the nation to take part in the war."[7]

A prophetic utterance.

The *malaise* of de Lattre's Army in Alsace in 1944 was a passing mood, soon dissipated by the hysteria of Allied victory, but the mood was destined to return, just as the victory was, from France's point of view, somewhat hollow. Nor was the difficulty of assimilating the Resistance fighters the only serious structural problem the postwar Army would have to solve. The simultaneous impact of social and technological renovation,

[6] *Cf.* Alexander Werth's résumé of a release by Jules Moch, then Minister of Defense, to the Anglo-American press in early 1951: "Moch . . . again assured his audience that there were only *three* Communist lieutenant-colonels in the French Army, and none above that rank, and that they were being most *carefully* watched." *France, 1940-1955* (New York, 1956), p. 508.

[7] Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires de Guerre* (Paris, 1959), Vol. III, t. 2, *Le Salut*, pp. 148-149.

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coupled with the lingering atmosphere of guilt and inferiority *vis-à-vis* the Anglo-Saxons, was to take a fearful psychological toll from an institution that had seen its base all but destroyed and the legend of its heroism besmirched.

As the years passed, the new Army was being increasingly penetrated by new blood; representatives of social classes which had been, previous to the national débâcle, barred or discouraged from serving as officers of France, found the feudal doors unbolted and untended, and entrance and advancement assured. The history of this phenomenon has yet to be written, but the tendency is widely acknowledged by numerous commentators.[8] In the Fourth Republic the politicians maintained a surer grip on commissions and promotions than before, and they were, by and large, determined that the composition of military hierarchies should in some measure reflect the new political life, of which *tripartisme*[9] was the temporary manifestation. The Minister of the Air Force was, in fact, during this period a Communist.

At the same time that necessity and conviction were producing a lower-echelon democratization of the officer corps (usually through advancement from the non-commissioned ranks), while the Gaullist and pre-Vichy elements of the upper echelons endured their *côtoiement* with difficulty, the majority of old military families came out of the war ruined, decimated, or disgraced. They were unable to maintain traditions that seemed suddenly superfluous. Nor were the scions of the upper bourgeoisie any more anxious to play their rôle: by this time they had largely

[8] See especially, "Essai sur la structure sociale de l'armée française," *La nouvelle critique,* No. 107 (June 1957), p. 55: "Two facts are . . . characteristic: 1) The constant falling off of the number of candidates at the School of St. Cyr: 2452 candidates in 1939, 587 in 1951, 360 in 1954. At the same time the number of former students of the Ecole Polytechnique tends to become insignificant in the cadres of the so-called 'learned' branches of the Army, where they were formerly in the majority: in 1913, the proportion of captains of artillery who were former polytechnicians was 53%, it fell to 11% in 1939, to 5% in 1953, to 1.5% in 1958. 2) The proportion in the cadres of the Army of officers advancing from the ranks, which is incessantly growing: if we take captains, the proportion has progressed from 5.4% in 1949 to 35.8% in 1958."

[9] The PCF (Parti Communiste Français)—SFIO (Parti Socialiste—Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière)—MRP (Mouvement Républicain Populaire) governing coalition that collapsed in April, 1947, to make way for the "Third Force."

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renounced the romantic emulation of the *noblesse,* and had, in addition, discovered that war was a highly dangerous, unglamorous, and unremunerative pastime. The Ecole Polytechnique, which regularly before the war supplied at least 100 officers a year to the services, now furnished three or four.[10] At the same time, deaths in the Indochina hostilities amounted to three-fifths of the six classes that graduated from St. Cyr during that war.[11]

Thus, by the end of the Indochina conflict, it may have been correct to label a vocal "activist" segment of the French Army as *ultra,* but the term will need redefining. The new ultras were neither wistfully *maurrasien* nor royalist, but disillusioned, technical ultras, susceptible to dangerous political intervention but essentially uninterested in the political process as such. Their most extreme utterances were, to be sure, anti-republican. Colonel Lacheroy put it this way in 1954: "One will never insist enough on this point: propaganda directed from the base of a mild-mannered democracy loses nine-tenths of its chances, while on the contrary it achieves its maximum efficiency from the base of a clean, hard *(pure et dure)* organization of parallel hierarchies."[12] As Jean Planchais sagely observes: "The most democratized armies are apt to be the most anti-democratic ones, at least in Europe."

In view of the circumstances we have just described, the heterogeneous French Army was obviously hard-pressed to find motive, mission, or solidarity in the years of its reconstruction. One now had any number of dichotomies operating: old versus new, socially liberal versus socially retrograde, metropolitan versus colonial, total war versus guerrilla war strategists, nationalists versus Europeans, Gaullists versus anti-Gaullists, and so on. Undoubtedly it is the memory of this slow and uncertain recovery from major surgery that prompted General Ely, resigning as Chief of Staff in the chaotic days of May, 1958, to proclaim to his subordinates: "Feeling as profoundly as I do the anguish which is yours today, I ask you, in the highest interests of France, to maintain, each in his place, the cohesion and unity of the

[10] See J.-R. Tournoux, "A Proletarian Army," in *The Reporter,* XXII, No. 4 (February 18, 1960), p. 19.

[11] Jean Planchais, *Le Malaise de l'Armée* (Paris, 1958), p. 10.

[12] *Le Monde,* August 4, 1954.

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French armed forces that is the supreme warrant of the national unity."[13] Many other commanders stressed the same point. As had been the case in 1942, they failed to tackle the problem of where duty theoretically lay. It was, in fact, no small achievement for the French Army to have discovered some measure of solidarity and a certain, though admittedly pathological, *esprit de corps* in the intervening years, seemingly *envers et contre tout*. But then, it is said that misery loves company.

IV

The ordeal of root-and-branch reconstruction in the meanest of circumstances would have been enough in itself to leave scars that could be healed only by time, stability, and new generations. But there was still worse, much worse, to come. France had hardly emerged from the most severe psychological strain of her history, a situation which had almost become a civil war disguised by the cloak of foreign occupation, when she was plunged into a series of colonial wars. They plagued her economy, caused the idealism of the Resistance to be offset by the rapacious venality of private interests, sapped her fighting strength in faraway struggles, and widened the grave chasm that already separated the nation and its bewildered Army.

The proof of the Army's ingrained propensity to neutrality is that even these things did not immediately produce the wish among its leaders for a "return to politics." They were, after all, professional career men first; and they had had their fingers burnt too often. They confined themselves for the time being to issuing explicit warnings to the government that it would be dangerous to sacrifice the loyalty of the Army or to allow it to deteriorate into a second-rate instrument. The following passage may be considered typical of this reaction:

> In principle the Army is charged with the external security of the country, and the police with its internal security. According to rule regular troops should not, under any pretext, be used to put down internal troubles. We know of no rule more hypocritical, for in France all regimes, including that of the Fourth Republic, have used the Army to defend themselves on the inside, and it is precisely

[13] General Ely's order of the day to the armed forces, quoted from Serge and Merry Bromberger, *Les Treize Complots du 13 Mai* (Paris, 1959), p. 247.

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> when they have not had the Army at their disposal or when that Army has grown deficient that they have been beaten or turned out.[14]

Although the character of the Fourth Republic made it certain that the French Army would dwell in a sort of patriotic wilderness, this did not at first produce a disgruntled group looking for a coup d'état. One reason was that the leaders were not in a position to seek this solution. If they could but master their military trade and function reasonably as a team, they were doing well. In the upheaval of the remodelling, with innumerable new assignments and promotions being made all the time by rapidly changing Ministers of National Defense, the high-ranking officers were initially shy of joining forces to fight the politicians. Moreover, in many cases, they were fighting each other, each one seeking to hitch his horse to the right wagon, his career to the right minister. Thus there were MRP generals, Radical generals, even Socialist generals.[15] This situation bears a superficial resemblance to the political-military equilibrium of the 1930's; however, now the politicians were all but supreme, and the military leaders, except for giants like de Lattre, had no charismatic appeal to fall back on as had their semi-deified predecessors. As one might expect, the politicians took advantage of their opportunity to use the generals as pawns in complicated ministerial games. Thus, the humiliation of the military services was already well under way before the crushing blow of defeat in a strange, new kind of battle sent the more thoughtful of the leaders into deep and unrestrained meditation. Before this had happened, however, the exposure of the Revers-Peyré case in 1950 had aroused enough passion among the military to insure that henceforward most of the officer corps of the French services would entertain the profoundest distrust of the political mechanism of the Fourth Republic.

The so-called *affaire des généraux* was the first of a series of important events—and scandals—that permanently shattered the already tottering relationship between the government and the Army.[16] It was also a direct consequence of a struggle between

[14] Colonels Georges-André Groussard and Georges Loustanau-Lacau, *Consuls, Prenez Garde!* (Paris, 1952), p. 220.

[15] Planchais, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

[16] The case is examined in detail from the left-wing perspective in *Les Temps Modernes*, September 1953.

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the MRP and the SFIO for primacy in the national "Third Force" coalition. General Revers, the French Chief of Staff, had gone to Indochina in 1949 to survey the conduct of the war against the Viet Minh and to make military and political recommendations for betterment. He naïvely allowed himself to be befriended and influenced by a certain adventurer named Roger Peyré, who had intimate connections in the Socialist and Radical parties. The tactic of these parties was to use Revers' influence in forcing the replacement of the French High Commissioner for Indochina, M. Léon Pignon,[17] who was MRP-sponsored, by their own protégé, General Mast. Revers did in fact return with a report that was harshly critical of all he had seen and that made, in particular, some very explosive political suggestions. Peyré himself, along with certain Vietnamese and Frenchmen of the *métropole,* was eager to use the situation to exploit the notorious *trafique des piastres,* which had become a lucrative consequence of the war and the political situation in Saigon.

An uproar followed the leakage or theft of parts of the Revers Report. This event had repercussions both on the political game in Paris and the war in Vietnam, some too complicated to be explored here. After agitation by the press, a parliamentary Committee of Inquiry was set up; it ultimately confirmed many of the charges made in the press and on the floor of the Assembly. In the meantime, it became evident that three members of the Government, the Radical Président du Conseil, M. Queuille, and two of his Socialist ministers, MM. Ramadier (War) and Moch (Interior), had gone to imprudent lengths to suppress evidence. Yet the MRP was not anxious to press the point since it also had been guilty of grave imprudences. Only the Communists benefited. The Duveau and Delahoutre Reports, which summarized the parliamentary findings later in the year, cannot be described as a whitewash, but they managed to spare the politicians, except Moch, from any charge of criminal culpability. The unfortunate generals, Mast and Revers, who had exercised deplorably poor judgment in allowing themselves to be drawn into the imbroglio, became the scapegoats: they were disciplined and retired from the service. It was not the last time that the military would be asked to stand alone and

[17] Former civilian assistant to High Commissioner Admiral Georges Thierry d'Argenlieu (1945-1947) and successor in the same position to Emile Bollaert.

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face censure for the consequences of the acts of politicians. For there would be Cao Bang . . . and Dien Bien Phu . . . and Suez . . . and Sakhiet-Sidi-Youssef. . . . Gradually the military command started to deplore the system they served and to reason that a political orientation was perhaps the best defense against political abuse.

If the isolation of the Army from the Nation and the manipulation of the services by a flimsy progression of glue-and-tarpaper governments stand out as the major factors contributing to the French military *malaise,* there were also many petty grievances contributing to the sum total. Salaries were abysmally low; privileges of rank *vis-à-vis* the horde of civil servants of a semi-*dirigiste* state were ludicrous and humiliating.[18] Relations between French soldiers of all ranks and their own civilian population had deteriorated immeasurably. As Girardet writes: "Less than ten years after the end of the [Second World] war the feeling that seems to dominate with regard [to the Army] in a very large sector of opinion is that of a rarely malevolent but willingly defiant indifference."[19] Then, at the highest echelons, the fight over the merits of EDC was bitter, divisive, and inconclusive. Frenchmen were just learning that they were expected to be Europeans as well, and they were uncertain and belligerent as to the extent of their commitment. To be sure, there was the "glamorous" occupation of Germany *(la petite revanche),* "where the colonel, with his villa, gave receptions and the second lieutenants danced, as they had in earlier times."[20] Also, French commanders shared the defense of the West with their military allies. But these external contacts were themselves disillusioning. They revealed that the nation had lost much virtue and power compared with the Greats. At home there was the distracting experiment of Gaullism (1947-1951), which won many sympathizers in military circles but repelled others, and was threatening, once it came to power, to reward the faithful and punish the hesitators.

Finally, there was Indochina.

[18] Planchais, *op. cit.,* pp. 17-18.

[19] Raoul Girardet, *La Société Militaire dans la France contemporaine, 1815-1939* (Paris, 1953), p. 322.

[20] Planchais, *op. cit.,* p. 25.

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V

Political pressure as a military principle arose partly from *ex post facto* observation of the many errors perpetrated in the waging of the Indochina campaigns. The Communist enemy had understood the techniques of political conflict. This led French theorists to accept the reality of *la guerre révolutionnaire,* an ideologically-inspired subversive war waged not for the conquest of terrain or the destruction of armies but for the minds of the population.[21] Whatever the moral and practical merit of this doctrine, it represented an attempt to formulate that grand strategy which, in the opinion of many, should have dictated the entire conduct of operations. The more one wrestled with the problem of what had gone wrong in Indochina—aside from the more obvious complaints that the government had followed a vacillating political policy, spent too little money, failed to provide the most effective armament and transport, especially helicopters—the more one realized the necessity of subordinating all political activity to the demands of the military effort. This did not mean the suppression of politics, but its total conversion into a legitimate means of warfare, as the enemy itself had understood. Or, to make the point in a paraphrase, "in the midst of *la guerre révolutionnaire* civil administration is too important a business to be left in the hands of the functionaries." This principle was later to receive a full test in Algeria, where there was not, however, the supplementary problem—from the French point of view—of dealing with the sensibilities of a nominally independent country.[22]

The recognition of the political aspects of modern warfare had the inevitable result that the Army, after a long history of non-interference, became involved in many spheres of domestic politics. This did not mean that it was filled with a passion for the traditional forms of political manipulation. Its position had no real connection with the parliamentary concepts of Left and Right or even with ideas of liberty or repression. It could admire

[21] See George A. Kelly, "Revolutionary War and Psychological Action," in *Military Review,* XI, No. 7 (October 1960), pp. 4-13.

[22] Vietnam was, by this time, a nominally independent nation within the French Union, its status having been regulated by the Auriol-Bao Dai agreements of March 8, 1949.

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whatever was practical, whatever served its own purposes, without becoming sentimentally involved in doctrinal issues.

Nevertheless, the political methods favored by the Army were those of the Right. There were two reasons for this. One was expediency, that is, the fact that allies in opposition to the ineffective regime at home (ruling out an alliance with the Communists as really a foreign alliance) seemed destined to appear on the Right, as the Poujadist movement was soon to demonstrate. The second reason was that the Army, both by nature and for practical reasons, looked with some favor on certain totalitarian shortcuts to its goals.

It was significant, however, that the Army could at the same time endorse the manhandling of prisoners and efforts to raise the standard of living of the *indigènes*. It was not attached to any school of political thought, but dedicated to the task of winning a war and pacifying a country. The means might be denounced as morally indefensible. The only relevant question was whether they were effective.

For the Army did not enter politics to play that game in its traditional ways nor is it doing so today. Instead, it has sought to translate politics into a combat weapon—the famous "septième arme" with all its ramifications of *guerre psychologique* and *action psychologique,* an arm, moreover, having internal as well as external uses. Political war demanded that the base (meaning the government in metropolitan France) be solidified in support of the conduct of military operations, a lesson learned too well from Ho Chi Minh.

Let us momentarily reduce our inquiry to human proportions. As prisoners of the Viet Minh, French officers were subjected to political lectures, study groups, and endless Marxist indoctrination in the most trying circumstances.[23] Some endured five years of this novel and debilitating experience; many more had at least a few months of it. This did not make many Communists: what it did make was a group of embittered professional soldiers who directed whatever hate they could not muster for the Viet Minh to the system, the politicians, and the insouciant civilian population of France in general—the whole complex of demo-

[23] See Commandant Grand d'Esnon and Capitaine Prestat, "L'Endoctrinement des prisonniers de guerre dans les camps du Vietminh," *Revue des Forces terrestres,* No. 6 (October 1956).

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cratic organization that had defended them and itself so badly against a little-understood menace. Jean Planchais compares their hatred of the enemy with "the same hate that the coalition generals felt toward the chiefs of the revolutionary armies and Napoleon: that of the *honnête homme* for the cheater."[24] It is unnecessary to add that the tactics of Napoleon were destined to prevail.

VI

Again and again agonizing questions were asked about the defeat in Indochina. It became imperative to explain why that defeat had occurred. Upon that explanation depended the mental health of an army already suffering from premonitions of inferiority in the world of today and from the anguish induced by a feeling of divorce from the nation it served. There were two leading answers. The first was a traditional answer, that is, one that appealed once again to the dilemma of politics versus force in which so many democratic countries, none more than France, found themselves in the last century. It was epitomized by the lament of General Navarre at the conclusion of his book *Agonie de l'Indochine:* "The true reasons for the defeat in Indochina are political ones." This was perhaps justification for the Army, but it pointed no way out of the dilemma and was therefore insufficient. Had not Lyautey himself written in 1901: "We feel out of date, because we are military people. We have been in vain more civilian and more administrative than three-fourths of the colonial professionals, we have in vain given proof of our liberalism and absence of prejudice, *so much so as to make us suspect among our own countrymen. . . .*"[25]

The second answer endorsed Navarre's thesis that the trouble had been political, but gave the word "political" a quite different interpretation. Here is how the argument ran in modern terms. "In Indochina, as in China, as in Korea, as elsewhere, we observe that the strongest seems to be beaten by the weakest," Colonel Lacheroy was later to exclaim at a lecture given in Nice on July 20, 1957. "Why? Because the norms we used for weighing our

[24] "L'Armée et l'Action Psychologique, I," *Le Monde,* June 25, 1958.

[25] Louis H. G. Lyautey to Max LeClerc, March 25, 1901. *Lettres du Sud de Madagascar, 1900-1902* (Paris, 1935), p. 74.

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opposing forces, those traditional norms, are dead. We have to face up to a novel form of warfare, novel in its conceptions and novel in its achievements."[26]

The certitude that France must learn how to fight a new kind of war that is expressed in this second answer was perhaps nothing more than a provisional hypothesis in 1954. The anguish produced by a cruel war and a humiliating defeat was not the most desirable stimulus for the task of remaking France. But it was the main stimulus in the case of the Army, although later another war, by providing the nation momentarily with a deceptive intoxication of unity, was to delay the process of self-healing of a vigorous race and richly endowed country.

VII

Between these wars—or, better, as one died away and the other flared up, for they are almost consecutive—the Army strode back into politics. The advance was sounded by the brilliant, dogmatic General Lionel Max Chassin, a leading strategist and military author, who had commanded the French aviation in Indochina and observed many specific factors that affected the outcome of that war. In a much-noted article in the *Revue Militaire d'Information* published in 1954 he wrote in part: "It is time for the Army to cease being the *grande muette*. The time has come for the free world, unless it wishes to die a violent death, to apply certain of its adversary's methods. And one of these methods—probably the most important—resides in the ideological rôle which, behind the Iron Curtain, has been assigned to the military forces."[27] Again, two years later, the general enlarged on his thinking. "What can the Western nations do to avoid the accomplishment of Mao's plan for world conquest? We must oppose a struggle based on subversion with the same weapons, oppose faith with faith, propaganda with propaganda, and an insidious and powerful ideology with a superior one capable of winning the hearts of men."[28]

There was little satisfaction in defending a regime that, by

[26] Charles Lacheroy, "La Guerre Révolutionnaire," in *La Défense Nationale* (Paris, 1958) p. 310.

[27] *Revue Militaire d'Information,* October 1954, p. 74.

[28] "Vers un Encerclement de l'Occident," *Revue de Défense Nationale,* May 1956, p. 548.

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majority opinion, was criminally squandering France's overseas possessions, one after the other, and sinking the nation deeper and deeper into a morass of venality and *dosage*. The creation of the *idéologie nationale* for which General Chassin had called was seen to require the transformation or overthrow of the Fourth Republic. But this could not be said openly. Therefore, the "defense of the West" was called in as a euphemism. This does not mean that these military ideologists did not believe themselves genuinely attached to "Western values and tradition," but by "Western values" they understood the traditional values of France. Certainly, they did not mean any further extension of European supranationalism, especially if it involved the military forces, because that would have separated them even further from the nation whose essential and distinctive quality they believed themselves to embody as well as to protect.

This belief grew steadily stronger. Isolated and turned in on itself, not so much by its own wish as by disgust at the prevailing political chaos and by divorce from the vital sources of civil activity, the French military structure became increasingly prone to regard itself as the psychological homeland of the *pays réel*, from which all the rest was, more or less, a monstrous aberration. More and more, the Army was seen by its leaders, many of whom had once quarreled bitterly with each other, as the core of the *rénovation*, the motive force in the reforging of national unity and purpose. It was not so much a question of the type of government, except among those of the extreme fringe; democracy was, apparently, the form most acceptable to that Occident which the military writers professed was at stake in the jungles of Tonkin, and they were not, after all, constitutional lawyers like Michel Debré. As Planchais has put it: "Republic, then, let it be, since that was apparently the spot situated geometrically between a fascism that had officially disappeared from the planet and communism. . . . But a Republic that knows what it wants. And, according to all appearances, this is precisely what it didn't know."[29]

There were, to be sure, more genuinely "republican" generals than this—a handful of them—who intellectually resisted the consequences of their distress and who would neglect to express

[29] Planchais, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

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their sympathetic solidarity in May, 1958.[30] But they were a small minority who commanded little solid admiration in the middle ranks of the officer corps, and it would be no task whatever to neutralize or isolate these convictions when the great ground swell of indignation finally burst forth. It would always be more convenient to be removed from the scene of the battle, and keep one's nose clean. Both those personally involved and those professionally disinterested were to receive promotions, without apparent bias and with a sage concern for unity, when de Gaulle returned to power.

VIII

What we have written about the Army ("armée de terre") holds generally true for the other services, although they have had a tendency to follow rather than innovate. The military *malaise* of 1954-1958 was general and comprehensive, and all three services reacted spontaneously against the political irresponsibility and civic *je m'enfouisme* of the period, which the military leaders perceived through a magnifying optic. It was natural that the Army, as the largest of the three and the one that had suffered the deepest humiliation, should lead the counterattack. The Navy, damaged in reputation by its virtually complete attachment to Vichy and its former chief, Admiral Darlan, had been extremely chary of politics in the postwar period and especially defensive and unsure of itself. Yet its sentiments were unmistakable when the chips were down, as its activities of the middle of May, 1958, were to demonstrate abundantly to the frustrated displeasure of MM. Moch and de Chevigné when they envisaged the reconquest of Corsica.[31] The Air Force, more independent of the venal maneuverings of the politicians and allegedly most radical in personnel (due perhaps in part to the legacy of M. Pierre Cot and the postwar re-

[30] For example, the Brombergers in *Les Treize Complots* (p. 379) cite General Gillet, military commander of the district of Marseilles, as one who refused Salan's overtures for "Operation Resurrection" (the projected *coup d'état* in the *métropole*). Other leaders were lukewarm, and certain influential persons were not even sounded out. However, the government doubted the loyalty of even the C.R.S. (Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité), and the Socialists more than once spoke wistfully of arming the workers.

[31] See J.-R. Tournoux, *Secrets d'Etat* (Paris, 1960), pp. 335-337.

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cruitment of M. Charles Tillon), was still to deny its planes to the Republican government of M. Pflimlin, while one of its outstanding leaders, General Jouhaud, stood by the side of General Salan during the dramatic days of the Forum. Thus there was virtual consent and mutual coöperation among the three services and a parallel development of soul-searching.

Common goals were accepted. Without venturing toward too specific an analysis of how these goals were to be achieved, if at all, or even whether their realization would require the magical intervention of General de Gaulle (who, contrary to popular myth, is not excessively loved in military circles), the service leaders were broadly agreed on the following points: 1) that the existing regime needed a radical reshaping and change of direction bolstered by constitutional guarantees of stability; and 2) that the moral fibre of the nation as a whole was in serious need of reinforcement. The corollary of these arguments was that the military organization seemed the only coherent group fitted to take the lead. But beyond this observation, which was in itself, we must emphasize, merely a strongly felt moral imperative and not an invitation to coup d'état, there was little agreement on a plan of action. Governments seemed condemned to increase in fragility and lack of moral stature and the spirit of the nation seemed constantly threatened with slow decay, without the real possibility that anything could or would be done about it. It was into this breach that the advocates of *l'action psychologique* eventually stepped with both a plan and a method, and this in great measure explains why, contrary to normal experience, the younger officers were temporarily so successful in imposing a number of views on their superiors and elders.

IX

The supreme irony of the situation we have described is perhaps that, regardless of the many particular events of the decade 1945-1955 which impelled the French Army to seek a political orientation, broad circumstances affecting international relationships, the nature of total war, and the evolution of the modern state were pointing in the same direction.[32] Defense

[32] For an analysis of this problem, see M. Megret, "Fonction Politique de l'Armée," in *La Défense Nationale,* pp. 133-182.

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policy has become in the fullest sense national policy, and any artificial separation between the two, which was characteristic of "depolitization," can no longer be tolerated. If there had been less unwillingness on the part of self-styled defenders of "liberal institutions" in France to make a place for the military in the national society and to recognize that an element of such potential influence can neither be kept from prominence nor ignored, an orderly plan for reintegration (which would have been neither that of Jaurès nor the one that imposed itself so precipitously in 1958, but something both humane and plausible) might have been achieved. Instead of feeding its cadres heavy doses of an indoctrination which, if not seditious, was at least perilously at odds with the ambiguous *mystique* of the government, the Army might have been willing to coöperate in a genuine national enterprise of renovation, one in which the soldier and the syndicalist, the farmer and the shopkeeper could have rubbed shoulders. The coöperation briefly achieved in agriculture between the Army and the farmers of les Landes under the impetus of M. Gatheron in 1946[33] might have become a model for such activity. Some sort of unity between the intellectuals of France—the group most deeply suspicious of all aspects of the Army—and the most intelligent military leaders, who, no less than the *lycée* and university professors, must today be men of knowledge and vision, might have been forged. Instead, the Army has attained real camaraderie only with the most retrograde elements of the population, in particular the settlers of Algeria, who, anxious for their patrimony, willingly ignore all else. The intellectuals, with remarkable lack of foresight, have attacked all military prerogatives indiscriminately, proving themselves as guilty of unrationalized passion and traditional prejudice as any other social element.

The period in which the Army could have made an orderly place for itself in the nation has long since passed. Another chance may come, but for the present—unless an Algerian settlement intervenes—the outlook is one of growing rather than lessening disharmony. For the Army has returned to politics, admittedly with some restraint but nevertheless in a way that is basically undesirable and has already borne bitter conse-

[33] Planchais describes this experiment whereby soldiers collaborated in crop-harvesting. See *Le Malaise*, pp. 105-106.

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quences. Neither the unity of the nation nor that of the Army has been served.

"Apolitism" is dead in a country and a world where politics at every turn transcends the limited range of "liberal" institutionalized forms. A "total" politics has developed as the logical complement of "total war." The curious persistence in ignoring this fact and going on the assumption that things can proceed as they did in less dangerous decades only slows down that process of perfecting a new and humane art of politics over which all shoulders should be bent in desperate labor. It results in a situation in which politically conscious and biased groups bring forth systems and ideas that are malformed and unstable because they are not the product of coöperative labor. This is the danger in national renovation which flows from a single source, especially one that has no unchallengeable popular credentials.

The French Army is, to be sure, not a monolith but a petty plurality of quite divergent interpretations of the national interest. Not only are these differences manifest today in Algeria, but one must consider the influential group of high officers who have cut their teeth in NATO, SHAPE, and Germany. There is little danger that France will, in the future, throw up a "government of major generals," even in the lacuna that would be caused by General de Gaulle's disappearance from the political scene. However, this is a highly sensitive and deeply introspective Army. If, as in the past, its concern for its own unity remains a paramount issue, it may still be tempted to take the lead from intemperate elements, provided that they succeed in creating an emotional common denominator stressing the superior patriotism and political morality of the *métier.*

Postscript, May 1961

Although the foregoing essay is not intended to cover the Algerian War and its side-effects in more than the broadest terms, a few reflections on the present situation are appropriate. In the course of the past five years the Army developed some deep-rooted complexes about Algeria; as Raoul Girardet sensitively puts it, Algeria became a part of the "sentimental geography of the French Army." The most critical of these complexes, because the most general, was the intense soul-searching practiced by many officers over the question of loyalty and commit-

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ment. The honor of the Army was felt to be committed in the *pacification* and, in some cases, in the advancement of the indigenous social welfare. This made it difficult for a part of the Army that was not otherwise politically "activist" to accept de Gaulle's formulas of negotiation and self-determination.

In the second instance, parts of the Army (especially in the Algiers sector) were highly susceptible to what has been called the "Algerian intoxication," that is, a feeling of solidarity with the settlers and a cardinal devotion to the premise of *Algérie française*. The revelations of the "trial of the barricades" (November, 1960-March, 1961) as well as the background of the military coup of April, 1961, make this amply clear.

Thirdly, there is the lingering and ambiguous battle which has been fought in the higher staffs between the proponents of the doctrine known broadly as *la guerre subversive* and those of a more classical form of warfare. The former, encompassing not only the psychological action bureaus but many line officers as well, owe much of their inspiration to an analysis of Marxist dialectics and bitter reflection on some of the politico-military techniques of the enemy. They have steadfastly insisted that wars of the Algerian type must be fought for the allegiances of the population, not for strict military objectives. Massu was a convert to this doctrine; interestingly but not surprisingly, none of the three most recent supreme commanders in Algeria (Challe, Crépin, Gambiez) has endorsed the primacy of *la guerre subversive*. Challe, though powerfully aided by a camarilla of "psychological" colonels—Godard, Gardes, Broizat, Lacheroy, and others—in the organization of the recent rebellion, lent his weight to the cause for other motives.

The "psychologues" have maintained—with some justice—that since the war in Algeria is "revolutionary" in character, government-directed military operations, though impressive in traditional terms (*katiba*-smashing), have been designed to lose it. As the F.L.N. has suffered military defeat, its political power has vastly increased. In short, the prospect has been one of victory in battle and loss of the war—defeat with honor. But many leaders of the Army perceive no honor whatever in defeat, especially those who have equated the F.L.N. with the world-wide communist conspiracy and their action with the "defense of the West."

The Army had been tense and agonized, many of its chiefs

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hanging on a razor-thin balance of decision, at the time of the insurrection of January 24, 1960. The experience of May 13, 1958, had already obscured the mechanism of traditional obedience. The onset of negotiations with the G.P.R.A. (Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne)—contrary to the assurance with which de Gaulle had restrained the Army a year earlier—triggered the decision to act in April. Although specific comment on this event must await deeper analysis, there is every reason to believe that this is the case of an elaborate plot that misfired: a plot, furthermore, born out of a chronic discontent whose roots go deep.

Throughout its postwar career the almost pathological concern of the French Army has been for its own unity, many times threatened by national divisions. This worry, above all, held the Army in line in 1960. As General Gracieux (former commander of the 10th Parachute Division, and now Inspector-General of Airborne Troops) testified at the "trial of the barricades" with reference to the events of January, 1960: "I say merely that there are not two armies, but only a single one which obeys. If there had been two armies I would no longer be wearing the uniform I wear." This reflex of unity also accounts for the fact that the April rebellion died swiftly once it became apparent that the majority of the national forces had opted for obedience to the government; Challe attempted to limit the damage.

But much damage has been done. There are today two armies—contrary to what General Gracieux had thought—the one obedient, the other disloyal—with, in many cases, only the criterion of action, not of thought, separating them. Several hundred superior officers are reported to be under arrest. Others, who remained loyal, are not spiritually at ease with themselves nor apt to become so. Root-and-branch reconstruction and "atomic" escapism are recommended; how they are to be brought about is another question. Everything suggests that the anguish of the Army is far from over. The deep political consequences of its return from Algeria will have to be measured.

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BRITISH LABOR'S "NEW LEFT"

THE popular image of the British Labour party's current malaise is that of a clash between traditionalists, still adhering to the old socialist slogans, and revisionists who, while considering themselves Socialists, have opted for pragmatic reform within the framework of a mixed economy. To be sure, the picture is complicated by the conflict over England's nuclear posture (or lack of posture) but this does not seriously influence the stereotype.

While the image may be correct in terms of votes at party conferences or even in Parliament, it is a gross over-simplification when applied to the battle of words. For there is in England a post-revisionist left—a left which grew up amidst the disillusion of the postwar years and seeks to transcend it. Those who compose the new left self-consciously reject the traditional categories (although they are sympathetic to them) and offer an analysis of the present, and a program for the future which take revisionism into account.

The dominant intellectual organ of the new left is the *New Left Review*. However, the group is producing an ever increasing number of books and pamphlets. In addition, echoes of its arguments are to be found in the occasional releases of the "Victory for Socialism" group within the Parliamentary Labour party, and in the pages of the ever militant *Tribune*. In fact even the élite *New Stateman and Nation* is beginning to take cognizance of its analyses, and the writings of so facile a polemicist as R. H. S. Crossman indicate that, for intellectuals at least, the arguments of the group represent the very latest in "real" socialist rhetoric.

In a sense the term "group" is a misnomer, for divergencies of opinion among its members are considerable. However, one can develop certain generalizations, provided one places the new left in context.

I

During the 1930's the intellectual left within the Labour party was avowedly Marxist, or at least heavily influenced by

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Marx. Thus, Stafford Cripps, Harold Laski, and Aneurin Bevan were convinced that capitalism was facing inevitable collapse; that National Socialism represented its last gasp in the age of imperialism, and that, more likely than not, the middle classes would turn fascist before they would accept a socialist England. They were also convinced that the coming of socialism would end imperialism and war; that the Soviet Union, despite its weaknesses, was essentially a socialist society, and that Communists and Socialists were brothers under the skin who disagreed only as to means. Finally, they were convinced that despite present and future difficulties the increasing class consciousness of the workers, that is, The People, would inevitably result in a socialist society. Thus, following Marx, they conceived of their task as confined to that of a "midwife."

While the influence of the left on policy-making within the Labour party was relatively limited, their intellectual prestige was great. Even moderates like Clement Attlee, who by no means can be classified as an intellectual, used quasi-Marxist slogans when he spoke and wrote.

The postwar experience changed all of this. The advent of a Labour government, the cold war, the Conservative victory of 1951, and the emergence of a consumer society, produced a change of mood among the new generation of intellectuals and forced many of the older generation to re-think their positions. In the universities, Conservatism (with a capital C) became increasingly respectable among students, and within the Labour party a revisionist trend developed.

Certain propositions were common both to the new Conservatism, and the new revisionism. Nationalization had not brought about utopia. The brave new world had not come into existence. The working class behaved as it always had and England faced the same economic problems. More than this, it was quite evident that the bureaucratic problems faced by a socialist regime were tremendous; that attempts to develop programs of working class participation in the running of industry had proven a fiasco; and that people were much more interested in their own narrow economic satisfactions than in displaying public spirit. Finally, capitalism had not collapsed. Under the impact of the "Keynsian revolution" (now accepted by almost every one) it seemed to have acquired new vigor. In fact the increasing pace of mass production was bringing about that

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social equality and economic affluence which Socialists had always argued could only come after the downfall of capitalism.

To the new generation of Conservative intellectuals these "facts" seemed to warrant a return to tradition. One could accept the welfare state and modernity, but one had to leave room for a substantial private sector as well as for a governing élite. Only then could one overcome the threats of a new democratic mass culture which in its worst aspects had come to resemble that of the United States. The revisionists within the Labour party, people like Anthony Crosland and Douglas Jay, took another tack. It was true that class differences had eroded; it was also true that some of the indictments of socialism were correct, and, finally, it was true that the central problem of the future was how to increase productivity rather than how to bring about utopia. Nevertheless, Crosland and others have retained a moral commitment to a society which, in social terms at least, is classless.

Interestingly enough the revisionists, unlike the Conservatives and (as we shall see) the new left, do not bemoan the advent of "mass culture," and the "Americanization" of British life. Crosland, for example, still argues that the end result of economic and political policy is to maximize the satisfaction of individually determined wants, and refuses to accept the contention that an élite's conception of what is desirable should be determinative. Thus he unabashedly admires the social classlessness of American and Swedish society.

In his emphasis on a mixed economy and pragmatic reforms, Crosland is self-consciously un-ideological, and one cannot help but agree with his left wing critics that when he calls himself a Socialist, it is primarily a rhetorical device. If his suggestions and those of people like him are followed, there can be little question but that the Labour party will become a party of social reform rather than of socialism.

In the period from 1950 to 1956, Crosland's position became increasingly respectable. For the first time since 1930, then, an important segment of Labour party intellectuals were thinking on the basis of non-Marxist (and even non-socialist) assumptions.

It was as a response to the intellectual challenge of the new Conservatism and revisionism that the new left emerged. The *Universities and Left Review* was founded in 1957 by a group of Oxford undergraduates, and *The New Reasoner* by a num-

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ber of ex-Communists and Trotskyites who still retained their faith in a broader vision than revisionism allowed. The two journals merged to form the *New Left Review* in late 1959.

The writers for the *New Left Review* would accept much of the revisionist critique of the thinking of the 1930's. Marx was wrong (as were Laski, Cripps, and Bevan) about the collapse of capitalism. A capitalist economic order can survive indefinitely. While it is undoubtedly true that capitalism is not nearly so efficient as a fully socialized economy, it can continue to satisfy the constantly increasing personal needs which it creates.

Thus the new left has abandoned inevitability. If it opts for socialism today, and by socialism it means full socialism, it is on other grounds. Capitalism may serve "artificial" personal needs but it is unable to serve rational public needs. For example, British industry is producing an ever larger number of motor cars, while the system of public transportation declines and London increasingly resembles New York in terms of traffic problems at least. Or cities burgeon out into suburbs, but the core of the city rots and living becomes ever more uncomfortable. The list could be extended indefinitely. In the long run the upshot will be that the capitalist West (and especially England) will find itself falling further and further behind socialist countries such as the Soviet Union not only in terms of absolute economic growth but in all of those things which go to make up a humane civilization.

The argument may sound familiar and it should. For the writers of the new left have derived considerable inspiration from an American author. Galbraith's *Affluent Society* has provided them with manna from heaven, though it has also been used by the revisionist left. Writers like Edward Thompson, Stuart Hall and others would argue, however, that Galbraith's or Crosland's pragmatic solutions represent only pious hopes, for public needs cannot be served except under a system of public ownership.

The new left levels still other arguments against a capitalist regime, and these too are derived largely from an American author. According to such writers as Michael Barratt-Brown, Stuart Hall, Peter Sedgwick and others, capitalism is producing a new élite and the concentration of irresponsible economic power is increasing. The "insiders" of the big corporations now

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control England, not the people, and they control England in terms of their own narrow economic interests. Taking off from C. Wright Mills' *The Power Elite,* these writers claim that the myth which pictures economic power as passing from owners to managers, is indeed a myth and that Marx's inevitable law of capitalist concentration is still relevant. Nor is it true, they argue, that the new masters are more responsible than the old, as A. A. Berle has argued in this country. Rather, the motives are the same and the mechanisms of control even more insidious. The new left, therefore, calls for a Labour party with a policy of militant socialism; a party committed to nationalize the economy as rapidly as possible when it comes to power.

Here the new left is faced with a problem—a problem which it often, with some honesty, has raised for itself. If capitalist collapse is not inevitable, and workers seem to be leaving the Labour party under the impact of the new affluence, how can a truly socialist party maintain itself and come to power? To this question the new left offers no answer, beyond the hope that "the people" can be educated to a realization of the necessity for such changes. As one wades through the pages of their rhetoric, one is reminded of the criticisms which Marx leveled against the Left Hegelians in Germany, and, by extension, against all "utopians." In *The German Ideology* Marx noted:

> Once upon a time an honest fellow had the idea that men drowned in water only because they were possessed with the idea of gravity. If they were to knock this idea out of their heads . . . they would be sublime proof against any danger from water. His whole life long he fought against the illusion of gravity, of whose harmful results all statistics brought him new and manifold evidence. This honest fellow was the type of the new revolutionary philosophers in Germany.

In truth, the new left is caught on the horns of a dilemma. If they drop inevitability they are reduced to sterile moralizing or the acceptance of the need for a revolutionary élite—but then there is little to distinguish them from the communist position, which they reject on other grounds. And their dilemma is heightened by their analysis of the failure of the first Labour government and the objective needs of the transition to socialism.

The revisionists and the Conservatives both point to the period 1945-1950 as evidence of the failure of traditional socialist categories. Their arguments, outlined earlier in the essay,

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are all drawn from the palpable failure of England's "socialist" revolution. The new left agrees that nationalization did not solve all problems, as agree they must if they are to effectively criticize an England which has accepted and incorporated the reforms of 1945-1950.

But, they argue, the failure came not from attempting too much but rather from attempting too little. The partial and reformist program of the Labour party did not succeed in transforming the bases of society. Rather, all the Labour party really did was to graft reforms on to a capitalist sub-structure. This is why England and Englishmen were not transformed. This is why the "new Jerusalem" has not yet been constructed. Here, again, the new left relies on the analysis of an American writer. Arnold Rogow's study, *The Labour Government and British Industry, 1945-1951,* is cited again and again to show how the Labour government retreated in the face of capitalist pressures.

It is little wonder then that the new left, on the whole, still admires Lenin and lays the evils of the Soviet system to Stalin's paranoia or to Deutscher's "dialectic of backwardness." One suspects that they long to be Leninists themselves but do not quite have the nerve. They are, to use Alfred Kazin's pungent phrase, "smiling Leninists."

II

The rejection of inevitability has had other consequences for the thinking of the new left. Left wing intellectuals in the 1930's paid relatively little attention to areas other than the economic, for, to them, the economic issue was crucial, and economic change would automatically produce the good society. But, if the equation no longer holds good one must be actively concerned with thought and action on a wider front.

Further, while Marxist, the left wing intellectuals of the 1930's, were also positivists. Values were matters of personal taste. One could not, they argued, prove that one value judgment was superior to another. The members of the left saw no contradiction in these two positions, of course. It was psychologically quite easy to attack the idea of an objective basis for values as obsolete while, at the same time, fighting for the inevitable victory of the society which was coming into being.

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Once again, however, if inevitability is now questionable, one has to justify taking action to achieve an end which is freely chosen, and which large numbers of people are not ever likely to accept.

It is little wonder, then, that the new left is now engaged in the dual task of outlining in detail the future society and, at the same time, attempting to justify it. Thus, the pages of the *New Left Review* are filled both with literary and social analyses of culture and society as well as abstruse discussions of ethical philosophy. Here the writers have turned to the essays of the young Marx, for they claim to find in these writings the basis for a humanistic ethic which transcends what they now consider to be the conservative implications of the positivistic and linguistic analysis so characteristic, they will argue, of the current "establishment."

These analyses serve still another purpose. The Conservative critique of socialism has emphasized the degenerative effects of equality upon culture, and, as noted earlier, Conservatives take their evidence both from the American and the current English scene. The new left, unlike the revisionists, agrees in deploring "mass culture," but, they argue, mass culture is not the inevitable result of democratization.

First of all, it is possible to raise the level of culture through concerted effort, and here their Leninist strand comes out once again. More importantly, however, the level of present culture, or rather, the trends in contemporary culture, are not the result of democratization but of capitalism. For it is capitalist society with its acquisitive emphases and its commercial orientation which corrupts culture. Given proper direction the level of culture will, in a socialist society, rise to new heights. These arguments have been advanced by Raymond Williams in *Culture and Society, 1780-1950,* and in other essays.

Further, those who are so concerned with the decline of culture, undoubtedly view it erroneously. As Williams puts it, culture is "ordinary." That is, culture is what people think and do, and consequently the culture of the working class is no less culture than the culture of those who consider themselves aristocrats. In fact, Williams and others go much further than this. The new left, on the whole, is directing a sustained attack upon British middle class values. They find its self-restraint stifling, its morality full of pious cant, and its conceptions of

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civilized living effete. They offer instead a conception of a healthy culture as one which emerges spontaneously from the free satisfaction of basic, and hence "natural," instinctual drives.

The attack is an interesting one, because it coincides with the development of a new generation of writers, the so-called "angry young men," personified by such people as John Wain, John Osborne, Alan Sillitoe, Kingsley Amis, and John Braine. These writers also mock the conventional values of English society, and glorify the anarchic individual: aggressive, self-centered, sexually potent, unrestrained by traditional standards of gentility.

Not surprisingly, many of these angry young men consider themselves to be Socialists of the left, and the new left looks upon them with considerable sympathy. The association is quite new to British political criticism. In France, for example, radicalism has always been associated very closely with a literary attack upon the standards of bourgeois culture, and socialism represented just as much a criticism of traditional morality as it did of traditional politics. In England the situation was quite different and, in fact, continental Socialists usually found their British brethren quite stuffy and very "English." Sir Stafford Cripps or Aneurin Bevan might have hated what they considered to be the inequities of the political and economic system, but their barbs were directed against this system alone. Each of them in his own way assumed the conventional values of English life.

All this has now changed and the change is no accident. Both the new left and the angry young men are products of an important and developing re-structuring of British social life. In the past English society has been characterized by a unique capacity to retain traditional social values, despite considerable economic and political transformation. This absorptive capacity has finally broken down, and the traditional patterns of English social life are eroding at an ever more rapid rate under the impact of modernity. Both the literary and political critics of English society reflect this breakdown as they are contributing to it.

However, the fact that these values are disappearing does not necessarily constitute complete progress. The traditional patterns of civility so characteristic of English society may have been marked by cant and stuffiness, and those who espoused them may have been blind to a great deal of suffering. Nevertheless, these

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social life which was relatively humane
at of a great many other class-ridden
th many not so class-ridden. The English
ented an ideal which was directed toward a
n standard of civilized existence. In many ways
of the new left and the new literary generation is far
active. Whether they realize it or not, the goals they
involve a lowering of the level of culture to what is least
human in men. Theirs is a contribution to un-civilization.

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HOME RULE—A CRITICAL APPRAISAL

IN recent years much has been written and said about the problem of increasing the effectiveness of local government in rapidly expanding urban centers. "Give us home rule and we'll solve these problems ourselves," is a demand frequently heard. This enthusiasm for home rule has not been diminished by decades of rejection and rebuff from legislatures, courts and, on many occasions, voters.

Is home rule the solution to the governmental problems which plague so many of our metropolitan areas? Has home rule made a major contribution to the cause of good local government? Or has home rule proved to be a myth and a delusion? Has it hurt more than it has helped?

It is now eighty-six years since the first clause was written into a state (Missouri) constitution granting to a municipality (St. Louis) some measure of local self-government. During the succeeding fifty years another fifteen states provided for some form of municipal home rule and other states have done so during the past thirty-five years. It is time for a critical reappraisal of this experience.

I

Home rule has proven to be valuable in at least four aspects of local government during the transitional period in which America changed from a predominantly rural to an almost completely urbanized society.

In the first place, the home rule concept has provided for variations in the structure of local government. The growth in the number, variety and complexity of our cities has made it highly desirable to have a form of government that could adjust itself to local circumstances. This freedom to experiment with the form and structure of local government has been a major factor in the evolution of our contemporary process of local government. Not all of the experiments have been successful and others, such as the commission plan, have lost some of their early attractiveness. Nevertheless many significant advances in the management of municipal affairs have resulted from the

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comparative ease with which a community can remodel its city government. Unquestionably many improvements can be and have been achieved in states without either a constitutional or legislative provision for municipal home rule, but home rule has encouraged and facilitated such changes.

Secondly, home rule has helped state legislators by relieving them of many of the local bills that used to be a great burden to their predecessors. An extreme example of what could happen in the old days is an act adopted by the Ohio legislature in 1868. Although classified as a "General" act it really applied only to Cincinnati. "The City Council of any city of the first class having a population exceeding 150,000 shall have the power to issue the bonds of such city in any sum not exceeding $150,000, to be used for the purpose of completing the Eggleston Avenue sewer."[1] A few years ago an analysis was made of the laws enacted by the 1953 session of the General Assembly of Indiana as part of a study to determine if that state should adopt a municipal home rule amendment to its constitution. Out of 874 bills that were introduced, 283 were enacted into law. The survey showed that 122 (over 40 per cent) of these laws related to local matters. They represented a significant loss of time to a legislature that is limited to a 61-day biennial session.[2] Both city and state officials owe a word of thanks to the growth of home rule for freeing them from such a procedure as this to solve a purely local problem.

Unquestionably home rule also has often provided the declared basis for opposition to proposed legislation which was actually being opposed for other, less respectable reasons. Likewise home rule has given many a harassed legislator a plausible basis for his vote which could not be explained in any other manner without political embarrassment.

Thirdly, home rule has sometimes provided a satisfactory solution to the jurisdictional problems which plague so many urban centers. The most notable examples are in Texas, where Houston, Dallas, Fort Worth, El Paso and other home rule cities have been able to keep ahead of mushrooming growth via the

[1] Quoted in *Constitutional Home Rule for Ohio Cities* published by The Municipal Association of Cleveland, January, 1912, p. 7.

[2] Carl L. Heyerdahl, "Indiana Still Seeks Home Rule" in *National Municipal Review*, Vol. XLIII, No. 4 (April 1954), pp. 182-184.

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annexation process. By granting to self-chartered cities the right to establish their own boundaries and to annex adjacent land unilaterally, Texas has offered a relatively simple answer to the problem of governing a growing metropolitan area. The value of this provision becomes most apparent when one studies the jurisdictional jungle surrounding other cities which have not been able to annex the growing urban fringe.

A more general, but very significant, result of home rule has been the creation of a favorable climate for the growth of municipal government. The home rule concept has encouraged cities to attempt solutions to their problems without continually running to the state legislature. It has encouraged many able people to participate in local government who might have shied away from accepting such responsibilities without the assurance of home rule. This psychological value of home rule is hard to overestimate. It has given cities the status necessary to become partners with the federal government in such matters as urban renewal and has helped to build up the general self confidence of city officials in their relations with state officials. Joseph S. Clark, the former mayor of Philadelphia, put the point well when he called home rule a "good hollering point" in a city's negotiations with the state legislature.[3] It is a good hollering point because the phrase "home rule" has achieved an unassailable position similar to that of motherhood. A contemporary authority on city government has called this psychological value the greatest benefit to be derived from home rule.[4]

II

Any comprehensive analysis of the results of home rule must recognize that this term has been used to convey a variety of ideas and concepts. Basically these may be divided into two categories, a narrow academic definition and a much broader popular usage. The former is usually based on political theory, law and reason; the latter, on emotion and expediency. Within the limits of the narrower definition an alderman may argue that the structure and organization of his city's government should be decided by the local voters. Another alderman will

[3] Quoted in *Modernizing a City Government*, Report of the Chicago Home Rule Commission (Chicago, 1954), p. 367.

[4] Charles R. Adrian, *Governing Urban America* (New York, 1955), p. 161.

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turn to the broader definition as he opposes the state's plans for a projected superhighway. In both examples home rule is used as a supporting argument for the speaker's position although the state's interest obviously is much greater in the second instance than in the first.

Supporters of home rule may argue that it is unfair to condemn the concept for damage resulting from a misuse of the term and therefore some of the following criticisms are unfairly made. However, like many other words and phrases, home rule has come to mean what its many advocates say it means, not what academicians contend it means. It is on this basis that both assets and liabilities are ascribed to the balance sheet for home rule. Unfortunately the "misuse" of the concept appears usually to have provided the basis for criticism rather than praise.

The criticisms of home rule may be summed up under three contentions: (1) that it represents the wrong emphasis at the wrong time; (2) that there has been too much of the wrong kind of home rule; (3) that home rule has not produced the results promised by its advocates.

III

The first criticism is not a new one. A generation ago one of the leading authorities on home rule pointed this out in colorful language. "The seeds of municipal home rule were sown too late in the summer of our urban era to promise a luxuriant crop."[5] However the passing of the years has made it clear that not only was the emphasis on home rule too late in coming, but that when the seeds were planted the resulting growth obscured alternative solutions to the basic problem. This becomes apparent when one recalls that the spreading of the home rule gospel was contemporaneous with the rise of the cities. This probably was only logical as cities had to cope with urban growth and rural legislators simultaneously. It is difficult to condemn the frustrated city fathers for feeling that they could handle the former if only they could be freed from the restrictions of the latter. In retrospect it appears they overestimated the oppressiveness of legislative control and underestimated the

[5] Joseph D. McGoldrick, *Law and Practice of Municipal Home Rule, 1916-1930* (New York, 1933), p. 299.

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state's interest in urban affairs. One can only speculate on what might have happened if city officials had turned to the state for assistance rather than independence. Another unfortunate aspect of this emphasis on home rule when cities were growing so rapidly was that it provided an excuse for legislators to ignore urban problems just at the time when the states should have been giving more attention to the plight of cities.

The expressed willingness of cities to "go it alone" has been in notable contrast to the relationship of rural areas to the state government. An outstanding example is the matter of state-supported research. During past decades agriculture has been declining and cities have been growing, both at relatively rapid rates. Only very recently have states been appropriating money for studies of urban problems, but many states have long had elaborate and expensive research programs devoted to the problems of agriculture.

It might have been more rewarding if the advocates of home rule had spent the past eight or nine decades building up better and closer relations between the cities and the state legislators. This might well have included stronger support for decennial reapportionment of the state legislatures. In many states this has now been postponed so long that any equitable reapportionment is almost impossible because the resulting shift in the balance of power would be too great to be politically acceptable. The inevitable result is an invitation to compromise on the basis for reapportionment. Cities also have themselves to blame in part for rural domination of the legislature. In many states the rural areas send men of genuine ability to the legislature. It is not uncommon for the rural legislator to be a seasoned politician with substantial experience in township, village, city and/or county politics. By contrast urban areas often use their top flight politicians for municipal or congressional offices and the state legislature as a training school for beginners.

Even more serious have been the effects of "wrong emphasis at the wrong time" on state-city relations in areas of joint concern. The rapid urbanization of the nation should have resulted in closer coöperation between the states and the cities. Instead the states have retained a rural orientation and the cities have continued their plea for greater freedom from state control. This division has left many problems unsolved and has found the cities going more and more to Washington for help in such

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matters as urban renewal, mass transit and sewage disposal. It is not the purpose of this essay to evaluate the second development, but it should be noted by advocates of home rule who are tempted to become critics of federal aid to cities.

It is paradoxical that at the same time that the home rule campaign has been carried on, the number of municipal government operations which are local in character is diminishing while the number of functions and services that are of state-wide concern is increasing. This is most apparent in such functions as highways, public health, water pollution abatement and urban renewal. That these are matters of state-wide concern has been recognized not only by the courts and state legislatures, but also by the municipalities that have sought both statutory and financial support from the state. It appears inconsistent for a municipality to seek financial help from the state for a new highway or a similar project on the grounds that it is a matter of concern to the entire state, but seek to exercise complete control over the planning and administration of the project on the grounds of home rule. During the near-century of agitation for home rule, the area of local government appropriate for its application has been growing smaller and smaller.

Another development of major importance for the appraisal of home rule has been the changing nature of the problems of cities. During the last half of the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth a city's chief adversary was often the farmer-dominated state legislature. However, the later suburbanization of population and industry has resulted in an entirely new set of problems for the central city. The home rule concept has provided aid and comfort for those satellite communities that want to remain politically independent of the central city. As a result, in many urban communities the old city-versus-state-legislature conflict has been replaced by a feud between the city and its suburbs. Frequently this division follows political lines as the Republican suburbs are allied with their fellow Republican legislators from rural areas in opposition to the proposals of the big city Democratic members of the legislature. Thus the old "big city vs. farm" division is intensified by partisan quarrels. Arguments about home rule only further complicate the division. The effort spent on promoting home rule might better have been focused on developing new ideas for solving the area-wide problems of politically divided

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urban communities and a unified approach to urban problems.

Home rule also has been running against the tide in that basically it is a decentralizing concept and for at least three decades the overwhelming tendency in American government has been for greater centralization at all levels of government. The larger rôle of the federal government, the assumption by state government of responsibilities in welfare, transportation and taxation, the consolidation of school districts, the widespread adoption of the city manager or strong mayor plan of municipal government, the renewed interest in area-wide metropolitan government and the reduced rôle of township government are examples of this centralizing tendency.

Of course, many people view centralization as deplorable and speak out against it as did General Eisenhower when he was in the White House. Moreover, there are certain counter-forces at work. Among these are the opposition, often more apparent than real, of many officeholders and office seekers; the fragmentation of local government resulting from the growth of suburbs; and the agitation for home rule itself. But these counter-forces are not strong enough to stop the trend to centralization which runs essentially counter to the demand for home rule.

Critics of home rule also argue that its theoretical justification is very limited in scope. It attributes to municipalities a kind of independence that they do not possess. The state-municipal relationship is not that of a federation. References to "cities' rights" are as inappropriate as references to "states' rights" are obsolete. The Civil War defined the latter and the former never existed. It is somewhat ironic that the movement for municipal home rule was in its infancy during the period in our national history when reconstruction symbolized the death of home rule for states. However, the basic idea, that a unit of government acquires certain inalienable and irrevocable rights as a result of its creation, is one that refused to die with the defeat of the Confederacy and has complicated the entire area of public administration. Too often the perpetuation of a political subdivision's existence completely overshadows all other questions including the fundamental one of service to its public. The resistance to school consolidations, the perpetuation of obsolete township governments, and the opposition to the annexation efforts of growing cities are but three of many possible illustrations. Home rule has been a factor in this matter by em-

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phasizing the independence rather than the interdependence of units of government.

IV

While it would be difficult to find many home rule supporters who would agree with this statement, in some ways Americans have had too much home rule already. It is the basis for many of the problems in the nation's metropolitan areas and has been made the excuse for many inexcusable developments. For example, the "right" of an unincorporated urban area to incorporate as a separate municipality, rather than to be annexed to the central city, is supported by home rule arguments.

The states must be held at least partly responsible for the jurisdictional confusion which has developed around many of the nation's large cities. Areas that were economically, socially and culturally a part of the central city were permitted, often encouraged, to incorporate. Likewise in many states the larger cities have been at a severe disadvantage in the distribution of state aid for education, highways, health, recreation and similar services. Frequently home rule is invoked in these situations as a means of defending minority rights. It has a pleasing sound even though in reality a suburban minority may merely be claiming as rights certain advantages which are really privileges that can be granted only at the expense of the general community. Some examples will illustrate the nature of the problem.

In Wisconsin approximately one half of the state income tax paid by an individual is returned to the municipality of his residence. A very small community, almost entirely surrounded by the city of Madison, included the residences of a large number of Madison's wealthiest businessmen. By incorporating as a village this community became a separate municipality and thus cannot be annexed to the central city. The returned income tax makes it possible for the village to support itself with a general property tax rate about one tenth that of Madison. In addition its residents become exempt from the financial burden of such metropolitan problems as urban renewal, highways and a growing school population. Any attempt to eliminate this "tax colony" is met by cries of "home rule."

In the state of Washington the Greater Seattle community has been faced with several area-wide problems including sewage

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disposal, air and water pollution, water supply and comprehensive planning. After a thorough study of the matter the State Legislature enacted legislation permitting the formation of metropolitan councils with authority to perform one or more of several area-wide functions. A specific proposal for metropolitan Seattle was drawn up and submitted to the voters on March 11, 1958. It received the approval of a majority of all persons voting. However the "home rule" theory required that the suburbs, although containing only a minority of the area's population, be given veto power over the proposal. Therefore when the charter did not receive a majority of suburban votes cast, it failed.

In Ohio, a 1928 study of highway needs in the Greater Cleveland Area stated that one of the high priority projects should be construction of a bridge across the Rocky River. One of the affected municipalities, a suburban city, objected to construction of the bridge because it would increase the flow of traffic through the suburb. It based its objections on the home rule provision of the Ohio constitution and contended that neither the county nor the state had authority to construct such a bridge without consent of the municipality involved. Finally in June, 1960, after a long series of court tests, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that the new federal aid highway was a matter of state, not local, concern and the bridge could be built without the suburb's consent.

This overemphasis on the isolationist aspects of home rule has been a major factor in the failure of our metropolitan communities to develop solutions to pressing problems. In 1959 residents of Greater Cleveland were offered the opportunity to approve a county charter which would have enabled a reorganized county to assume responsibility for several area-wide municipal functions. The charter failed to receive the necessary majorities and one of the decisive arguments against it was that it would have reduced the "home rule" of the various cities and villages in the county.

With the exception of Miami, every community that has tried to develop some type of metropolitan area-wide government has failed to overcome this home rule fixation. In some places, such as Cleveland, the desire for decentralized home rule was sufficient to kill the plan. In other cases the requirements for approval either made it impossible to write an acceptable charter

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or made it impossible to get the necessary majorities. The most extreme example of this latter difficulty was the 1929 vote on a charter for metropolitan government in Greater Pittsburgh. The proposal was approved by over 68 per cent of those voting but adoption required a two-thirds majority in two-thirds of all affected municipalities and it received this extraordinary majority in only slightly more than one half of all municipalities.

Much of the blame for the failure of the regional planning can be attributed to this isolationist aspect of home rule. As urban growth spilled over beyond the boundaries of the central city, the need for comprehensive metropolitan or regional planning became obvious to nearly everyone—including many staunch advocates of home rule. However, experience has demonstrated that effective planning cannot be carried out on a purely voluntary basis. The person who supports home rule on the one hand while promoting regional planning on the other is only proving that you cannot have your cake and eat it too. Effective regional planning and complete home rule are incompatible goals.

Students of municipal finance also have cause to regard home rule as a disruptive influence and many are inclined to agree that municipalities have had too much home rule. In most of our large metropolitan centers the financing of functions which are area-wide in nature can be divided into two groups. The first group includes those services which are financed by the central city but used by the entire community and, while the list varies from city to city, includes such things as airports, libraries, zoological gardens, museums, major highways, auditoria, hospitals, parks and vocational schools. There may be some kind of user fee but the deficit usually comes out of the general fund of the central city.

The second group includes those services which are required by the existence of the suburban communities. Sometimes these are financed through intermunicipal arrangements. However, the home rule concept requires that the contributions of each municipality must be made voluntarily. Frequently one or more municipalities refuse to make voluntary contributions to such projects and services as highways, storm drainage facilities, civil defense, police protection or planning. A common solution is to have the county government "take over" responsibility for the function and finance it from the general property tax. The net

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result is that the central city supplies and finances a full range of urban services for its own residents and then, via the county general property tax, makes a substantial contribution to the cost of providing urban services to the home rule suburbs. The resulting high tax rate in the central city causes more people to pack up and move to the suburbs where "taxes are lower and government is closer to the people."

This kind of financial irresponsibility is particularly common in highway construction and maintenance. The central city is expected to finance its own highway needs but many suburban municipalities, with a major highway running through or along the boundary of the community, allow the road to deteriorate until the howls of the motorists force the county or state to step in and pick up the suburbanites' burden. In many instances the cost of a particular improvement would be an undue burden on the responsible suburb and the other affected communities often won't voluntarily contribute to the financing even though their residents may benefit from the improvement.

The practice of this aspect of home rule has led to the formulation of a basic generalization. This is that the degree of financial irresponsibility is directly proportional to the fragmentation of municipal government in a metropolitan area. This "law" is being given increasing recognition by states and counties. For example, in Ohio a municipality with a population in excess of 5,000 must assume financial responsibility for maintenance of all state highways within its boundaries. For smaller municipalities the county provides this service and finances it out of county-wide tax receipts. Likewise in financing the urban portions of the interstate highway, the state expects the larger cities to pay a portion of the total cost but finances the entire state-local share in smaller municipalities. Obviously any attempt to change this would be denounced as a violation of home rule.

V

The final section of the debit side of the balance sheet on home rule is that it simply has not delivered on its promises. Again, it is true that unrealistic promises have been made and even more unrealistic promises have been thought to have been made. However, these promises have been made in the name of home rule and it is home rule that receives the credit if they are

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fulfilled—and therefore must accept the blame if they are not fulfilled.

In the first place, there is no clear-cut evidence that states with a home rule provision in their constitutions or in the statutes have had better urban government than other states. Basically the quality of government at any level depends on the persons selected to fill public office and not on the structure or organization of the government. The most home rule can offer in this respect is that it probably has encouraged more able people to participate in local governments. However, there is an infinite number of reasons why people do or don't seek public office.

Furthermore, what has actually happened is that home rule has taken much of the decision-making power from the state legislature; but instead of being put in the hands of the local officials, that authority either has been assumed by the judiciary or lost in a never-never land between the state and local governments. In several states the courts have encroached on the legislative branch of government and are, in fact, making legislative decisions under the guise of home rule. In other states the legislatures have delegated to home rule cities the authority necessary to solve local problems. The courts have whittled down this grant of authority to the point where the municipalities are powerless to act. They can wait for the next session of the legislature and hope for help there, or they can begin the long process of judicial appeal. Each takes time, and the effort that should be spent developing solutions to pressing urban problems is wasted on attempts to define jurisdiction. Would it not be better for the legislature to make the decision rather than to delegate this task to the courts or to leave the problem unsolved?

In this same vein an examination of many of the controls exercised by the state over municipal governments reveals that they resulted from abuses of local discretionary power. Such statutory or constitutional provisions as limitations on local indebtedness and tax levies, uniform bond laws, state audits of local accounts, maximum salaries for local officials, and required bidding procedures usually were enacted because of the failure of local government to act in a responsible manner. It is far from inaccurate to say these restrictions on local governments are the result of earlier abuses of home rule.

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Possibly the biggest failure of the home rule concept is in the financing of municipal government. The emphasis on a dichotomy of state-local powers naturally has been reflected in a division of tax sources. Generally, local governments have sought exclusive use of the general property tax but they have secured it in relatively few states. Instead of an exclusive tax they have been granted a partial monopoly of an inadequate tax. All too often local governments have more home rule authority than they can finance through "home rule" tax resources.

The increasing cost of local government has made this the prime concern of most municipal officials and they find themselves begging for more state financial assistance at the same time that they are demanding more home rule. This inconsistency has not been lost on state legislators. It is becoming more and more obvious that many so-called local services (slum clearance, highways, transit, sewer facilities) cannot be adequately financed without some help from a state-administered tax. Inevitably if the state assumes a share of the cost, it will have a voice in standards, in selection of projects and in the general administration of the function. Despite the limitations this places on home rule there appears to be no obvious escape from the dilemma. Municipalities cannot expect to receive increased financial aid from the state without a corresponding limitation on the scope of home rule.

VI

If home rule failed during the years when municipal government was relatively simple in structure and narrow in scope, what is its future? Considerable evidence can be assembled to support the belief that home rule soon will be considered an obsolete theory.

The most important reason is that more and more states are becoming predominantly urban in character. It is inconceivable that the legislatures in such states will surrender control over these clusters of population which account for the largest share of the state's wealth, power and votes.

Secondly, more and more problems which formerly were "local" in nature are now metropolitan or regional in scope. Home rule is an unworkable concept—there must be a centralized authority competent to solve such problems. It is reasonable

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to expect that this rôle will be filled by existing state governments rather than newly created regional authorities.

Thirdly, recently many states have gained valuable experience in state-local coöperation through the administration of public education. The lessons learned there may be useful in developing a new form of state-municipal coöperation.[6]

Finally, there is a growing realization that with the emergence of large metropolitan centers, municipal government no longer is a matter of local concern. The entire state has a substantial interest in the quantity and quality of municipal services offered by both the central city and its suburbs in these metropolitan areas. Acceptance by the state governments of a larger responsibility for the administration and financing of these municipal and intermunicipal functions will spell the end for home rule.

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[6] Lyle E. Schaller, "The Role of the State in Reorganizing Local Government" in *Social Science*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (January 1961), pp. 48-52.

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From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples. By RUPERT EMERSON. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1960.—x, 466 pp. $7.75.

In the decade and a half since the Second World War, more than forty countries have joined the roll of new states, and another dozen or so are awaiting their turns. Journalists in their columns and diplomats in their *aides-mémoire* invariably refer to these new states of Asia and Africa as "nations" from the moment the last colonial administrator has clamped a padlock on his liftvan. In this book Rupert Emerson, America's leading scholar in the fields of colonialism and postcolonial nationalism, carefully and forthrightly examines the conditions which may give substance to that conventional euphemism. In his introductory reflections on the rise and fall of colonialism, Emerson rejects any claim "that imperialism was the ideal instrument for the spread of the civilization of Western Europe" to the rest of the world, yet questions whether "the non-European peoples could have been induced, without compulsion, to undertake in any comparable span of time a revolutionizing of their societies which involved abandonment of their established way of life." The three central parts of the book explore the ingredients of nationhood as they relate to the new states—territorial boundaries, language, culture, religion, and economics, assess the relationship between "Nationalism and Democracy"—and air the problems concealed within the deceptively simple doctrine of "Self-Determination." The concluding section examines the fundamental dilemma that even "The most intransigent of nationalisms must live in a world of which interdependence has become a central feature; [a world where] no state acting alone can guarantee its own security or assure its own well-being."

Professor Emerson's work represents an imposing achievement of thorough scholarship, judicious evaluation, and literary presentation. Amid the growing literature on the emerging states it stands out as the best introduction for both the scholarly and the general reader. Emerson's style of thought and writing contrasts in almost every particular with most of the current fashions in political science and sociology; yet one suspects that his work will stand out when the pace of events and the progress of scholarship will have swept aside most other current writings

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on the subject. Where younger authors feel compelled to dissertate tediously upon their presumed "methodology" Emerson prefers to demonstrate his method in application rather than to justify it by explanation. His confident mastery of English prose provides welcome relief from the involuted neologisms of the Parsonian school. Where much current work is based on the tacit and absurd assumption that man turned into a political or social animal in the last decade or two, Emerson never allows his reader to forget that historical experience is the only sure guide to present insight and future action. Forsaking the futile search for a "value-free social science," Emerson on almost every page evaluates explicitly, urbanely, and convincingly. He acknowledges the ultimate "desirability of substituting . . . rigorous and quantitative analysis for the looser and more subjective evaluations which have hitherto been employed"; yet he recognizes that "ample room is still left for the subtle task of appraising human emotions." Avoiding premature quantification, it is to this latter task that he turns again and again with skill and sympathy.

In the growing literature on contemporary Asia and Africa there is no single author who has accomplished a comparable sweep of time, place, and scope. It is only natural that specialists will quarrel with an occasional detail relating to their favorite country or region. This reviewer, for example, might object that reforms like Abdul Hamid's constitution of 1876 were far more than mere efforts "to win a diplomatic success through the appearance of conversion to [Western] methods" (p. 266), that the Ottoman Empire was not an "alien power" to nineteenth-century Arabs (p. 167), and that Atatürk translated into Turkish the Muslim call to prayer, not the prayers themselves (p. 138). But such points are mere trivia that detract in no wise from the over-all structure.

Professor Emerson's results are especially impressive in his treatment of two themes central to the book—the prospects of representative government and of communism in the emerging nations. His sober realism prevents him from reviving the myth that democracy is somehow the "natural" form of government which will emerge, like Pallas from the head of Zeus, once colonial restraints are relinquished. Yet his profound sympathy for the aspirations of Asians and Africans groping toward self-government and economic progress keeps him from writing them off as natural victims of military or communist dictatorship. Instead he fruitfully explores the middle ground in which democratic institutions may painfully and gradually take root. Similarly, Emerson avoids the Cold War First Fallacy—which

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sees all developments anywhere in Asia or Africa solely as so many assets and liabilities for Western defense against potential Soviet attack—and the Fallacy of Diabolic Infallibility—which attributes to the communists an unerring if mysterious recipe for success. Instead he carefully weighs, at each point, the strengths and weaknesses of the Western and communist positions as they impinge upon nations struggling to be born.

DANKWART A. RUSTOW

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Politics and Culture in International History. By ADDA B. BOZEMAN. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1960.–xiv, 560 pp. $10.00.

This work by Mrs. Bozeman is striking from the first for its originality and richness. Its originality is that it studies certain little-known aspects of international life since the origins of writing—from the third millennium B.C. to the fifteenth century. At this latter date, we see the formation of the modern states of Western Europe, founded on a particularist and nationalist concept, and putting an end to the dreams of universality and Christian unity. With the Portuguese and then the Spanish explorers, we also see Europe undertaking the conquest of the world.

This conquest, which decolonization has just rather brusquely ended, created among Westerners the illusion of the unity of the world. They believed that the international system of which they were the creators, and which rests on three traditions —the Greek (exercise of rationality), the Latin (jurisprudence and the theory of contract), and the medieval—was applicable as such to the new nations. Now this illusion, already partially destroyed by the advent of a second system, the communist system, will not stand up in the face of experiences the newly independent countries are going to unfurl before us. Introduced abruptly into an international world of Western construction in which a part of their élite has been formed, and, at the same time, exposed to the temptation of the communist system, they are rediscovering something new: international traditions which are their own. For the relative rationality of the West, they will try to substitute their myths, for the simple reason that these are rooted in their past.

One gauges the richness of this work on discovering therein, one by one, excellent analyses of international life in the Middle East—the former Mesopotamia, Egypt, Assyria, Persia; in the

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classic Greek world and the Alexandrian; in India, China, the Roman Empire; in the barbarian states which were successors to the Empire of the West, and among their principal contemporaries, the Byzantine Empire and the Arab world. It is impossible, in a brief review, to analyze even approximately these useful descriptions. All the forms, all the problems of diplomacy appear therein: the conflict between idealism and realism in the Persian Empire; the Indian theories of imperialism, distinguishing individual ethics, which are strict, from international ethics, infinitely more lax; the wavering of Chinese theoreticians between peaceful penetration by moral force, and conquest, the whole resulting in the myth of the Universal Empire, against which Westerners had the shock of clashing in the nineteenth century; the police theocracy of the Byzantines and the tradition it imposed on the Orthodox of Russia, and so on. The whole is perhaps a little overfull. One would like more summaries, more conciseness, at times. But an enterprise of this kind represents a prodigious effort and deserves the full respect of the specialists.

Our reservations bear on two points. First, in endeavoring, with success, to analyze what is specific in the international systems examined, Mrs. Bozeman has brought out points of comparison with present-day international life. In this matter, her vocabulary conforms too resolutely with that which we use today, and at times constitutes an anachronism. The state, and above all, the nation (pp. 73, 147), are concepts which should be used with more prudence when the subject is the Hittites, Charlemagne or Tamerlane.

In addition, international life is very cleverly related to cultures, conceived here as systems of thought and concepts of law. On the other hand, economic life is viewed as the principal tie between distant communities. But almost nothing is said (except in the case of the Byzantines) about what played at least an equal rôle in international life: power relations, strategic concepts. The Dorian invasion is explainable by iron weapons, the fall of Rome by the massive use of cavalry by the barbarians, just as much as, if not more than, by cultural phenomena.

There lie new directions to be followed. But Mrs. Bozeman has already given us so much in this book, that we cannot reproach her for not having described everything. As it stands, her work is new, interesting, indispensable.

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The Moulding of Communists: The Training of the Communist Cadre. By FRANK S. MEYER. New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1961.—x, 214 pp. $5.00.

It is now commonplace to recognize the Communist as a new kind of man, an individual equipped with an ideological lodestone that charts his line of action in any given situation, and with the necessary self-discipline to put his capacities at the disposal of this ideology in the continuous struggle to attain an endless chain of proximate goals totally destructive to our Western society. The logistics of this struggle for power have been charted in the histories that have related the successes of communism in Russia, China and Eastern Europe. The human and moral costs of these victories have been assessed by many of communism's victims and former adherents. A number of writers and a handful of social scientists have inquired into a range of significant questions that these developments raise with respect to the future of our society, and the life of the individuals in it. Polemics pro and con have saturated the literature for the past forty years. But little or nothing of an analytical nature has been available to describe how the Communist is trained, how he acquires his unshakeable ideology, his incredible self-discipline and his truly remarkable determination to fulfill his rôle in a process of history that might easily grind him up in achieving its objective. This gap has been recently filled by Mr. Meyer, whose book deals exclusively with the problem of the selection, training, and testing of the Communist cadre, the inner circle, the hard core, in short, the real Bolsheviks. Since the October Revolution millions of men and women have passed through the international communist movement, but outside of those countries which have fallen under the political control of the Communists, few of these recruits have remained in the party, and fewer still have penetrated the society of real Communists—the Communist cadre. The author devotes the first section of the book to what he calls the mould, the analysis of the elements that go into the making of the ideal type of the Communist cadre, and the pressures that shape him. The process could hardly be called indoctrination or education, for it produces a complete transformation where all traces of, and ties to, existing groups and institutions are utterly destroyed (except in cases where they might be advantageous to the party), and the individual comes to accept the fixed star of the party and its doctrine as the sole guide to understanding and action. The rôle of theory, experience, organizational life and a series of crisis situations which are utilized as a means of testing the

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cadre candidate under fire are explored for their functional value in the process of this transformation. In the second section, the development from recruit to cadre is traced, and the impact of each step of the process, the rationale of the obstacles placed in the way, and the meaning of the agonizing series of crises are carefully analyzed. When a final determination is made, there is little fear of later regret or failure. The methodology is time proven, and few turn back. The author, who speaks from a decade and a half's experience as a party member and functionary, cannot recall as many as a score of cadre Communists in the American party who have broken within the last twenty years, despite the serious crises that beset the party in 1945 and 1956. The communist tide is running strong, and should we underestimate its power and the iron quality of its cadre, we do so at our peril. Mr. Meyer's book is an important contribution to our understanding of this continuing challenge.

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The Transformation of Russian Society. Edited by CYRIL E. BLACK. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1960.—vii, 695 pp. $9.75.

This symposium of papers, by nearly forty eminent, mostly American, scholars in the Russian field, is the result of a conference held at Arden House in April, 1958. In form it follows the pattern adopted in the two previous Arden House symposia, which have established themselves as essential reference books on Russian history. The present volume is concerned to study different aspects of the social and political changes which have taken place over a hundred years, since the liberation of the serfs started Russia on her path towards modernization. Each of the several groups of papers is summarized by a "compère"—that on Law, Politics and Social Change by Professor Fainsod, on Social Stratification by Professor Inkeles, on Education, Scholarship and Religion by Professor Harcave, on Family, Youth and Human Welfare by Professor Bauer, and on Personal and Social Values by Dr. Hans Speier. Professor Black sums up in a general essay on Modernization, and there are three introductory papers. All the papers are good, and a few are excellent. It would be invidious in a short review to discuss individual papers, but in general the standard of the factual analysis, in many cases of unfamiliar aspects of Russian society which escape treatment in the general histories, often seems to this reviewer to be higher than the standard of historical insight.

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The guiding formula adopted by most contributors is that of "continuity and change." This is not entirely satisfactory as a basis for historical investigation, since it may lend itself to the temptation of drawing false analogies or of overemphasizing contrasts in the search for a satisfying pattern. The general editors of sections have usually found it necessary to caution against some of the more questionable patterns discerned by authors of individual papers.

There is little doubt that this volume will rightly take its place on the shelf of required reading for all serious students of modern Russian history. Two general criticisms may therefore perhaps not be out of place. The first is what seems to this reviewer an insufficient appreciation of the effect upon the whole of society of the one-party system of control. This is not merely a more efficient form of dictatorship. It produces a transformation of all society, a killing off of the pluralism which in an embryonic way existed in Imperial Russia, and the creation of a rift between the individual and society far beyond anything envisaged, say, by the authors of *Vekhi*. All this seems to this reviewer to render some of the conclusions and conjectures at least doubtful—for example, the final words of Professor Black (p. 680) that one can imagine in the Soviet Union many concessions "to the desire for an easier way of life without significantly affecting the party and the state as the source of authority." On the contrary, the concessions which can safely be made by a totalitarian party are strictly limited, as the present leaders fully understand—if they go too far, if, for example they allow any semblance of pluralism to emerge, they are lost.

The other omission is the failure of the contributors to appreciate the importance of the fact that even after 1861 the most significant feature of Russian society remained the complete segregation from the rest of society of the great majority of the population—the peasants—so far as legal status was concerned. The first requirement for the development of civil liberty is equality of legal rights. Russia did not begin to achieve this until the eve of the First World War, when it was much too late. This all-important factor in Russian social structure was most fully analyzed by the late Professor V. Leontovitsch in his *Geschichte des Liberalismus in Russland* (Frankfurt am Main, 1957). His work seems to have escapted the notice of all the scholars who have contributed to this volume—further proof of the fact that a translation of it into English is urgently needed.

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The Soviet Design for a World State. By ELLIOT R. GOODMAN, with a foreword by Philip E. Mosely. New York, Columbia University Press, 1960.—xviii, 512 pp. $6.75.

It is a commonplace that communism is a doctrine whose supporters consider it applicable to the whole human race: they believe that it is the common destiny of all nations, at different times and at a different pace, to pass from more or less primitive social stages, through capitalism or bypassing capitalism, to "socialism" and thence to "communism." It is also a commonplace that the former Russian empire passed, after November, 1917, into the hands of men dedicated to accelerate by their efforts what they regard as a historically ineluctable process. The present ruler of the Soviet Union, N. S. Khrushchev, seldom misses an opportunity to assert the predestined victory of communism. It may therefore be thought to be of some interest to know how Soviet theorists imagine to themselves the future communist world order.

Western writers on Soviet affairs have however neglected this subject. This is not because the sources for study do not exist, or are not available. Rather it may be attributed to the political climate of the last decade, the age of McCarthyism and its aftermath, and the two one-eyed orthodoxies of anti-communism and anti-anti-communism. To the first school, it seemed impious to pay attention to devilish doctrines: to treat them seriously was something like participating at a celebration of the Black Mass. To the second school, to suggest that communists mean their ideas of a world order seriously, was "reactionary" or "warmongering," and in any case most unseemly at a time when all decent people ought to be basking in the warmth of Khrushchev's smile and pursuing unilateral peaceful coexistence.

Mr. Goodman, however, was frightened neither by Scylla nor by Charybdis, and spent a number of these years in studying the subject. Only those who have forced themselves to read their way through the dark forests of Marxist-Leninist literature can appreciate the horror of his ordeal. The use of systematic boredom as a political weapon is one of the most deadly branches of Soviet strategy. All the greater should be the reader's gratitude to Mr. Goodman for producing this solid work, and to the Russian Institute of Columbia University for publishing it.

A large part of the book is devoted to the relations between Russians and non-Russians in the Soviet Union. The author also discusses the meaning of "socialism in one country" and

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"peaceful coexistence." There are interesting chapters on the question of a "world language," on the rôle of war in bringing about a communist world state, and about the hostile Soviet attitude to the various non-communist proposals for supranational states. Mr. Goodman also examines carefully the evidence on the theory of the "withering away of the state," as it developed under Stalin and then Khrushchev.

Even under "full communism," and on a world scale, the leading rôle of the Party, and its coercive powers, seem likely to remain. Khrushchev, in speaking of the distribution of wealth to all according to needs under "full communism," observed: "Of course, when we speak of satisfying people's needs we have in mind not whims or claims to luxuries, but the wholesale consumption of a cultured person." It is the party which decides what "a cultured person" will need.

Mr. Goodman's book is rather shapeless, and in order to deal with his subject he has to rush off in many different directions, entering the fields of foreign policy, political philosophy and economics. But in this reviewer's opinion, such untidiness is a price which all must pay who seek to come to terms with such vast themes as this. Those who insist on the preservation of traditional "disciplinary" barriers at all costs may think themselves defenders of civilized standards of study, but they risk falling into the sin of pedantry. It is however permissible to argue that Mr. Goodman would have done better to leave the mass of material which he has assembled, under the main, more or less clearly defined, chapter headings. Instead he has chosen to write a last chapter on "The Response of the West." But if this may have been a mistaken choice, it is at least well carried out. Mr. Goodman is admirably free from the customary woolly-minded exhortations that this theme seems to call forth, on both sides of the Atlantic. He does not ask for the manufacture of some synthetic ideology to meet the communist challenge. Nor does he believe that the United States can save itself and freedom by striking still more anti-colonial attitudes, by loudly proclaiming that Afro-Asians are always right. In his last paragraph he rightly diagnoses the main weakness of the West. It is not lack of faith in freedom, or lack of intelligence, but lack of will.

It is not only specialists in the Soviet field who can learn from Mr. Goodman's book.

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The European Common Market and the GATT. By JAMES JAY ALLEN, with a preface by Heinrich Kronstein. Washington, D. C., The University Press of Washington, 1960.—xii, 244 pp. $6.00.

Europe's Coal and Steel Community: An Experiment in Economic Union. By LOUIS LISTER. New York, Twentieth Century Fund, 1960.—495 pp. $8.00.

The two volumes under review are significant contributions to the rapidly growing literature on European integration. Louis Lister, an American international civil servant, was closely connected with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) since its inception. His book is a massive and amply documented study of the functioning of the ECSC during the first six years of its existence, from 1952 to 1958. The European Economic Community (EEC) and Euratom being still in a formative stage, the ECSC is the only non-military intra-European organization whose record can be examined in a historical perspective, even though a limited one. It is much to Lister's credit that, unlike so many writers on European integration, he did not restrict himself to an elaboration of the theories of Jean Monnet and a recapitulation of the unlovely complexities of the Community's constitutional charter, but has presented a clear factual picture of how the ECSC actually works. Indeed, he went further and has related the ECSC to the conditions of the coal and steel industries in the member countries and in Great Britain, and has drawn some illuminating parallels between the ECSC and the EEC treaties.

Lister's findings based on a close scrutiny of the record are not encouraging to those who put their faith in European integration and supra-national institutions. The expectation of higher productivity resulting from free competition, which is the theoretical foundation of the ECSC, was not realized. The character, structure, and tradition of both the steel and the coal industry are such as to preclude their responding readily to the interplay of market forces. Moreover, the powers of the High Authority are so circumscribed as to prevent effective action. "Competition through the price mechanism has not been legislated into existence in the steel industry as the means of raising average efficiency through greater regional specialization," writes Lister. ". . . Practices in the ECSC steel industry are closer in spirit to those of the United Kingdom in spite of the formal difference in rules. . . . The free price mechanism in steel has

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been explicitly rejected by the British government; it does not operate in the ECSC either, though it is part of the official dogma of the High Authority, because the individual governments have tacitly rejected it, too. The ECSC thus suffers from a divergence between theory and practice and a fragmentation of authority." The situation in the coal industry is similar although for different reasons. According to Lister "improvements in the average efficiency through greater regional specialization in coal production depend . . . in present circumstances not on the price mechanism but on administrative decision and coordination." The High Authority's supra-national powers, perhaps the most striking feature of the ECSC, have proved of little practical import, and Lister notes that while "new activities have been added through the European Economic Community and Euratom . . . the dosage of federalized central power has been reduced."

James Jay Allen's volume is a painstaking, legalistic, and abstruse analysis of the relationship between the EEC and GATT. The author is primarily concerned with the legal compatibility between the rules governing the two organizations, the trade creation and the trade diversion aspects of the Common Market, and the interests of the United States in the resulting legal and economic situation which this country itself helped to bring about. Like Lister, Allen notes the many uncertainties that beset European integration. Referring to the Common Market, he writes for instance that "psychologically the common tariff rates will have the greatest impact. This is a factor that can be readily seen, while the question whether the Community industries are in fact becoming more streamlined can only be determined after many years have elapsed . . . If the outer customs duties are set too high . . . trade war could ensue in which a decade of progress in patiently reducing trade barriers could be wiped out in a quick series of retaliations."

These misgivings notwithstanding, both Lister and Allen look forward to the advancement of European integration. Neither author has much to say about the conflict between the Six and the Seven, probably because it was still in an initial stage when these books were written. It would be ironical and tragic if the drive for integration should result in the actual split of Western Europe into warring camps at the very time when the assertion of its unity is imperative. If this danger is real, the abandonment of imaginative schemes and the return to the traditional methods of international coöperation, such as were practiced with notable

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success by the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, would seem to be the reasonable thing to do.

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The Necessity for Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy. By HENRY A. KISSINGER. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1961. —xii, 370 pp. $5.50.

The running theme of this generally successful book is the interrelation of strategic and diplomatic policy. In the chapters chiefly devoted to military matters the author gives a sound if sometimes turgid account of recent strategic debate, in which he has himself played a part. His recommendations include urgent attention to our deficiency in intercontinental weapons, an increase in conventional forces, and consideration of a North Atlantic Confederation to make deterrence effective in Europe. In part the book drastically revises the findings of the author's *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy.* Although little in these chapters is novel, the discussion is a balanced one, occasionally illuminated by a striking phrase such as the observation that "disputes about targets are usually settled by addition."

Mr. Kissinger's discussion of strategy is also distinguished by being closely related to consideration of arms control. He leans toward arms control rather than disarmament and always displays a sane scepticism. His scathing refutation of the more enthusiastic advocates of a test ban at any price loses none of its validity as the months pass.

It is in the attempt to expose the connection between method and purpose in diplomacy that the book gathers impetus. The author deplores the lack of informed self-confidence in American policy and, in an interesting final chapter on "The Intellectual and the Policymaker," he has original things to say about the causes of this deficiency. On specific diplomatic issues, however, the treatment is more critical than constructive. On Berlin, for example, a subject on which he clearly feels deeply, the author spends pages on past errors in negotiation but raises and drops in a single paragraph the problem of Russia's overwhelming strategic advantages. Nor does he do justice to British military thought. Whatever its failings, it is just not true to say the R.A.F. has paid no attention to invulnerability. It was just such considerations which led to the abandonment of the Blue Streak. Nor should the author's bitter condemnation of

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European reluctance to play host to American I.R.B.M.'s be divorced as it is from his own later demonstration of their dubious military value.

By far the best section of the book is one most removed from purely military affairs. In his chapter on political evolution Mr. Kissinger's prose finally begins to flow and in short order he raises a whole series of stimulating doubts about our facile assumption of a connection between economic development and progress toward democracy both in Russia and in the underdeveloped lands. Perhaps he pushes his own argument a little far but its force is undeniable and forms a real addition to our ability to peer down the longer dimensions of our world.

This book is not easy reading but, all in all, it is worth the effort. Some will find it a useful summary of recent writing on strategy and almost everyone will profit from its fresh look at broader questions. As befits one whose custom it has become to sound the alarm, Mr. Kissinger's method is disputatious. He needs men at whom to tilt and his sparse acknowledgements are chiefly to those whom he is about to squash. One hardly knows what he would do without Mr. Denis Healey. Readers interested in the development of academic debate may care to pursue the not too obscure mystery of the missing citation, beginning with a look at the index reference to Professor W. W. Rostow.

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Tropical Africa. By GEORGE H. T. KIMBLE. Volume 1: *Land and Livelihood.* Volume 2: *Society and Polity.* New York, The Twentieth Century Fund, 1960—Vol. 1, 603 pp.; Vol. 2, 506 pp. $15.00.

For the political scientist who wants a comprehensive study of Africa, south of the Sahara, there are now available two highly readable and lucid surveys: George Kimble's *Tropical Africa* and Lord Hailey's *An African Survey: Revised 1956* (London, 1957). Aided by working papers prepared by specialists, each author deals with geographical, cultural, economic and demographic forces and with various forms of social, educational and political organization. Lord Hailey, a distinguished British authority on African affairs and an ex-colonial administrator, is primarily concerned with government, administration and colonial policies, while Dr. Kimble, a former director of the American Geographical Society, stresses economics and geography. Each author treats the area as a whole (Kimble excludes

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the Union of South Africa), with specific territories treated individually under substantive topics.

Kimble performs best in Volume 1 where he discusses population, agriculture, water resources, minerals, industrialization, transportation, markets and labor. Carefully compiled statistics and thoughtful analyses record the economic development and depict the potentialities of the area. While these potentialities give basis for hope for a better future for Africans, they also weave a pattern of limitations: limitations on industrial development because of lack of resources, capital investment, basic infra-structure, and skilled and technical personnel; obstacles to agricultural development that stem from an inhospitable lateritic soil and from scarcity of water; and restrictions on economic progress which the traditions of a subsistence economy impose on labor concepts and marketing. After appraising this balance sheet of limitations and potentialities, one can better appreciate the context in which African political transitions are taking place and foreign policies being formed.

Society and polity is the subject matter of Volume 2. On the social side, Africa is a highly fragmented society in which the tribal unit (there are over 600) constitutes the main impediment to politicizing and nationalizing the (legal) nation-state. That tribalism will continue to act as a main centrifugal force on the body politic becomes readily apparent when one realizes that education, a main key of change, has only made a ripple in a sea of "ignorance" and that economic development, another vehicle for transmitting ideas and values, can only progress gradually. Kimble discusses the European colonial policies and the attempts to structure machineries of local and national government. An important note is sounded when he remarks that "it is unlikely that in the whole of human history there were ever so many people governed by so few. . . ." For African territories have been politically undergoverned as well as economically undeveloped. Today, the mantle of government is thrust upon a new élite which has the burden of guiding the fledgling nations to prosperity and political stability. The heritage of the past and the socioeconomic environment do not permit a facile adaptation of Western democratic processes. And there is danger that although the accolade of independence has brought psychological and spiritual rewards, the new governments may find their economic resources insufficient to erase poverty and to provide for rapid social, political and educational development.

Obviously, a work of this type, which undertakes to deal with so many facets of land, livelihood, society and polity, is easy prey

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for critics, and I assume that sociologists and anthropologists will plunge in with healthy appetites. As far as the political scientist is concerned, there is much with which to take issue. The chapters on education, colonial policies, government, nationalism and the new élite do not come up to the standard set in the first volume. These sections are sketchy and fail to incorporate the essence of available rich research materials.

If Volume 2 had been more analytical than descriptive, it would not be so outdated by such things as the Monckton Commission's report on Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the steps taken to provide for the independence of Sierra Leone and Tanganyika, the underlying factors involved in the Congo débâcle, the rapid political strides in Kenya, and the changing character of the Community. Lord Hailey is even more dated, but his analysis and synthesis are clearly more perceptive than are Kimble's. In addition, Lord Hailey is more successful than Kimble in steering the course between the extremes of cultural relativism and ethnocentricism.

Given the magnitude and complexity of the study, these criticisms may appear petty and unfair. Surely any other person would have produced a similarly—or even more—vulnerable piece of work. But then, this is the heart of the matter, for the main questions deal not so much with the author as with research methodology. Dr. Kimble was given seven years and the assistance of forty-six contributors and six consultants. He may be taken to task for not always employing the best available resources and for not making more ample use of the leading authorities at his disposal. In any event, it would seem that a more useful approach would have been to employ several teams comprised of key authorities from each of the relevant academic disciplines who would work in close collaboration with European and African research centers. Whatever the case, it is hoped that the next comprehensive survey is substantively interdisciplinary.

These comments should not detract from the valuable contribution Dr. Kimble has made to African studies. His work substantially demonstrates that it is impossible to make generalizations about the continent and that there is no area in the world which cries out as loudly as does Africa for social scientists who can grapple with the essentials of the relevant disciplines and produce works of an interdisciplinary character. African affairs is not for the political scientist who feels no need to burst out of the confines of his own field.

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Congo: Background of Conflict. By ALAN P. MERRIAM. Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1961.—368 pp. $6.00.

The confused internal conflict that has marked the first year of the independence of the Congo has led to a flood of newspaper and magazine reporting much of which does nothing to illuminate the fundamental causes of Congolese instability. Professor Merriam's work is one of the first that is at least partially successful in delineating the real sources of the struggle in the former Belgian colony and in demonstrating some of the errors which both East and West have committed in their attempts to influence the political destinies of the Congo. The author is an anthropologist with recent extensive experience in the Congo and he uses his intimate knowledge of village life in the Congo to illuminate his thesis that the Congolese were neither prepared for their entry into the Western political system nor, for the most part, necessarily interested in becoming a part of that system.

Before dealing with contemporary political events the author stresses the foundations of Belgian colonial policy which by its strong paternalism prevented the development of any popular expression of African political views. He demonstrates clearly that the Western political organization which the Belgian government sought to impose in the last days before independence could not be understood by the Congolese because it had not been explained to them and that the concept of a unified Congolese state was entirely a Western one not shared by the Congolese themselves—"the reality for them is not the centralized state but rather a mixing of the political with the social structure in a formulation which rests upon villages, tribes, and, at the most, regions."

The most interesting chapters of Professor Merriam's volume are those which deal with the life of the village, Lupupa, in which he resided before independence. Lupupa had a traditional democratic system which functioned quite satisfactorily within the limited horizons of the village. Voting played no part in it, however, so that when the Belgian administration required the villagers to express their choice of candidates for election, the voting process so familiar in the West had little or no meaning for them. Indeed, as the author points out, it is a tribute to the Lupupans that the villagers made as earnest an effort to vote as they did, considering the failure of the administration to explain the process to them. Perhaps the most striking fact of Lupupan life is the limited horizon of the villagers. The outside world even of the Congo meant little to them—yet they were expected to have a voice in the choice of

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national leaders for a country of which they could not even conceive. Nowhere does the failure of Belgian policy to anticipate independence become more evident.

Professor Merriam devotes a lengthy chapter to the Congolese political parties and to a description of the emerging leaders. The multiplicity of parties and the constantly changing groupings make any attempt to simplify the confusing party structure almost a hopeless task. He manages to distinguish between those parties which favored a federal as opposed to a unified state and sought to retain a closer relationship with Belgium as against those which favored breaking the tie completely. In the end there appears to emerge a series of personalities whose relationship to one another in party alignment is forever shifting. The results of these shifts make up the threads of Congolese politics. Basically the constellation of parties springs from tribal connections; to understand Congolese politics the outsider must understand something of the Congo's tribal history.

Professor Merriam's book is to be recommended for the specialist or the layman. It proposes no solution to the Congo's problems but it clarifies the factors that must be taken into account before any real stability can be created in the Congo.

L. GRAY COWAN

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Nasser's New Egypt: A Critical Analysis. By KEITH WHEELOCK. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1960.—ix, 326 pp. $6.00.

The center section of Mr. Wheelock's book is made up of chapters on "Agriculture and Agrarian Reform," "Education and Social Development," "Economics and Industrialization," and "The High Dam" which present a balanced and detailed analysis of these complex subjects. These chapters duly note the corruption and resistance to change within the Egyptian bureaucracy which have made reforms of every kind difficult. They also point out the many new departures and the considerable achievements of the Nasser regime in the field of domestic reform and give notice to the work of individual Egyptians whose contributions have been outstanding (pp. 85, 129, 168, 170). Nothing better has been done on many of the subjects treated.

The author has had a more difficult time, however, with the first three chapters, which deal with the establishment of the regime, and the last four, which are primarily concerned with foreign relations. He has devoted equal industry to the collection of material for these chapters; one of the strong points of the

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mount of fresh and interesting material
ial interviews. Nevertheless, the reader gets
m the first and the last part of the book that
he work of a reporter who rushed through the
his notebook with facts and figures but taking
ient to consider how things came to be as they are
look through the eyes of the people about whom

em to take over Mr. Wheelock's narrative and the
ves over the surface of a choppy sea of fact. Reading
pters, one has the feeling that he can see hundreds of
ial waves but has no idea where the currents are or
the land lies.

empts to analyze the motives that inspired Nasser and his
enants are haphazard and inconclusive. At one point, for ex-
ple, it is noted that observers in 1955 remarked "a trend
ward power for power's sake" (p. 48), but the evidence cited
oes not support or refute the proposition. The question of Nasser's personal motivation is dealt with here and there throughout the book. He is described as "a tireless and sincere patriot" who "has not developed an insatiable lust for power" (p. 73). The book ends, however, with the observation that Nasser can become "one of the great personalities of the twentieth century . . . if he tempers his personal desire to dominate the Arab world . . ." (p. 285).

That Mr. Wheelock does not resolve the problem of Nasser's motives is not to his discredit, but attempts to do so are about the only suggestion of a thesis to explain the new Egypt. Nasser is described as a tactician rather than a strategist (p. 223) and the Egyptian revolution comes out in the telling as though it were entirely a matter of tactics. What is lacking is an examination of the forces, in Egypt and in the Afro-Asian world at large, which for a time at least made Nasser a force in the world.

It would be wrong to belittle the difficulty of the problem to which Mr. Wheelock has addressed himself or the patience with which he has charted the events in Egypt in the years from 1952 to 1959. He is not the first man who is of two minds about Nasser. Any westerner who seeks to bridge the gap between Nasser's view of the world and his own faces the same difficulties, but in this particular case they seem to be compounded by a tendency to judge the situation on the basis of events out of the context of the deeper currents in which they are immersed.

CHARLES D. CREMEANS
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

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The State and the Trade Unions. By D. F. MACDONALD. don, Macmillan & Co., Ltd.; New York, St. Martin's P 1960.—vii, 199 pp. $4.50.

British Labor and Public Ownership. By HERBERT E. WEIN Washington, Public Affairs Press, 1960.—viii, 111 pp. $3.

The two books under review represent essays on related an in part, overlapping topics. In his brief survey Mr. Weine attempts to outline the origins and changes in British labor attitudes and policies regarding socialization of industry. Pro fessor Macdonald surveys in broad strokes the historical relationship of British trade unions to the state and its government from the emergence of modern industrialism to Britain today. Neither of the two books seems to have been written to fill a particular gap in our knowledge or to meet a particular educational or academic need. Nor do they represent significant reappraisals of existing literature or points of view. Neither reflects a particularly incisive or idiosyncratic analysis which could arouse the reader's wrath or enthusiastic approval. Both are short sketches (the term is Professor Macdonald's), definitely too brief to do justice to the broad topics they address themselves to. But there are significant differences in the way they deal with their self-imposed task and in the level of their achievement.

Mr. Weiner's essay is all too easily disposed of. His focus is blurred so that even within less than one hundred pages of text he strays repeatedly into descriptions irrelevant to his main topic. Thus several pages (pp. 37-44) are devoted to a description of public corporations prior to 1945 (BBC, London Passenger Transport Board, and so on) without attempt to relate them to labor policies or criticisms. Where Mr. Weiner discusses a specific point he often fails to clarify the issue. [For example, he confuses the reader by his ambiguous use of the term "workers' control" (on pages 51 to 53 and elsewhere)] The book is further marred by addiction to cliché ("tide of opinion," "they had learned by hard experience the dangers and responsibilities as well as the advantages of combining their strength") and by the failure ever clearly to define the central term "labor" or distinguish clearly between the component parts of the movement. The blandness of his treatment is enhanced by a general attitude of "all is for the best" which leads him to take scant notice of the profound crisis through which the British labor movement is passing at present and of which the heated debate over Clause 4 (ending in ignominious defeat of Gaitskell) is an important symptom.

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Within his brief compass Professor Macdonald succeeds admirably in presenting both a survey highlighting legislative and political milestones in the history of British trade unionism and a succinct, not unoriginal theory of state-trade union relationships. Considering that Professor Macdonald was (according to the publisher's blurb) for twelve years the chief executive of a national federation of employers dealing with labor affairs, the understanding and fairness with which he approaches the case for the trade unions are admirable and probably significant of the genuine acceptance which organized labor has achieved in Britain. In his point of view Mr. Macdonald could perhaps he best described as "statist"; concerned primarily with protecting the political community against abuses of concentrated power. Faced with a tight system of highly organized "countervailing power" the author does not share Galbraith's somewhat excessive optimism that the struggle between the giants would, by and large, redound to the public benefit. Perhaps this is due to the fact that the contingency which Galbraith feared—over-full employment and inflationary pressure—remains a characteristic feature of the British economy and thus justifies a much larger dose of state action. Nevertheless his (cautious) advocacy of compulsory arbitration and, related to this, the outlawing of strikes raise serious doubts in this reviewer's mind. By his own admission, "industrial relations are not simply issues of right and wrong; they are also trials of strength" (p. 183) in which no clear and general norm for deciding the controversies has evolved. In the absence of a much clearer definition of "the community's interest" of which the state, according to Professor Macdonald, is the impartial guardian, compulsory arbitration operates in a vacuum and is unlikely to prove acceptable in the long run to any of the parties involved. And, given the nature of the bargaining situation through which a variety of pressures and demands must be accommodated, the strike weapon (as the "gun behind the door" in the escalation process) fulfills a definite and unavoidable function. Without wishing to deny the very real problem posed by "strikes against the community" the fact that "many of the strikers in unofficial stoppages have only the vaguest notion of the alleged grievance" (p. 189) appears as essentially irrelevant. In spite of his obvious sympathy for organized labor Professor Macdonald may be misled somewhat by his middle-class orientation (see p. 188) into excessive demands for rationality and orderliness and underestimation of the heritage of grievance and insecurity which are the sources of explosively irrational behavior.

KURT L. SHELL

HARPUR COLLEGE
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Adenauer and the CDU: The Rise of the Leader and the Integration of the Party. By ARNOLD J. HEIDENHEIMER. The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1960.—xv, 259 pp. 19 guilders.

The two most significant political phenomena in Western Germany since the War have been Dr. Adenauer himself and the party of which he was the chief architect, the Christian Democratic Union. The influence, both positive and negative, which he has exerted on his fellow countrymen can hardly be exaggerated, while his party, with its ideological strength and its structural weaknesses, will be his chief legacy to the German Federal Republic. At the same time both the man and his creation are highly complex and also paradoxical in character.

Dr. Heidenheimer has therefore chosen a difficult as well as a most important subject. His book is based on a doctoral dissertation presented at the University of London in 1957. Yet it is quite free from the faults sometimes associated with publications of this kind. The author has steeped himself in his sources, especially in the CDU archives and party publications, and the result is a well written and finely integrated piece of scholarship. Though we are told on the dust-cover that the rôle of Adenauer is always handled within the framework of the party, there emerges a clearer and more convincing picture of his achievement than can be obtained from the much longer "authorized biography" by Paul Weymar.

The book deals mainly with the development of party leadership, policy, and organization during the first five postwar years, but in order to carry on his analysis during the period in which the CDU has been in power the author deals more briefly with the period 1950 to 1959. He has solved skillfully the problem of treating a subject in one work on two different scales. The least successful section is the Introduction in which the formidable task is attempted of dealing in ten pages for each with such comprehensive subjects as "German Political Systems and the Problems of Party Leadership" and "The Growth of Christian Democratic Parties in Europe." In his analysis of the different elements which make up the CDU Dr. Heidenheimer deals fully with the contrast between the Christian trade unionists with their social programs and the champions of free enterprise. He does not give as much attention to the need for maintaining a balance between the Catholic and Protestant members and the problems it involves for the party leadership.

On the whole this is the best and most coherent account of Adenauer and his party known to the reviewer. Politically it is admirably detached. The brief judgments the author allows

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himself on the last three pages are judicious and convincing. Dr. Adenauer, he writes (p. 242), "has shown questionable foresight in encouraging the Germans to all but institutionalize a system of government which has been tailor-fit to his personality. . . . He has accustomed the Germans to a style of party government which owes its efficiency to the ease with which direction from the top outweighs impulses from the bottom." Dr. Heidenheimer then concludes by returning to a point which he has emphasized earlier, Adenauer's interest in European unification, "He must finally be judged not only on his rôle in creating the CDU, but on his wisdom in mortgaging its future, and that of the Federal Republic in order to make possible the creation of the larger European and Western political community" (p. 244).

RICHARD HISCOCKS

THE UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA

The Future of Mankind. By KARL JASPERS. Translated by E. B. Ashton. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1961.—xii, 342 pp. $5.95.

This book does not present an analysis of mankind's probable biological, intellectual or social development, but the author's highly personal response to the Cold War and to the prospect of nuclear destruction. Much of it is an application of Jaspers' earlier philosophy to these situations, and as such should interest anyone concerned with representative European ways of thought. Some of it, however, amounts to a fairly superficial review of current affairs and to standard Cold War ideology—all expressed in dramatic tones.

On the philosophical plane Jaspers restates his belief that reason must be separated from intellectual and, above all, technological thinking. The occasion for such a "mood" of reason occurs when men face an "extreme situation" which brings them to "self-awareness" and to a vision of Transcendence, and to the possibility of rising above their "existential entanglements." The probability of universal destruction has now put all men, not just a few unique individuals, in such a situation. If we are to survive at all, our only hope lies in every person's will to attain to reason and self-transcendence. This demands self-discipline and sacrifice, not only for the sake of mere life, but of a genuinely moral human order. Since this act of rational self-transcendence is by definition autonomous, no one can instruct men or prescribe their conduct for them. Thus Jaspers

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has "no ready solution and no panacea," only "unreserved thinking" can help us now (p. 213). Since transcendence itself is not a stable creed, not moral, natural or religious law, but an ineffable experience, philosophy can help men only to see their condition more compellingly, not to choose. The only true teaching is that of setting an example in one's own life. Only thus, indeed, can the individual hope to influence his fellowmen. If all this has a Kantian ring about it, it is no accident. The spirit of Kant dominates this book: in the unconditional commitment to truth as one's first ethical duty, as well as in specific political notions, such as the conception of liberty as freedom of rational discourse, the idea of an international confederation and of democracy as "the republican manner of government." These positive Kantian views, moreover, constitute a real departure from Jaspers' earlier, far less rationalist, outlook. But many elements familiar from *Man in the Modern Age* (1931) remain. The same laments about the technological world order, the masses and the absence of great leaders recur. As in *The Origins and Goal of History* (1953) the economic ideas of Hayek and Röpke are accepted as gospel truth, requiring no defense or explanation. The economic struggle today is one between planners and non-planners. "Either there is total planning by the state itself or else the government provides the legal framework for planning on private initiative" (p. 176). This is the sum of economic insight into the "future of mankind." Freedom in history is still identified with indeterminacy, with the impossibility of total prediction. Hence "praise and thanks to the incomprehensible" (p. 339), expressing the old confusion between causality and coercion, explanation and material necessity.

On the political level, we are given a dour and quick review of the United Nations, Ghandi, neutralism, colonialism and Suez which does not rise above the Sunday supplement level. The analysis of totalitarianism is explicitly based on Miss Arendt's work. That is, totalitarianism is treated as a static "essence," not subject to change or variation. Mao's China, as it happens, is not put into this frozen category, because "none of the Russian or German totalitarians could have written poetry as beautiful as his" (p. 116), a bit of silliness that unhappily is not alone in this work. It is rivaled by a patronizing chapter on the moral state of "scientists," based exclusively on Robert Jungk's journalistic *Brighter than a Thousand Suns* (pp. 189-204).

The net result of these political reflections is that all piecemeal negotiations and coexistence with the Russians are doomed.

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What we face is "final destruction of human existence by the atom bomb and general destruction of the human essence by totalitarianism" (p. 168). Jaspers prefers the first, a choice, which he does not quite realize, one may well make for oneself, but not for another, on his own philosophic premises. Even more questionable is his rather commonplace identification of the West—the entire history of European civilization since classical antiquity—with freedom. This is not a geographic notion of the West—Spain, he knows, is not free (p. 135) and Israel, which he includes, is not in Europe (p. 125). Nor can it be a genuinely historical concept. Freedom has been rare, precarious and discontinuous as a reality and as an ideal in the West too. Freedom is an aspiration, not a tradition, and the rhetoric of the Cold War should not obliterate that truth, least of all in so genuine, and even heroic, a liberal as Jaspers, who really does know better.

JUDITH N. SHKLAR

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Plato's Cretan City: A Historical Interpretation of the Laws. by GLENN R. MORROW. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1960—xxii, 623 pp. $12.50.

Ever since the publication in 1935 of his *Studies in the Platonic Epistles* Professor G. R. Morrow has been well known to classical scholars on both sides of the Atlantic as one of the foremost Platonists of our time. It is therefore a source of great satisfaction that he should now have crowned his work with a really comprehensive study of the *Laws,* a dialogue long neglected but now fully recognized as of equal importance with the *Republic* in Plato's political thought. It need hardly be said that it is an excellent piece of work, indispensable to all future students of the subject.

Professor Morrow calls his work "a historical interpretation" and in Part I he analyzes the way in which Plato utilized the historical states, Crete, Sparta and Athens. The reference to Crete in the title page is slightly misleading; the projected new state was to be placed in Crete in a definite locality and certain features of Cretan life are mentioned with approval, but, as Morrow rightly insists all through the book, Plato never ceased to regard himself as a patriotic Athenian and much of his new city's constitution was based on Athenian precedents. On the other hand, he had no love for Ionian ways (p. 59) and chooses Dorian stock to people the new colony with. Morrow rates

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Plato's understanding of history fairly high and gives some good reasons for his statement (p. 72) "our survey has failed to show any important instances in which Plato has distorted facts in the interests of theory." There is much more history in *Laws* III than is generally supposed.

Of the three parts into which the book is divided Part II is by far the largest, since it is in fact a descriptive analysis of Plato's city and its bases, with the addition of some excursuses of particular value to the classicist. The chapter headings of Part II are: IV Property and the Family, V Government, VI The Administration of Justice, VII Education, VIII Religion, IX The Nocturnal Council. These chapters are much more than a descriptive account; their aim is to show, where it can be shown, the historical background of Plato's ideas. It has indeed long been recognized that much of the system of law proposed is modelled on that of Athens, while for education Plato drew more on Dorian, especially Spartan sources. Morrow goes far deeper than any such generalizations, commenting with much learning and acuity on each question as it arises. In his opinion free invention played little or no part in Plato's construction of this practical, second-best state; he had precedent for nearly everything, though not for the Nocturnal Council as such. But it seems to the reviewer that the author is straining the slender evidence overmuch when he seeks to maintain (p. 509) that this council is a "permanent agency for the study of the laws" with "something of the character of a learned body." The subject is taken up again in Part III entitled "Plato's Principles." These are stated to be three in number—The Mixed Constitution, The Rule of Law and The Rule of Philosophy. There is a certain incompatibility between the two last of these and Morrow sees in the Nocturnal Council a body capable of tackling problems arising out of the inevitable conflict between a fixed legal code and the demands of justice, the social good or other philosophical concepts. But he does realize (pp. 574-575) the inherent defect in any arrangement which confines to such a small body of citizens the opportunity of free discussion of such problems.

In this connection it is proper to refer to Plato's desire that all legislation should be accompanied by "Preambles." The purpose of these is not merely to explain and justify the various enactments, but also to set forth the philosophical bases on which they are founded. It is almost as if Plato anticipated the modern need for bridging the gap between legal and political science. Professor Morrow's remarks on this subject (pp. 553-558) are of especial interest. He cites Jeremy Bentham, who, apparently unwittingly, was "Plato's authentic successor in this

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respect." Morrow accepts Plato's claim to be an innovator, rejecting the somewhat flimsy tradition that some earlier legislators had attached preambles to their laws. [*Contra,* the present reviewer's *History of Greek Political Thought* (1952), pp. 195-197.] At any rate Morrow is right to emphasize the value which Plato attaches to the "non-rational servants of the golden cord (of reason)," that is, to the power of persuasion by means of words. To persuade a people to accept a law, a government or a whole regime is part of a legislator's task. These preambles must, however, have a philosophical, doctrinal, even religious basis; it is this that differentiates them from the devices of the rhetoricians, who also are exponents of the arts of persuasion.

Space forbids further comment on other parts of this sane, learned and well-documented book. On the legal and educational systems and on the all-important theocracy Morrow has much to say that is valuable. The *Laws* of Plato is full of problems, of passages difficult to comprehend in themselves or in relation to their setting. Professor Morrow both in his level-headed discussion of others' views and in his modest statements of his own has provided readers with much-needed assistance for which they will be most grateful.

T. A. SINCLAIR

THE QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY OF BELFAST
NORTHERN IRELAND

The American Historian: A Social-Intellectual History of the Writing of the American Past. By HARVEY WISH. New York, Oxford University Press, 1960.—vii, 366 pp. $7.50.

As has been often remarked, Americans are the most history conscious people on earth and American historians the most numerous and prolific. Following successive generations of history graduate students who repeatedly have ploughed the comparatively narrow field of our history, students of the last decade and a half have turned increasingly to a study of their predecessors. Thus we have had studies of George Bancroft, Charles Andrews, John B. McMaster, Henry Adams, Charles Beard, and of many others. *The American Historian* by Harvey Wish reflects this interest in American historiography and provides a masterly summary of the careers of prominent American historians and an able analysis of their interpretations of our past.

The organization of Professor Wish's study is chronological, biographical and topical. He first discusses American historians of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—the "Puritan Mis-

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sion in History," "The Enlightenment . . . and the Tory Emphasis," and "The Federalist-Whig Historians"—before turning to a topical approach. He then devotes separate chapters to the more important later American historians (Henry Adams, Frederick Jackson Turner, Charles Beard, Vernon L. Parrington, U. B. Phillips, and Allan Nevins) and groups minor historians together according to the subject on which they wrote (colonial history, the abolitionist controversy and reconstruction, or social history). The major historians are made to personify major historiographical trends. Thus Henry Adams and Frederick Jackson Turner represent, although in different ways, "the dream of a science of history," Vernon L. Parrington "the rise of Intellectual history," and Allan Nevins the changing trends in our interpretations of American business men. While this organizational plan has the obvious virtue of making Mr. Wish's book something more than a mere catalog of writings on American history, it has the defect of forcing him occasionally to repeat the same discussions in many chapters. For example, the influence of German historians (Ranke, in particular) on American historiography is nowhere discussed as a separate subject; one must follow that influence through the successive chapters on George Bancroft, Henry Adams, Frederick Jackson Turner, and the "abolitionist" historians.

A signal merit of this book is the encyclopedic information it provides. Not only are both major and minor historians of our past discussed, but an attempt is made to show how historical writing in our own day has followed or modified their work.

The author's purpose in making this study was to examine "the representative writers in American historiography with a primary view to determining their social conditioning." He concludes that "the social determinants are but too intrusive in the writings of so many of our leading historians and inspire caution on the part of serious readers." A major part of Professor Wish's book is an attempt to explain precisely what presuppositions underlay the writings of each historian he discusses and the extent to which prejudice or bias vitiate their writings. Of course, to measure our historians against the absolute standard of "objectivity" is to find them all wanting, for what is objective to one generation is mere quaintness or parochialism to another. The author is abundantly aware of this fact, and although he points out the presuppositions of leading American historians he also discusses their use of documentary material, their occasional plagiarisms, and their literary merit.

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This book obviously was not written for the professional historian, for it contains little information with which he is not perforce familiar. It must have been designed for the general reader and for the fledgling historian. To the general reader it will serve at once as a guide to the best that has been written on American history and as a map to the pitfalls to watch for in reading our great historians. To the student of history—and particularly the graduate student—it will provide an able survey of American historiography.

JACOB E. COOKE

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

A History of Socialist Thought. By G. D. H. COLE. Volume V: *Socialism and Fascism, 1931-1939.* New York, St Martin's Press, Inc., 1960.—xvi, 351 pp. $8.00.

Just before his death in January, 1959, G. D. H. Cole completed the draft of this work, the fifth and final volume of his *A History of Socialist Thought.* Except for a brief analysis of socialism in the United States, Canada, and Latin America and a somewhat longer essay on Chinese communism, Cole concentrates on European socialist movements during the tragic decade of the 1930's. The story is a grim narrative of disaster succeeding disaster—Hitler's destruction of the powerful German socialist movement, the eclipse of Austrian socialism under the Dollfuss regime and the Nazi occupation of 1938, the tragedy of the Spanish Civil War, the failure of Blum's Popular Front government in France, and the weakness of the British Labour party after MacDonald's defection and the electoral disaster of 1931. Only in the Soviet Union was there forward movement during this decade; great increases in production, especially of producers' goods, resulted from the first two Five-Year Plans. However, this success is overshadowed by the enormous costs of the liquidation of the kulaks, the famine of the early 1930's, and Stalin's purges of military, political, and industrial leaders from 1936 to 1938.

In this work, as in the third and fourth volumes of his history, Cole pays more attention to the organization and activities of socialist parties and of labor unions than to his announced subject, the development of socialist thought. Only in the chapter on Chinese communism do we find an extended discussion of a new departure in socialist theory—Mao Tse-tung's argument that since China was not ready for a socialist revolution, the first step for the Communist party must be to lead a coalition of peasants,

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workers, intellectuals, and the middle classes in carrying out the democratic revolution and the struggle against imperialism.

It is interesting to note that both in his introductory essay and in the chapter on Germany Cole firmly rejects the thesis, once so popular on the Left, that fascism represented the final stage of capitalism in decline. He insists that fascism was "not fundamentally an economic movement" (p. 3), but rather an expression of aggressive nationalism. The basic elements of the Nazi creed—Pan-Germanism, militarism, and anti-Semitism—were in no sense "manifestations of capitalist sentiments or attitudes" (p. 3), but arose out of much more "primitive drives toward cruelty and intolerance" (p. 6). Cole makes no real effort to analyze these drives or to explain why they became so powerful among Germans in this period; nor does he try to relate this explanation of fascism to any more general psychological or social theory.

Readers of this volume will find the last chapter, "Looking Backwards and Forwards," especially interesting. There Cole briefly surveys the major components of the tradition of socialist thought from Babeuf at the end of the eighteenth century to the Bolsheviks, and he discusses the impassable gulf that separates the values and beliefs of Western European social democracy from those of Soviet communism. He concludes by a reaffirmation of his life-long opposition to both social democracy and communism as "creeds of centralisation and bureaucracy." "I feel sure," he says, "that a Socialist society that is to be true to its equalitarian principles of human brotherhood must rest on the widest possible diffusion of power and responsibility, so as to enlist the active participation of as many as possible of its citizens in the tasks of democratic self-government" (p. 337).

HERBERT A. DEANE

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Political Reason of Edmund Burke. By FRANCIS P. CANAVAN, S.J. Published for the Lilly Endowment Research Program in Christianity and Politics by Duke University Press, Durham, 1960.—xiii, 222 pp. $5.00.

Reflections with Edmund Burke. By TIMOTHY P. SHEEHAN. New York, Washington, Hollywood, Vantage Press, 1960.—288 pp. $5.00.

If we except the special interest which Burke, as a conservative, still commands, these two books may be said to reveal the two

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major sources of Burke's enduring appeal. As an intelligent and articulate practitioner of the art of politics, unusually clear-sighted about the sphere of politics as well as the limits of political activity, uniquely gifted for the rôle of persuader and political educator, he has attracted generations of parliamentary politicians. Their endless quarrying of quotations from his works, exemplified in former Congressman Sheehan's *Reflections*, a Burke anthology, has dwindled in the twentieth century, not so much because of the staling effect of custom but because of new modes of communication, and an urgent concern to extend political activity to deal with pressing problems. Meanwhile, though Burke has become less a public mine of quotations, he has drawn a multitude of scholars eager to illuminate the relations of thought, culture, and politics by studying the milieu of an articulate politician, whose ranging mind touched on so many subjects, and by placing him in the stream of intellectual history. Father Canavan's study is a well-argued and carefully researched example of this second category.

Father Canavan takes sharp issue with those who see Burke as an opponent of reason, a utilitarian, a pragmatist, or a historicist. In his view Burke in politics was a principled pragmatist who emphasized the necessity of dealing with existing situations but looked to some fixed stars in charting his course. For Burke politics was a part as well as a prop of morality and both in turn reflected God's handiwork in designing universal order. This order was to be discovered and maintained by reason. There is, then, implicit and sometimes explicit in Burke a view of natural law and natural right. But Burke "stood for the primacy of 'practical wisdom' over 'theoretical science'" (p. 53). Inheriting a tradition of scholastic metaphysics of which he, as a practical man, had only a defective mastery, he has on occasion "applied even to propositions of the theoretical order a practical or pragmatic standard" (p. 53). Thus, he has provided the material to be used by those, like Leslie Stephen, Harold Laski, Leo Strauss, and others whom Father Canavan effectively criticizes. Here, he insists, Burke was concerned not with an attack on natural right but with an attack on the social order based on "a false claim of natural right against the idea of inherited and prescriptive authority" (p. 102). The conclusion, persuasively presented and generally free from exaggeration, even in the appendix devoted to "Burke's College Study of Philosophy," is that Burke's political thought "supposes the doctrine of natural law in its medieval form and relates it to the problems of politics through practical reason and prudence" (p. ix). Moreover,

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Father Canavan seriously and formidably attacks those who argue against his thesis by noting the influence of Locke and Hume on Burke's early work.

Reflections with Edmund Burke provides oddly pleasant reading. Many of the Burke quotations are very good, indeed. When the quotations lose their fascination, the editor's headings prove diverting. Some subjects are richly, if not well and truly represented, but elsewhere the headings of the quotations are arbitrary and strange. Some of the selections are Burke's paraphrases—for example, a scriptural passage gains no authority from Burke.

M. A. FITZSIMONS

UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME

In Hard Times: Reformers Among the Late Victorians. By HERMAN AUSUBEL. New York, Columbia University Press, 1960.—viii, 403 pp. $7.50.

This is a good, lively, informative book on the period of the great depression in England (1873-1896). Its greatest merit is enthusiasm and enterprise in exploiting unpublished manuscript sources. There is smooth and skillful use of quotation, and there are also flashes of depth and subtlety of insight, for example, the analyses of Carlyle, Joseph Chamberlain, and W. T. Stead.

Reformers of the last third of the nineteenth century enjoyed singular advantages. The extension of the suffrage in 1867 and 1884 created a multitude of new voters who were reached through the written word thanks to the reduction in illiteracy. Profit could be derived from the errors of reformers in the earlier part of the century. Above all, the business cycle proved to be an unexpected ally. England was at last hit simultaneously by the growth of world production and the lag of world purchasing power. Ausubel also points up the effects of prolonged agricultural distress which forced landowners and tenant farmers, beset by poor seasons, high taxes, foreign competition, and declining prices, to make much-needed changes. Essentially, however, the book is a study of the reformers, both great and near great, as people, rather than the reforms themselves. The biggest single influence in making them reformers, he feels, was still religion. Many were members of the clergy, or devout laymen. They were also distinguished by their impatience of opposition, energy, concentration on commitments, and annoyance at the indifference to them.

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Ausubel is most astute in assessing the influence of Carlyle and Ruskin on the later reformers who had read them. He also stresses the growth of the press and how reformers made great efforts to win journalists as supporters, for example, Mary Carpenter and W. T. Stead. The press publicized reform books, though Ausubel is correct in citing the problem of public squeamishness and consequent censorship. Interviewing politicians was another favorite device of reformers.

Ausubel has made an excellent analysis of Joseph Chamberlain. His study of the socialists is less impressive, with possibly not enough emphasis on the Fabians. There also might have been more on the female suffragists. He is most enlightening in delineating the attacks on free trade and the scope of the anti-imperialist attack. He makes no mention of the reformers living in the Empire, but that is probably a conscious omission. Ireland is included, and there is a fine sense of proportion and balance in the treatment of reforms there, especially land reforms. Proper attention is focussed on the Land Act of 1881, and he is shrewd in his sketch of Gladstone, whose passionate involvement in the Home Rule movement is given ample space. Ausubel perceptively observes that Gladstone's character "had much to do with his conduct, for his self-image required him to act according to what he considered the standard of proper Christian behavior" (p. 285).

Advocates of every cause, from temperance to educational reform, from birth control to bimetallism, are to be found in these pages. Relatively unfamiliar names, such as Robert Blatchford, Ernest E. Williams, and T. H. Green, appear along with the better known John Bright or Sidney and Beatrice Webb. As a confirmed Savoyard, this reviewer would nominate Gilbert and Sullivan as reformers through their pointed satire. Sometimes there is an overabundance of quotations, but they never cease to be interesting. The cartoons and illustrations are apt, and the Columbia University Press has extended itself in the production of an attractive book.

SAMUEL CLYDE MCCULLOCH
SAN FRANCISCO STATE COLLEGE

American Suffrage from Property to Democracy, 1760-1860. By CHILTON WILLIAMSON. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1960.—x, 306 pp. $6.00.

A reviewer such as this one must appraise Professor Williamson's book with mixed feelings. On the one hand, it is the best

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general work on the suffrage that we now have, and will therefore be useful to scholars, probably for a long time. But at the same time, the scholar who has dug deeply into the records of one colony or state will recognize that the book is by no means definitive.

As the title implies, the author has attempted to delineate the development of the suffrage in this country from colonial days, when voting was based largely on the freehold, to the period of the Civil War, by which time most states had abolished property qualifications for voting. In so doing, he accepts the recent work of scholars to the effect that property qualifications did not greatly limit the colonial electorate. In spite of this, however, and in spite of the fact that he discounts the "internal" revolution to some extent, he *does* believe that the question of the suffrage fits somewhat into the old interpretation of an internal revolution. "The period leading up to the Revolution, as well as the Revolution itself," he says, "was the turning point in the conscious democratization of ideas about the suffrage and in the actual liberalization of colonial suffrage laws" (p. 76). From this time the suffrage reformers successfully attacked voting restrictions until they had abolished not only the freehold and personal property qualifications, but in many states, even the small tax requirements. According to Williamson, "among the democratic achievements of the period between the Revolution and the Civil War, universal white manhood suffrage stands out as a reform of considerable magnitude in the context of the history of the United States and also of the world" (p. vii).

A more detailed study of any one state might well have changed Williamson's account in many important aspects. In Virginia, for example, townsmen would have enjoyed local town government except for the British government, and town officials had no real powers whatever. Sydnor's figures of a third to a half enfranchised were far too low, although Williamson recognizes that these figures were conservative. Virginia did restrict the electorate to males, and Catholics were legal voters if they were not recusant convicts. The "élite" could expect to be reelected only if they satisfied the voters, and while some sons succeeded their fathers in office, others failed in election or were rejected after one term in office. In characterizing colonial society as "pre-democratic" we may be misconstruing the colonial term "republican" which seems to have had the connotation of our term "representative democracy." Many of the changes attributed to the Revolution (p. 77) were accepted before that time in Virginia, where representatives had long been forced to reflect the will of the people. Much of the evidence presented

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in Chapter V on suffrage reform at the time of the Revolution does not, in fact, support this thesis. Closer study may well reveal that suffrage reform, far from being an innovation, was merely bringing the suffrage laws in line with actual practice.

Although this book tells us a great deal about the suffrage, it might well serve as a point of departure for several detailed studies of the suffrage and its practice, if the right to vote and its use are of any significance in our history.

ROBERT E. BROWN

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

The Diplomacy of the Winter War: An Account of the Russo-Finnish Conflict, 1939-1940. By MAX JAKOBSON. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1961.—281 pp. $5.75.

Since World War II, the publication of diplomatic documents has revealed much of the story behind the headlines of the Russo-Finnish Winter War (November 30, 1939-March 13, 1940). An impressive number of memoirs has been contributed by leading participants in the wintry drama. Somewhat more hesitatingly, historians inside and outside Finland have begun to grapple with the available material in efforts to sort out conflicting testimony and bring together the relevant information. Of all these efforts the most successful one has been made by Mr. Max Jakobson, a former newspaperman who stands outside the fraternity of professional historians, but brings to his task the experience of active service with the Finnish Foreign Office.

The great value of Mr. Jakobson's book, which was first issued in Finnish in 1955, is not that it reveals new information or suggests previously unsuggested conclusions, but rather that it brings together between two covers the entire known story of the diplomatic prelude and response to the Winter War. Finnish-Soviet diplomacy between 1938 and 1940 is tied in with the general diplomatic activities of the Western world, and although Mr. Jakobson's emphasis is on the Winter War as viewed from Helsinki, he does not exaggerate its significance within the general European and world picture. As he says (p. 4): "In the vast drama of the Second World War, the Soviet-Finnish conflict was merely an incident within an episode: a Soviet attempt to move by force a recalcitrant pawn into the square assigned to it in the deal between Stalin and Hitler." And yet it was (p. 5) "an incident that almost unhinged the power alignments of the Second World War" by very nearly bringing France and England into conflict with the Soviet Union through a fantastically

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unrealistic scheme to "aid" Finland by sending an expeditionary force through Norway and Sweden.

Both the Russo-Finnish negotiations of October-November, 1939, and past history support Mr. Jakobson's contention that the Soviet Union's reasons for wishing to extend its frontiers into Finnish Karelia were primarily and genuinely strategic. As early as 1721 the Treaty of Nystad was an expression of Peter the Great's concern for the security of St. Petersburg, and tsarist planning up to World War I demonstrates a similar concern. In 1918-1919 the White Russian leaders refused to accept the independence of Finland because of the security of Petrograd. The first Soviet overture to Finland, leading up to the Winter War, took place immediately after Germany's annexation of Austria—the first hint to the Kremlin that Hitler's eastward expansion of Germany as outlined in *Mein Kampf* was under way. As Stalin told the Finnish negotiators in October, 1939, the Soviet military planners insisted that the defense of Leningrad required the Soviet Union to regain the 1721 border with Finland. There was no indication that a desire to conquer all of Finland and impose upon her the Soviet system figured prominently in Soviet thinking. Of course, once the Winter War had begun Stalin probably hoped to realize those things as well, but he was not prepared to pay a heavy price for them, and quickly abandoned the idea and settled for the border of Peter the Great. The insistence on this line, by the way, was not based on any fear that Finland might coöperate with Germany in a future war against the Soviet Union—such fears vanished with the defeat of Svinhufvud in the presidential elections of 1937, but rather on the belief that Finland was militarily incapable of upholding her policy of neutrality.

Mr. Jakobson has written a well organized, compact, and lucid account. It should be recommended to anyone who is looking for the standard work on the diplomacy of the Winter War.

HANS PETER KROSBY

FAIRLEIGH DICKINSON UNIVERSITY

The Saar Conflict, 1945-1955. By JACQUES FREYMOND. With a Foreword by John Goormaghtigh. Published under the auspices of The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, European Centre. London, Stevens and Sons, Limited; New York, Frederick Praeger, 1960.—xxviii, 395 pp. $10.00.

The Saar Conflict is the first instalment of an unusually ambitious project. In the words of John Goormaghtigh, Director of

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the European Centre of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the object of the five studies of which Jacques Freymond's volume is the first one, is "not only to analyse the sequence of events in time but to understand the structure of international tensions and the interaction of the basic forces, and to bring out constants and analogies. . . ." Although admittedly "one can hardly speak of 'laws,' which at best would have to be qualified as imperfect," it is difficult to escape the suspicion that the formulation of such "laws" is what the Carnegie Endowment's new series is striving to achieve. The subsequent volumes will deal with the Franco-Moroccan conflict, Trieste, Cyprus, and the Anglo-Iranian dispute. A concluding study by Goormaghtigh will summarize the findings and, presumably, build up a "model" that "can be used as a basis for a new series of studies" and will also provide statesmen "with food for thought . . . and perhaps suggest certain lines of action." The project is "inspired by methods appropriate to the natural sciences" even though the organizers of the series are aware "of the limits of the application of such methods to the social sciences."

The Foreword refers to Freymond's assignment as a "thankless task." This statement is no mere figure of speech. Jacques Freymond, professor of International History and director of the Institut Universitaire des Hautes Etudes Internationale at Geneva, has written a detailed and informative account of the evolution of the Saar question presented against the background of a rapidly changing international situation. A sound historian, Freymond displays caution in dealing with the elusive social and economic factors which the organizers of the series expect to supply "constants and analogies" that would guide future statesmen. A regrettable restriction imposed on the author is the limitation of the period under investigation to the years 1945 to 1955. The history of the Saar from 1919 to 1934 presents remarkable elements of similarity with the situation after World War II and would offer much more illuminating analogies than those likely to emerge from the examination of the conflicts in Morocco, Trieste, Cyprus, and Iran. The part played in the early 1920's by Victor Rault, first president of the League of Nations' government in the Saar, has been largely duplicated by Gilbert Grandval, successively military governor, high commissioner, and ambassador of France in the Saar in 1945-1955. Like Rault, Grandval was *un grand préfet de la république,* and his high-handed arrogant policies, again like those of Rault, powerfully contributed to the final triumph of Germany.

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Freymond warns his readers against over-simplifications. This is sound advice, but over-elaborations are no less pernicious and potentially misleading. The van der Goes van Naters scheme of "europeanization" of the Saar, which never had any chance of success and is by now largely forgotten, hardly deserves the respectful attention given to it by the author, even though it served the useful purpose of facilitating the incorporation of the Saar into Western Germany. The segregation of the "political" study from the "analytical" one is unfortunate and tends to blur the picture while the twenty-five pages of diagrams, charts, and maps in the appendices are a source of bewilderment and confusion rather than of enlightement.

None the less, *The Saar Conflict* is a useful and well-written book. It would have been an even better one, had its author been free of editorial guidance. It seems highly improbable that the companion studies of Morocco, Trieste and so on, written by competent scholars and dealing with situations so unlike in the basic factors involved, would produce a plausible generalized "model," for history cannot be forced into doctrinaire schemes without suffering grievous distortions.

Michael T. Florinsky

Columbia University

A German Community under American Occupation: Marburg, 1945-1952. By John Gimbel. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1961.—vi, 259 pp. $5.50.

Can the United States transplant successfully the seeds of democracy, as it envisions it, to a nation that it occupies? Can it pursue short- and long-range policies which will result in a positive rather than a negative impact upon that country? These are some of the questions posed by John Gimbel, assistant professor of History at Humboldt State College, California, in *A German Community under American Occupation.* Several authors, such as Wolfgang Friedmann, Hajo Holborn and Harold Zink, already have written about the grand design of Allied military occupation of Germany but this is the first major case study of the rôle of military government in one specific city. In this perceptive portrayal, the author focuses his attention on the politically conservative and Protestant city of Marburg in Hesse province.

The study is based on the files of military government located in the Kansas City Army Records Center and the Department of State, and on German-language manuscript sources of various

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Marburg public authorities and private individuals, including police department records, as well as personal interviews and correspondence. The author has ably distilled the mass of materials and has written a most readable and dispassionate book.

The danger is that a microcosmic study of one city may be atypical and not represent the norm of the occupation record in Germany. Only further case studies of selected areas could prove or disprove the findings and conclusions reached by the author. But on the basis of the over-all record as already analyzed by several writers, and personal observations by this reviewer of occupation in other German cities, the Marburg experience seems to correspond closely to the prevailing pattern although the effects of the occupation apparently were more unfavorable there than in many other cities.

In describing and assessing this pattern, the author had several objectives in mind: (1) to study a "military government detachment at the lowest administrative level to suggest what an analysis of a larger unit might reveal"; (2) to gauge the political thinking of Americans who directed the efforts to establish "peace, democracy, and free enterprise" in Germany; and (3) to assess "the impact of the occupation on a German community," and the response of that community to the occupiers. His findings are a cause for pessimism and concern about American policies during the crucial initial period, 1945-1949. Germans who were our potential friends and who might have helped in the building up of a democratic Germany were soon disillusioned with our efforts and coöperated no further. Power was assumed by a leadership élite which "bore a striking similarity to those . . . leaders of the same community who proved so ineffective in the face of the Nazi challenge."

The Americans in Germany who were motivated by a passion for democracy were unable to produce among many Germans a firm commitment to democracy. Why did this failure occur? One explanation seems to be the frequent policy changes made by authorities in Washington to cope with changes in the international realm and in the internal German situation. The detachment in Marburg found it impossible to convince enough Germans that despite changes in denazification procedures, dismantling and demilitarization, our aims were still the promotion of peace and democracy.

But, one may interpose here, should it be the task of the conquerors to remake a nation in its own image? Can such a task be executed successfully given the strong traditions and prejudices found in any community? We adopted the grass-roots

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approach in the reorientation program by sponsoring town hall meetings, public forums, women's clubs and even soap-box derbies. The population did not respond to any significant degree to these myriad efforts, believing them to be unimportant and superfluous. This is not to say that all Germans are anti-democratic, rather that their concepts of democracy often differ from ours. For instance, the educational, social, and welfare programs of political parties are more important to them than to us.

Furthermore, our programs were conceived too vaguely or too pragmatically, and our occupation personnel was frequently rotated, thus leading to confusion and to a lack of communication. All in all, Gimbel concludes, the individual American created a favorable impression in Marburg, while American policy made a lasting unfavorable impact upon that city. But despite the limitations which any case study holds, this book is an important contribution to the study of occupation policies.

GERARD BRAUNTHAL

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

The United States and the Southwest Pacific. By C. HARTLEY GRATTAN. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1961.—xii, 273 pp. $5.00.

The editor of the series, of which this book is a part, makes the amazing statement that the author was "obliged to do a good deal of pioneering work in writing this excellent volume" (p. ix). An excellent volume it is, in its way, but as the author correctly says, it is bringing into focus "thirty years of reading in relevant materials," rather than "pioneering." The book duplicates much of what has been published before—by Mr. Grattan among others—and fails to supply fresh insights, new interpretations, or even a novel focus. The dearth of material for a story on American involvements in the Southwest Pacific made the need to replough well-worked ground foreseeable. Once the author decided merely to point out but not to fill gaps in the knowledge of American activities in the area, this need became inevitable. At one point, for instance, the author frankly limits himself to speculating briefly about American investments in the economies of the Southwest Pacific—a most pertinent subject—because "nobody has ever worked out" just where they were. The consequence of such an approach is a coverage of the topic essentially along previously developed lines and on the basis of previously published accounts.

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The book begins with brief chapters on the geography, economy, culture, and communications of the major sections of the Southwest Pacific, along with a few impressions of the peoples living there. It ends with summary references to New Zealand, the islands, and the Antarctic. Its bulk is devoted to American-Australian relations, with emphasis upon the Australian side. In chronological order the obvious topics are dealt with: early contacts of American sailors and whalers with the colonies; sealing, whaling, gold digging, and trading in the middle 1800's; growing economic and cultural contacts just before and around the turn of the century; the Samoan affair; the aftermath of World War I, especially in regard to the islands and new trade patterns in the Pacific; Australia's growth into nationhood; the coöperation during World War II; Labour's search for a viable foreign policy; and the Conservatives' implementation of such a policy. Mr. Grattan's account does not make sufficiently clear that the change in Australia's security policy from reliance upon Great Britain before World War II to close coöperation with the United States thereafter, like several other postwar features of Australia's policy, had their ideological beginnings long before the war. He does not evaluate the effects of the influx of a wave of non-British immigrants or of American investments since World War II on ties to Great Britain and relations with the United States. The West New Guinea dispute with Indonesia as a factor in American-Australian relations is settled in one sentence. The rôle of Australia in the creation of SEATO was much more important and dramatic than the reader of this volume would guess. The book does not match the significance of Mr. Grattan's many other contributions to knowledge of this area. But it is excellently written and a good introduction for the uninitiated.

WERNER LEVI

UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII

The Impact of Collective Bargaining on Management. By SUMNER H. SLICHTER ET AL. Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1960.—xv, 982 pp. $8.75.

The sweep of this study, the prominence of its authors and respect for the publisher insure a wide and attentive audience of readers among students and practitioners of labor relations. The attention is deserved and will be rewarded, for the book is a comprehensive encyclopedia filled with illustrations, cases, and analyses of collective bargaining policies and practices, 1940-

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1960. Modeled on Slichter's classic of twenty years ago, *Union Policy and Industrial Management,* the authors do not examine the effects of unions upon inter-industry wage structure or such economic issues as wage and price trends and distributive shares; they concern themselves with the less dramatic but larger, more practical issues that arise in the day-to-day relations of unions and employers.

With the purpose of determining the effects of unions upon management, they examine, in separate chapters, the content of the policies and practices of seniority, work sharing and layoff, promotion, work scheduling and assignment, subcontracting, pensions, health and welfare, employee benefits, severance pay, and plant wage incentives, rates and structure. The book also explores in detail the administration of the labor-management agreement through the grievance (and arbitration) process and the problems of discipline, wildcat strikes and union pressure tactics. Several chapters perceptively examine unions' control of hiring, training, apprenticeship and approach to technological change; other chapters examine the impact of unions upon the decision-making process narrowly conceived—line and staff coöperation, the position of foremen and contract negotiators. The problem of high-cost plants and the experience of union-management coöperation receive special attention.

With its wealth of case material, history, and information about collective bargaining, this book makes a major contribution to an informed understanding of the development and form of current management policies and practices. Its uses will be so multitudinous that its readers need to be on guard against its shortcomings. First of all, the apparent methodology raises grave doubts about the meaning of some of the data and certainly about many of the authors' interpretations of those data. Over a period of three years approximately 650 individuals in 150 companies, 25 industry associations and 40 unions were interviewed. On the average, the researchers spoke to about three people per organization. Even granting that they spoke to more than the average number in many organizations and less than the average in others, the depth and scope of their probe into policies and practices may well have been limited. What positions did these individuals hold? What was their rôle in, and responsibility for, collective bargaining? We are not told, though the answers would enable us to evaluate better the picture of industrial relations drawn by those interviewed. Shop stewards do not necessarily view union practices in the same light as even local union officers, and responsible labor policy may mean one thing to a foreman and quite another to an in-

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dustrial relations staff man. Since the authors sought "material that is significant, rather than representative," even a brief discussion of the standards of significance employed by the authors, the researchers, or those interviewed would help students to relate the materials to other studies of labor.

Second, the authors display an unfortunate tendency to make definitive statements which seem to be based simply upon the remarks and opinions of the individuals interviewed. For example, "seniority has become progressively more important during the past twenty years" (p. 104), and "in the postwar years . . . use of pressure tactics as a substitute for, or supplement to, the grievance procedure declined" (p. 736). How valid are these statements? No proof in the study indicates the growing importance of seniority or the decline of pressure tactics. That people handling labor relations believe these changes have taken place is a useful datum, but quite a different piece of information from the fact of the changes themselves.

Third, the authors admit a bias in their judgment of collective bargaining practices. In a conflict between union and management, they favor managerial goals which they define too simply as efficiency and production. (These are often contradictory goals depending upon circumstances and the level of management concerned.) However, their admission does not relieve them of a scholarly responsibility to take full account of the consequences of the collective bargaining they describe. In the first third of the book particularly, they repeatedly note that unions have restricted managers' *freedom* but pass over what the cases they relate so strikingly reveal: the positive benefits brought to management and workers by unions and collective bargaining (for example, in scheduling work, pp. 213 and 233; jurisdictional disputes and work assignment, pp. 254-278; work rules and technological change, pp. 348-354; discipline, p. 626; and seniority, p. 841). The interpretive sections of the book would be much more valuable and reliable if the authors emphasized not only managers' losses but also managers' gains through collective bargaining.

While this book will stand as a monument to the late Sumner Slichter, who died before it was finished, he may be longer remembered for his earlier book of 1940. Then he was not so much concerned with merely the impact of collective bargaining upon the office of manager as he was concerned with a problem of greater import, the development of constitutionalism in an industrial society. The present study limits its vision, having forgotten Slichter's earlier admonition "that industry produces men as well as goods and the kind of men which a democratic

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community needs may not be produced in shops which are small oriental despotisms."

JAMES W. KUHN

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Party Politics. By SIR IVOR JENNINGS. Volume I: *Appeal to the People.* Volume II: *The Growth of Parties.* Cambridge, at the University Press; New York, Cambridge University Press.—Vol. I, 1960, vii, 404 pp. 45 s.; $8.50. Vol. II, 1961, xxxiv, 377 pp. 45 s.; $8.50.

The Master of Trinity Hall has contributed an impressive treatise. It obviously challenges comparison with Professor Martin Lipset's book, one of the finest in political science in this decade, *The Political Man.* The obvious differences are that Professor Lipset takes an international sweep, Sir Ivor Jennings, despite his title, a national one; Professor Lipset, with his remarkable bibliography, gives evidence of extensive teamwork, whereas Sir Ivor pursues the somewhat old-fashioned style of the individual scholar; and Professor Lipset's book is richer in architectonic theory, generalizations and insights of high interest to both political theorist and practical politician, which generalizations, right or wrong, are challenging. Sir Ivor's book is far more 'academic', even if he has, for example, discouraging news for the Liberal party.

It begins with chapters on the history of the franchise, a little reminiscent of the Stubbs and Maitland tradition, and largely of local interest. After a discussion of the influences of newspapers and churches and of what (as every candidate knows) is now the slight *démodé* technique of the public meeting, he moves on to a discussion of class structure, to which scholars from Michels to Meisel have devoted attention—incidentally, is this "sociology" or "political science"? Sir Ivor provides a gallant practical and concluding chapter of this volume, entitled "A Primer of Electioneering," as a guide to those who run for public office, howbeit that Sir Ivor himself has not so run. Both Professor Lipset (whose book I have reviewed elsewhere) and Sir Ivor strongly incline to the Marxoid thesis that the clue to the interpretation of voting lies in the class structure. This is fortified by statistics, but is the more interesting because most contemporary sociologists are sceptical of the value of this concept on the ground that, on close examination, it becomes vague, ill-definable and unhelpful. Sir Ivor's is quite a wise book, full

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of discussions of the views and prejudices of "Bill," the common voter. However, he holds that "the only permanent class is the middle class," which is class-conscious. (Lipset, with an artillery of statistics, maintains that this class is the sociological basis of fascism). Rank and class do not coincide; but the prestige of Eton remains almost unchanged since 1801. Briefly, for Jennings, "class" boils down to an economic distinction between "sur-tax payers" and other income tax payers. (In parentheses, many Labour Ministers are in the first class.) Briefly, we arrive at the, perhaps not astounding, conclusion (supported by Lipset) that economic interests differ and that men vote according to them. . . . Lipset, however, introduces so many important reservations to this that one doubts whether the Marxoid hypothesis is valid, profound or useful.

For the British Labour party the problem is that it has a public "class" image which many of its own now-affluent supporters reject, as they would not that of being a Democrat. For the "evangelists," as distinct from the "brokers," among the politicians the remedy is to emphasize it and to thrust the blazing image into the damp faces of the "floating vote," while bringing out fully the apathetic laboring vote. Jennings discouragingly comments: "If the Labour Party is regarded as a working class party, it cannot appeal to the majority of the people." But, despite Jennings' Propositions 6, 9 and 11, the economic interest is not all. The "swing of the pendulum," he holds, is due to new voters and to abstentions. I would submit that the voter does not vote for party power, economic group, national interest or for objectives of the hour; that he votes with resentment *against* the party which does not deliver the goods he wants.

Like the first, the second volume of this indispensable work by the Vice-Chancellor-elect of Cambridge is exclusively about British political parties and is largely historical. Within this field, as might be expected, it provides a masterly survey of the relevant facts. Nor does it lack wit, as when Conservative Party Conferences are described as full of "jolly old boys and grim old girls." There are some speculations, such as that the Labour party is in for "an inexorable march" towards decline, which seems rather risky. Certainly, on Sir Ivor's own evidence, the Liberal party seems unlikely to replace it. The ground for the guess provides an interesting comment on Sir Ivor's own theme about class influence in politics: with Mark Abrams he feels that everybody subjectively is becoming middle class. As the gravity of the British economic situation is borne home, I would rather anticipate something very other than "a sham fight." On the

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other hand, he regards the epoch of the popularity of *Land of Hope and Glory* as "tawdry."

My only criticism is that Sir Ivor does not seem to like hope; that he presents a vista of a country bourgeois, purposeless and defeatist; and that perhaps an opponent could say such temperamental superiorities and valuations as his, and moral detachments, do the country, whether or not engaged in "sham fights" (where "No one loves Johnnie"), small service. I doubt whether either Disraeli or Gladstone would approve. At least Sir Ivor Jennings can yet congratulate himself on having now covered, single-handed, the entire constitutional machinery, Cabinet, Parliament and Parties. It is a massive and individual achievement, although perhaps of the traditional juristic and historical order of scholarship.

GEORGE E. GORDON CATLIN

McGILL UNIVERSITY

The Meaning of Modern Business: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Large Corporate Enterprise. By RICHARD EELLS. New York, Columbia University Press, 1960.—xi, 427 pp. $7.50.

Bertrand Russell defined Hegel's Absolute Idea as "thought thinking about itself." We can describe this work, whose author is both senior researcher in Business at Columbia University and director of Research in Public Policy at General Electric Company, as Big Business Thought thinking about itself. Its most striking feature is lack of incisiveness and clarity, sharing, perhaps, in the attributes of Hegel's Absolute Idea.

At the outset (Ch. II and III) Mr. Eells contrasts two models of the corporation, the traditional corporation and the metro-corporation. The first is the profit-maximizing enterprise of economic theory. The second is Eell's own term (the most original contribution of the book) for the "new model" enterprise described in the writings of Drucker, Berle, and others, in which the corporation is viewed as a broadly political rather than a narrowly economic institution, a polity in miniature. He finds both unsatisfactory: the first, because it departs too much from empirical reality; the second, because it goes too far in emphasizing the non-economic side of corporate activity. Characteristically, his own model, termed the well-tempered corporation (whether in the sense of Ferdinand the Bull or Bach's clavichord is not quite clear), represents in his own view some kind of *via media* between the other two models.

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Between the final chapter (XV) in which the well-tempered corporation is discussed and the three introductory chapters, Mr. Eells reviews recent writing on the business firm. The problems of corporate goals are considered (Ch. VI); the difficulties of rationality in business decision making are catalogued (Ch. VII); policy steps and instruments are studied and strategic decision areas marked out (Ch. VIII and IX). After the dilemmas of corporate responsibility in general are pondered (Ch. IV), the responsibilities of the corporation to various claimants are examined one by one—security holders, customers, employees, suppliers, competitors, local communities, the general public and its governments (Ch. X-XII), and the problems of public relations get a chapter to themselves (Ch. XIV). In none of this does Mr. Eells either present anything novel, or summarize and analyze other discussion in a clear and compelling way.

To Mr. Eells, the well-tempered corporation is a middle way between the traditional model which no longer applies, and the model of the metrocorporation, in which he finds alarming portents of a new feudalism. To me, the well-tempered corporation is merely the metrocorporation described by an admirer rather than a critic. Its five salient elements are (pp. 335-336): (1) a goal of profitable long-term return on investments, together with concern for those who have committed their property and careers to the company, and full consideration of the commitments the enterprise has made to society; (2) a recognition of its inseparable links with the total economic, political, and cultural environment; and therefore its commitments to sustaining the economic and political processes of the whole society; (3) a decision-making process which takes account of the multitude of corporate goals; (4) a recognition that although most strategic decisions are primarily economic, some will be concerned with the broader factors that determine the rate of growth, social acceptance, and survival of the organization; and (5) a system of internal government with self-generated principles of constitutionalism that match corporate authority to corporate responsibilities, and impose restraints on the abuse of power.

Whatever other conclusion about the large corporation this study justifies, it appears to me to make clear that it would be wiser for it to eschew adding social philosophy to its other product lines.

CARL KAYSEN

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

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The Open and Closed Mind: Investigations into the Nature of Belief Systems and Personality Systems. By MILTON ROKEACH. New York, Basic Books, 1960.—xv, 447 pp. $7.50.

This volume represents an integration and interpretation of research by Rokeach, together with his colleagues and former students, which goes back at least as far as 1948, and which even prior to the present publication aroused considerable interest and some controversy. Rokeach's original emphasis on rigidity as a factor in ethnocentrism added an important dimension to the approach to prejudice as a function of personality. The argument which followed centered mainly on the question of the generality of rigidity as a personality trait, since a number of investigators failed to find high positive correlations between two different measures of what was presumably one and the same characteristic.

Rokeach now returns to the same and related issues, but with a broadened base and a more inclusive theoretical approach. He is here concerned not so much with *rigid* as with *dogmatic* thinking. These appear at first glance to be synonymous, since they both refer to resistance to change, but the latter, in Rokeach's view, is much more important, because it refers to whole systems of beliefs and not just to single or specific tasks. The "referent of dogmatic thinking seems to be a total cognitive configuration of ideas and beliefs organized into a relatively closed system; rigidity, on the other hand, points to difficulties in overcoming single sets or beliefs encountered in attacking, solving, or learning specific tasks or problems" (p. 183).

A large part of the volume consists of a series of research reports, many of them showing considerable ingenuity, in which persons high and low in dogmatism, as measured by a Dogmatism Scale, are compared in a variety of ways, ranging from their religious, political and ethnic attitudes to performance on a number of laboratory tasks. To mention only a few of the findings, those with high scores on the Scale (the "closed minds") take longer to solve problems requiring the synthesis of a new system of beliefs, and have greater difficulty in remembering the beliefs to be integrated; they show less transfer effect from one problem to the next; when faced with an Impossible Problem they are more frequently "loyal," that is, continue to believe there must be a solution; they are less ready to enjoy new forms of music; when their values change, they do so in the direction of becoming more opportunistic; they tend to show more anxiety, and a smaller degree of identification with persons outside their own family; they are more authoritarian.

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The Dogmatism Scale, which is in a sense the crucial instrument used in this series of studies, is made up of a series of statements, forty in the final Form, to which the respondent is asked to express agreement or disagreement respectively. Many of the items sound as if they do indicate dogmatism, for example, "Of all the different philosophies which exist in this world there is probably only one which is correct." Others are somewhat more doubtful, as "If given the chance I would do something of great benefit to the world." This is included because Rokeach believes that "concern with power and status" goes with dogmatism, but this and a number of other statements must inevitably raise in the mind of the reader the query as to whether the Scale really measures what it purports to measure. There is a chapter on validation, and two relevant studies are described. Since only one of them gave positive results, the reviewer would like to add the need for further validation to the list of research projects which Rokeach regards as necessary.

One very constructive aspect of this volume relates to the author's demonstration that authoritarianism can be of the left as well as the right, and that what he calls "opinionation" can be found anywhere along the political spectrum. His "Opinionation Scale," which also contains forty items, includes such "Left opinionation" statements as "A person must be pretty stupid if he still believes in differences between the races," and "Right opinionation" ones such as "It's the agitators and left-wingers who are trying to get Red China into the United Nations." Here again one might quarrel about the significance of some of the items, although the "face validity" or "construct validity" of this scale seems a little more logical than is the case with some of the "Dogmatism" statements. At the same time, the need for some further evidence regarding what the scale really measures appears to be indicated. There can be little doubt, however, that one can be "opinionated" even if one is "liberal," and this provides a needed correction to earlier formulations.

The analysis of ethnocentrism introduces some exceedingly interesting, but again debatable conclusions. Rokeach contrasts his view of prejudice with the prevailing one, for example, by stating that whereas the usual view is that "The basic criterion of categorization is an ethnic or racial criterion: how much we like and dislike Jews, Negroes, foreigners, etc.," his own conclusion is that the basic criterion is rather: "how much we like and dislike those whose belief-disbelief systems are similar to or different from our own" (p. 394). The evidence for this conclusion is found in research, for example, which indicates that a

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white respondent states a preference for association with a Negro who believes in God over a white person who is an atheist. Rokeach concludes that "The major finding in all samples was that discriminatory preferences are made primarily on the basis of belief congruence rather than on the basis of ethnic or racial congruence" (p. 166).

This is a startling conclusion, but not entirely convincing, at least to this reader. Even if Rokeach is right, he appears to neglect the fact that prejudice and discrimination are usually expressed *before* we know anything about the beliefs of the member of a minority group. If we are "prejudiced against the Negro" (I retain this outmoded expression) we may refuse to let him get close enough, in any real sense, even to discover whether his beliefs and ours are congruent. We reject him in advance, without inquiring into his beliefs. To say, as Rokeach does, that this is a "sociological" rather than a "psychological" phenomenon does not seem to be particularly helpful.

Even if (as Rokeach himself admits) a number of questions are left open (perhaps even more than Rokeach realizes) the fact remains that this volume is exceedingly stimulating, raises a number of issues which are of concern to many disciplines including political science, and reads well and interestingly. It contains a quantity of research leads which are bound to be followed up at the level of Ph.D. dissertations and beyond, and this constitutes a very significant contribution. Although many of the conclusions will be debated, this is in many ways an exciting volume.

OTTO KLINEBERG

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

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In C. P. Snow's novels the heroes are all tinged with villainy and the villains with heroism. These reprinted Godkin lectures, *Science and Government* by C. P. Snow (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1961; vi, 88 pp. $2.50), tell a real life tale of conflict between Sir Henry Tizard and F. A. Lindemann (Lord Cherwell), Churchill's trusted scientific adviser. As Snow recounts the narrative there is precious little to be said for Lindemann and against Tizard in their arguments over the use of radar and the strategy of massive bombing. It may only go to show that truth is stranger than fiction. Certainly if C. P. Snow is right—he appears to base his account on his own wartime recollections and Tizard's papers—Tizard's opposition to strategic bombing was amply justified, and Lindemann's hostility to radar very nearly lost the Battle of Britain. The events are in themselves fascinating but it is the morals which are most important. Snow concludes from his own understanding of the close personal relationship between Churchill and the "Prof" that there is enormous danger in reliance on a single scientific adviser, a need to select the right scientists and avoid the gadgeteers, and a large advantage in employing substantial numbers of scientists at many governmental levels. In substantial part, then, the present lectures carry a step forward the theme of *The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution*. But as might be said of that provocative essay as well, there are more questions than answers. How are the scientifically ignorant politicians to distinguish between the good and the bad scientists? How does a Harry Truman adjudicate the argument between a Robert Oppenheimer and an Edward Teller? How, on the other hand, can physicists and mathematicians understand that wily beast the politician? Exactly what sort of jobs should scientists be doing? Is the relationship between scientists and public officials really different in kind from the relationship between other experts and politicians? Are economists, farm specialists, psychiatrists, and sociologists really in a better position to communicate with their official masters than the "real" scientists? Of such questions the list could be very long.—ROBERT LEKACHMAN, Barnard College.

In his book, *The Purpose of American Politics* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1960; viii, 359 pp. $4.50), Professor Hans Morgenthau, certainly one of the most distinguished of American students of international relations, turns political philosopher, and

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examines both the past and the present of the American political scene in a series of broad generalizations. These generalizations are suggestive, but they are, like most sweeping statements, sometimes subject to challenge. And they seem to reflect a mood which, while not hopeless, is deeply tinged with pessimism. It is a good thing to shock Americans out of complacency, but in doing so, one must not exaggerate. For example, it does not appear to the reviewer quite true to say that from 1950 to 1954 McCarthyism, "this stupid and dangerous farce," as Professor Morgenthau calls it, was "the most powerful political influence in the United States." It is difficult to accept the thesis set forth in the chapter on the decline of the public realm, which seems to say that the quality of our public service is deteriorating, and that able men no longer seek governmental office. It is doubtful whether there has been a decline in what the author calls "the objective standards of excellence," and that the United States is more the victim of a monotonous and majoritarian conformity than it was, say, in the era of Harding and Coolidge. One wonders, in fact, about Professor Morgenthau's sense of perspective. There is certainly much that is uninspiring about the last eight years, but eight years is a short period in which to judge a society. But this reviewer has no desire to cavil. For what Professor Morgenthau wishes of the future is wholly admirable, if not always stated with precision. What he asks of America is that it should continue to promote vertical mobility, that is, free access from lower to higher social and economic groups, that it should develop to the full its cultural possibilities, that it should deal sympathetically with the new nations emerging from the colonial status; that it should meet resolutely the problem of nuclear weapons, and strive to promote international control of such weapons; that it should "restore" (I question the word "restore") democratic government. His program suggests more dynamic action than we had during the eight years of the Eisenhower Administration. In nothing does Professor Morgenthau seem more right than in his conception of the importance of the Presidency. His views on this are, of course, not original, but they can hardly be stated too often. What a democracy needs is leadership, positive leadership, infused with both passion and understanding. Such leadership we did not have during the Eisenhower years; in fact, Eisenhower, as our author points out, explicitly rejected the idea. What we will get now we cannot yet say. But the very seriousness of the issues that now confront us, and the sense of history that President Kennedy has frequently demonstrated, give us some reason to hope.—Dexter Perkins, University of Rochester.

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Writings about Supreme Court Justices Frankfurter and Black seem almost inevitably to end up as apologias for one or the other; *Justices Black and Frankfurter: Conflict in the Court* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1961; x, 151 pp. $4) by Wallace Mendelson, is no exception. As a former student and associate of Frankfurter, Professor Mendelson is concerned to defend him. He does an excellent job. The book is well-written and concise, covers a broad area of Supreme Court decision-making, and uses cases and quotations effectively. That the book is more than fair to Frankfurter and less than fair to Black is to be expected, but it is unfortunate that the dust jacket (and the author himself at some points) indicates that it is an unbiased, scholarly treatment. It is probably sufficient for an indication of this that nowhere in the book does there appear any recognition that Frankfurter has ever made a mistake, or that there are any inconsistencies in his judicial career. The mistakes and the inconsistencies are all Black's. For instance, there is no explanation of how Frankfurter, with all his deference to state legislatures, has been able to vote to strike down state laws in the religious field in the *Everson, McCollum* and *Zorach* cases, or even in the segregation cases. The First and Fourteenth Amendments are no more clear in these areas than in the ones Mendelson concentrates on. Nor is there a recognition that what Mendelson refers to as Frankfurter's "pragmatic approach" is sometimes close to pedantry and sometimes amounts to nothing but counting noses. On the other hand, Mendelson is often effective in his criticisms of Black, especially as to the Steel Seizure issue, the FELA cases, and the difficult question of diversity jurisdiction. The basic difficulty seems to be that Mendelson does not recognize that the libertarian position of Black is based on explicit constitutional provisions, which (while admittedly ambiguous and difficult to apply) cannot be argued out of the constitution by an assumption of legislative supremacy. As a result, he sees all too clearly the contradictions in which Black is involved, but he cannot see at all the contradictions which Frankfurter's position imposes upon him. References to the "anguish" of decision-making do not meet this difficulty. The impartial observer—if there were one—would probably conclude that both men are partly right and partly wrong, and that both hold positions which inevitably force them into inconsistencies at times. The definitive work on this subject is yet to be written.—Loren P. Beth, University of Massachusetts.

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As the author suggests in the preface to his volume, *The Eighteenth Century Constitution, 1688-1815: Documents and Commentary,* by E. N. Williams (Cambridge, at the University Press, 1960; New York, Cambridge University Press, 1961; xvi, 464 pp. $9.50, cloth; $4.95, paper) historians in the nineteenth century assumed that the eighteenth-century political system was but a precursor of their own. Historians in this century, however, have made no such assumption, being more interested in the eighteenth-century political system for its own sake, more concerned to uncover its distinctive language and practices. This fundamental shift in point of view has had two consequences: first, a large amount of detailed research; and second, a time of discomfort (especially for teachers) while the old building was coming down and the new one was going up. If the new building is not quite finished—and there are some historians who maintain it will never look as if it were finished—nevertheless it is ready for use, thanks to the patient labors of Sir Lewis Namier and his disciples. In his highly useful compilation of documents for the study of eighteenth-century politics, Mr. Williams has sought to provide a kind of floor plan for this new edifice, for what might be called Namier's century. In this he has been altogether successful, and readers of English history in the eighteenth century—from William III to William Pitt—should now take comfort; they need no longer approach that century with alarm and distaste.

Mr. Williams has arranged his documents under six heads: the Glorious Revolution, the central government, parliament, local government, the Church, and liberties of the subject. As he remarks: "Much of the British Constitution notoriously exists only in the minds of men"; and accordingly he offers an insight into many eighteenth-century minds. He does not insist that constitutional history be learned only from statutes and law cases, but encourages and permits his reader to range more widely: among pamphlets and essays, memoirs and parliamentary debates, borough and county records, even among manuscript collections like the Dartmouth Papers in the William Salt Library and the Newcastle Papers in the British Museum. Good Namierite that he is, Mr. Williams pays much attention to the machinery of electoral influence and patronage, to the structure of society and politics in the localities; and his examples could scarcely be improved on. Leafing through his pages one comes, for example, to Edward Harbord's letter to his brother, Lord Suffield, explaining how the Harbord family had benefited by bringing him into parliament for Yarmouth: "Your Lord Lieutenancy and Petre's Receiver Generalship have been the conse-

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quence." Or there is the Duke of Newcastle's letter to Mr. Pelham, instructing that gentleman on the mysteries of electioneering in Sussex: "That we should have as large a Meeting of Considerable People, as we could get; but not to descend too low." Mr. Williams' book should delight and surprise as well as instruct. Among its many good things there is also a most useful bibliography.—DAVID SPRING, The Johns Hopkins University.

The development of Canadian economic thought from the closing of the War of 1812 to the outbreak of World War I is covered in the study, *Canadian Economic Thought: The Political Economy of a Developing Nation, 1814-1914,* by C. D. W. Goodwin (Durham, Duke University Press for the Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center, 1961; ix, 214 pp. $6.00). Like the studies on economic thought in the United States, this book goes beyond the development of the technical doctrines which are treated in the usual college course in "economic analysis." The author gives considerable attention to economic policy, drawing his materials not only from the academic world, but also from the popular and quasi-popular press, and government documents. For organizational purposes, the author divides the book into two parts, "economic policy" and "economic science"; but he notes that "almost all Canadian economics before 1914 was policy oriented." The section on policy is devoted to land colonization, banking and currency, and tariffs. The treatment of land colonization is notable for the detailed discussion of the little known but acute analyses and proposals of Robert Gourlay. Gourlay's studies, the author points out, have particular significance because of their influence on Gibbon Wakefield, the foremost British theorist on land colonization. This influence is apparent in Wakefield's contribution to the *Durham Report,* that "first expression of policies which led ultimately to the creation of the British Commonwealth." In the section on economic science, the author assembles much useful information on the development of the teaching of the subject in all Canadian colleges and universities. This section is enlivened by the thumbnail sketches of eminent British and Canadian scholars who occupied—some for short periods—academic posts in Canada. Of special interest are the economic historian, Sir William Ashley, and the value theorist and statistician, Sir Alfred Flux. There are also some succinct discussions of John Rae's generally well known views on capital and banking theory. The author may seem unduly harsh in his conclusion that during the period covered by this book, Cana-

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dian scholars contributed very little to the progress of economic science. We hope that he will eventually undertake a study of the post-World War I period which, he holds, witnessed substantial contributions by Canadians.—JOSEPH DORFMAN, Columbia University.

In *Thought Reform of the Chinese Intellectuals* by Theodore H. E. Chen (Hong Kong, University Press; London and New York, Oxford University Press, 1960; xiii, 247 pp. $5.00) a convenient summary is provided of Chinese communist policy towards the strategic group of intellectuals from the accession of the Peking regime to power in 1949 through the aftermath of the Hundred Flowers Campaign in 1957. One of the most useful features of the book is Dr. Chen's identification of the particular attitudes which the Communists have sought to reform in the intellectuals. Among these, pro-Americanism has been a prime target not only because the Communists are "ideologically opposed to capitalism, and the United States today has become the symbol of capitalism, but also because few Chinese intellectuals in recent decades have been free from American influence" (p. 67). To publish in an American journal, to flaunt academic degrees, to insist on international standards, to cherish ambitions of personal success and fame, to talk naïvely of freedom and democracy, to subscribe to American magazines or praise the American way of life, to rate the achievements of American science above those of the Soviet Union is to be reprehensibly pro-American (pp. 57-58). Among the ingredients of the condemned "bourgeois mentality" are scorn of the laboring masses, objectivism, wage rather than service psychology, insistence on technique rather than politics, and isolation of theory from practice. Other targets of communist thought reform are identified as "individualism," scepticism of the Soviet Union, and a "supra-politics mentality," or aloofness from class and political struggle (pp. 62-67). Dr. Chen has traced chronologically the communist attempt to win, or at least utilize, the intellectuals. He has described various reform campaigns and the special training centers to which many intellectuals have been sent for political indoctrination. His account clearly sketches the shifts in communist strategy as it zigzagged back and forth between lenient persuasion and tougher compulsion. Dr. Chen also devotes a few pages to the organization and techniques of thought reform, the use of criticism and self-criticism in small group or *hsüeh-hsi* sessions. The chief weakness of the book is that it concentrates on external description or analysis and does not explore the problem of what happens in and to an indi-

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vidual in thought reform. The author has not really discussed the nationalistic, moral or emotional factors which have been invoked. If these are not understood, thought reform is for the most part merely reduced to a matter of forced compliance. It is this external approach which has kept Dr. Chen from differentiating between those campaigns, like land reform, in which intellectuals were according to many observers genuinely affected by their participation, and those in which compliance was often perfunctory, as in the early stages of the Resist-America Aid-Korea Campaign. Despite this, the book is the most concise guide to the relevant material yet available.—HARRIET MILLS, Cornell University.

The final chapter of *Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan: A Study of Post-war Trends* by I. I. Morris (Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs by Oxford University Press, London, New York and Toronto, 1960; xxvii, 476 pp. 50s.; $8.00) is about as succinct and comprehensive an essay on the postwar status of democratic and nationalistic ideas in Japan as one could hope to find. It is done with insight and at times with a polish approaching elegance. It is of course a personal view, and if this reviewer does not entirely agree with the author's cautious estimate of the depth to which democratic ideas have been implanted in the several sectors of Japanese society, he feels that the problems have been accurately located. This applies both to the description of the phenomena and to the analysis of the factors whose future variations are likely to have an important bearing on the tone of Japanese politics. The body of the book is not for reading at one sitting. The author's diligence in collecting and presenting facts makes the book as much a reference work as an analytical study. Coverage of Japanese sources is excellent, as is the synthesis of the analyses of Professors Maruyama (who contributed an Introduction to the present volume), Kinoshita, Fujiwara and others with the author's own. Mr. Okubo Genji has contributed very useful observations supplementing published data. The weight of fact is sometimes so great as to obscure the structure of the analysis. But in the factual aspect, at least, the book should be regarded as definitive. In general, a distinction is drawn between prewar and postwar right-wing nationalist movements in terms of their access to, and relations with, the holders of power. In the postwar period, a further distinction is made between movements prior to the peace treaty, which simulated democratic organizations through the "amuletic" use of words, and the later revival of nationalist move-

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ments on traditional lines. The latter are more particularly this book's subject matter, considered in terms of ideological position, internal structure and trends toward a unified movement, and relations to the new military, the student movement and the like. Basically, the author regards rightist movements as organized nihilism. He distinguishes between the nationalism of such movements and the diffuse, unorganized nationalism, whose content is not right-wing or necessarily nihilistic, of the Japanese general public. The author's antipathy for his main subjects is quite understandable, but it may, to a small degree, have inhibited the possibility of a really systematic social-psychological analysis and may also have produced a slight overestimation of the potential receptivity of the general public to right-wing leadership. This, however, is again a question of personal judgment and does not detract from the book's value.—A. M. HALPERN, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California.

The mainspring of Egyptian nationalism stems from the old idea of Islamic unity, but in its recent manifestation it owes much to the Albanian renegade who founded modern Egypt, and to the literary activity of an Afghan intellectual living in Cairo late in the nineteenth century. Mohammed Ali (1769-1849) wanted to shape the destiny of Egypt according to his image: he wanted Egypt to benefit from Europe's intellectual and scientific advances by providing the country with European-educated Egyptian leaders. Thus he started in the 1820's educating Egyptian students in Europe at government expense. There these students were imbued with European ideas of nationalism. Upon their return some of them entered government service, a few secluded themselves as teachers in the Al-Ahzar University, that famous seat of Koranic learning in Cairo, while many others became writers, journalists, and publishers. Whatever official or unofficial positions they held, their zealous advocacy of egalitarianism, brotherhood, democracy and modernism had tremendous impact on Egyptian nationalism, especially at the intellectual level. This interesting and intriguing story, from its effective beginning in the second half of the last century, is ably and skilfully told in *The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian Nationalism* by Jamal Mohammed Ahmed (Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs by Oxford University Press, London, New York, Toronto, 1960; xi, 135 pp. $5.00), a brief but valuable and readable book by the Oxford-educated Sudanese scholar-diplomat. It is based on a large variety of published works of a group of Egyptian, Lebanese and Syrian writers who, as teachers, political leaders

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and journalists, contributed to the mainstream of Egyptian nationalism, as understood by the rebellious Arabi Pasha in the 1880's, and as expounded later most eloquently by Sa'ad Zaghlul (1860-1927). Next to Afghani, as the most influential intellectuals emerging in these pages are Mohammed Abdu (1845-1905), the liberal civil servant, Lutfi al-Sayyid (1872-), a follower of John Stuart Mill, and Mustafa Kamil (1874-1908), the founder of the first real nationalist party and also the first to harmonize Coptic and Arabic views on Egyptian nationalism. Sayyid is favored here with a whole chapter, while the more influential Zaghlul, the Mahatma Ghandi of Egypt, is treated, in comparison, somewhat perfunctorily. The author shows the tremendously important part played by the press in the propagation of nationalism. It is interesting to note that the founders and publishers of many influential journals in Egypt were Lebanese and Syrians. To many of these European-oriented leaders the old Islamic notion of unity did not appeal, for they found it incompatible with the realities of modern and contemporary life. In this they were eminently pragmatic. In general their views were free from dogmatic rigidity and untainted by aggressive, intolerant nationalism.—A. O. SARKISSIAN, The Library of Congress.

The scarcity of scholarly works on most of the modern countries of the Middle East makes Professor Majid Khadduri's revision of his book on Iraq, first published in 1951, a most valuable contribution to the field of Middle East studies. The merits of the revised edition, *Independent Iraq, 1932-1958: A Study in Iraqi Politics* (Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs by Oxford University Press, London, New York, Karachi, 1960; viii, 388 pp. $7.20), derive chiefly from the author's recent examination of German documents which shed considerable light on the events leading up to the pro-Axis coup of 1941 as well as from the fact that Professor Khadduri has conducted personal interviews with practically every civil and military personality of any import in Iraqi politics in the last decade. An interesting addition (Appendix IV) is a letter dated January 20, 1941, from the Mufti of Jerusalem to Hitler couched in vigorous anti-British language, assuring Hitler of the pro-German sympathies of the Arab people and suggesting in consequence the initiation of negotiations between the German government and the Mufti's own personal secretary who was delegated to Berlin for that purpose. In an additional and final chapter (Chapter XIV) the author devotes a few pages to the history of the oil industry in Iraq

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and to the Development Board created in 1950 and concludes with some observations on communists, nationalists, political stability and social reform in Iraq. It is unfortunate that Dr. Khadduri chose to avoid an analysis of the 1958 revolution itself and of the political forces subsequently operating within Iraq, but he does give us an inkling of his philosophy of advisable institutions for Iraq, and by inference for some other Arab countries at this crucial juncture in their history, when he states that "the adoption of moderate socialistic principles may be regarded as a healthy approach to social reform, and the history of Islam demonstrates that the Arabs have been capable of blending foreign elements of culture and creating their own synthesis." What he considers to be the danger is that the moderate Arab reformer "might succumb to the influx of radical leftist ideas before he had the time to effect such a synthesis." As to the prospects of dictatorship in Iraq, Dr. Khadduri advances the thesis, which some would undoubtedly argue against, that the division of Iraq into Sunni and Shi'i communities as well as into Arab and Kurdish nationalities constitutes a check-and-balance system which militates against permanent dictatorship.—MAURICE HARARI, Dartmouth College.

The authors of *Survey of International Affairs, 1955-1956* (Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs by Oxford University Press, London, New York, Toronto, 1960; viii, 327 pp. 50 s., $8.00), Geoffrey Barraclough and Rachel W. Wall, guide the reader through the welter of events of the period, January, 1955, to July, 1956. The key developments were in the Austrian peace treaty, the admission of Western Germany to NATO, the Saar plebiscite, the Baghdad and Warsaw pacts, the Twentieth Party Congress, the Bandung Conference, SEATO, and the nationalization of the Suez Canal. The focus is still the polarization of international politics around Washington and Moscow, but, as the authors intimate throughout the work, the "third force" set off by the Afro-Asian Bandung Conference "recast the framework of international affairs and placed old problems in a new context; it broke the deadlock which had paralysed the world since the first atom bomb fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki" (p. 6). The reader is cautioned that Bandung must not be exaggerated. Yet the volume (about two thirds is devoted to Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa) is testimony that events in the Afro-Asian world were crowding in on the dominant position long held by European issues in global affairs. It was not so much that Europe was of less importance, but rather that, during this

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period, the "periphery" was becoming the "center" of the dynamic changes taking place in international politics. Dulles responded to these changes by lecturing the uncommitted nations on the "immorality" of neutralism. More vigorous was the Twentieth Party Congress which established a new framework of Soviet policy toward the Afro-Asian nations. Indicative of the new directions were the rapid extension of Soviet-bloc commercial and diplomatic relations with the non-committed world, the attempted normalization of relations with Japan, and the Czech-Egyptian arms deal. In the context of this new strategy, "peaceful competition" had a specific meaning. The West did not fare so well: besides the Aswan Dam débâcle and the Suez nationalization, the West was left with a tenuous Baghdad and a rather doubtful SEATO. There is, of course, more than this in the *Survey*. Barraclough and Wall give considerable attention to the alliance systems, to the inability of the superpowers to agree on disarmament, and to the consequence of this on the thermonuclear revolution. In weaving these events together, the authors find two main accomplishments during the period: the settlement of the Austrian question and the absence of "peripheral" wars. Above all, the volume is an index to a turning point in international politics. One sign of this was the end of American and European hegemony in the United Nations. The rise of the Afro-Asian "bloc" also had the effect of producing a "looser international system, more flexible and multilateral." Have we come full circle? Langer saw imperialism as the main source of conflict among the European powers. Do the events described in this work suggest that decolonization may be a major source of conflict between East and West?—A. A. CASTAGNO, Queens College.

The Communist International, 1919-1943: Documents, Vol. II, 1923-1928 (Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs by Oxford University Press, London, New York, Toronto, 1960; xiv, 584 pp., $12.80) selected and edited by Jane Degras, is a major contribution to the study of the international communist movement. Maintaining the high standards set by her earlier three-volume *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy,* Mrs. Degras, Soviet expert in residence at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, has carefully gathered and annotated the major available documents relating to this "middle period" of Comintern history. The major issues then confronting the Comintern—application of the strategy of united front, the Anglo-Russian Trade Union Committee, the alliance between the Chinese Communist party and the

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Kuomintang, the failure of the uprising in Germany in October, 1923, policy toward the first Labour government in England, "Bolshevization" of the Comintern, relations between the Comintern and its "sections"—are clearly reflected in the documents presented here. To these, Mrs. Degras has added introductory notes, many of which summarize and quote from the Trotsky archives and the papers of Humbert-Droz, a Swiss member of the Comintern secretariat. These introductions are particularly useful in that they help offset the weight given by the documents themselves to the official Comintern position and reveal the decreasing areas in which criticism of official policy was still possible. Further, they help underline the crucial fact that the disputes over policy in the Comintern during this period in particular must be viewed in terms of the struggle for power then going on in the Russian party. As Mrs. Degras points out, as early as December, 1923, in the post-mortem on the failure of the October uprising in Germany, "the quarrel in the Russian Communist party found its echo in other communist parties" (p. 68). The bitterness of the quarrels within the German Communist party, the dispute over the policy of allying with the Kuomintang, characterized in 1923 as "the only serious national-revolutionary group in China" (p. 5), the wrangle over continuing the Anglo-Russian Committee after the General Council of the British trade unions had "betrayed" the 1926 General Strike can be properly understood only if the reader bears in mind that Stalin did not shrink from using the Comintern first against Trotsky and then against the whole "left opposition." The editor's frequent quotations from statements and speeches of Trotsky, which in later years were often suppressed by the Comintern, help remind the reader of the political environment in which these questions were decided. This reader eagerly looks forward to the publication of Volume III which will examine the application of the policy of "class against class" adopted by the Sixth Comintern Congress with which the present volume concludes.—MORTON SCHWARTZ, Columbia University.

Five Elections in Africa, edited by W. J. M. Mackenzie and Kenneth E. Robinson (Oxford, at the Clarendon Press; New York, Oxford University Press, 1960; xi, 496 pp. $8.80), is a modest book. Primarily it asks one question: what happens when a European administration institutes free elections in an African colony? The authors examine the obstacles raised by African conditions to the conduct of elections according to British and French standards, and they describe in detail how these obstacles have been at least partially overcome. The five

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elections studied took place in the Western Region of Nigeria in May, 1956; in the Eastern Region of Nigeria in March, 1957; in Sierra Leone in May, 1957; in Senegal in March, 1957; and in Kenya in March, 1957. Thus in each case they were still supervised by European administrators striving for standards of performance that would pass muster in London and Paris. In their analysis of how electoral organization was superimposed upon tribal organization, all the authors succeed in conveying the essence of emergent African political participation. Their symposium is a triumph of intelligent, perceptive, succinct description. (Professor Robinson's introductory summary of French West African political developments in the section on Senegal is a little masterpiece.) It seems hardly fair to ask for more. But inevitably readers will seek to apply the facts presented to the larger questions of politics in Africa. Here the authors are too modest and cautious to offer much assistance. However, a concluding section by Professor Mackenzie usefully suggests lines of inquiry for future research and analysis. Unsurprisingly, these suggestions focus on the development of political parties, aside from a plea that governments should issue more comprehensive post-election reports. Four major hypotheses concerning parties are derived by Professor Mackenzie from the findings of his colleagues: 1. Despite difficulties of communication, the initial tendency when elections are introduced is for candidates and parties to seek the largest possible audience and to transcend a narrowly sectional base; but "the imminence of self-government tends to force parties back into sectionalism, since they must seek support by promises to effective interests . . ." (p. 479). 2. Under African conditions party leadership is most easily provided by a dominant personality, but this must be complemented by effective organization; "the personal 'grace' or magic of leaders is in large measure a matter of competent staff-work . . ." (p. 481). 3. In Africa parties cannot sustain themselves on subscriptions by individual party members; "it therefore seems to follow that strong parties must depend for finance either on business organizations or rich men" (p. 483). 4. "At present all African parties tend to become tribal parties" (p. 484). It is left to others to explore these suggestions. The merit of this book lies in its effective description of the mechanics involved in transferring European electoral practices to five different African contexts.—STEVEN MULLER, Cornell University.

In *Profiles of African Leaders* by Thomas Patrick Melady (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1961; viii, 186 pp. $4.95)

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the author presents a series of sketches of nine African leaders and the countries of which they are the heads. He points out in his preface that he has been "disappointed by the books on Africa because so few tell about the people" and to remedy this he has gathered the basic biographical facts about the subjects he treats, and describes their rise to their present positions of political eminence. The book concludes with a series of speculations on the important problems of Africa's future. Dr. Melady is writing for a general audience and the specialist will find little that is not already well known. The sketches are on the whole accurate but it is to be regretted that the author did not go into greater detail with regard to character analysis of his subjects. The over-all impression left is that these men have few if any faults. The positive side of their political leadership is stressed to the almost complete exclusion of any critical observation of their political actions. In his attempt to simplify complex political situations the author is led to inanities such as, "Dr. Azikive was especially popular with members of the Ibo tribe." The author has clearly spent much time and effort in the research for his book. It is to be hoped that he will at a later point be able to use his material in the context of a fuller and more critical analysis of the elements of leadership in Africa today.—L. GRAY COWAN, Columbia Universtiy.

Among ten papers collected in *Studies in Roman Government and Law* by A. H. Jones of Cambridge University, (New York, Frederick Praeger, 1960; viii, 243 pp. $6.00), the essay on Civil Service in imperial Rome will probably be of particular interest to the readers of this Quarterly. We read for instance (p. 169) that when the government tried to cut down the number of officials in some departments, supernumeraries crowded in. In one office, in 399 A.D., there were 224 regular and 610 auxiliary functionaries. From another essay our sociologists will learn, probably without surprise, that when the Roman citizenship, so prized by St. Paul, became universal, it also began to be worthless. Now, only the privileged class of *honestiores* still enjoyed the personal protection, such as immunity from flogging, which had once belonged to all Roman citizens. The common citizen was "degraded to a status slightly if at all superior" to that which the Roman subjects had held (p. 65). Informative and thought-provoking, the book is unfortunately priced too high in the United States. It is printed in England and its English price is 30s. I wonder, incidentally, why such books are not issued in two editions: hardcover for libraries and paperback for scholars and students.—E. J. BICKERMAN, Columbia University.

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The *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1959* (New York, Columbia University Press, in coöperation with the United Nations, 1960; x, 660 pp. $12.50) follows in general the established pattern of the previous five years. It is fifty pages longer than the previous year, thus reflecting the increase in activity of the Organization. Furthermore, the distribution of space reflects the relatively greater emphasis on economic and social questions and questions concerning the non-self-governing territories and the trusteeship system in the Organization's work. It is gratifying to note that the authors of the *Yearbook* are not being held too rigidly to a certain maximum number of pages irrespective of the extent of the Organization's activity; it is difficult to see how condensation of the material can be carried much further without serious loss. Compared with the 1958 volume, that for 1959 contains two valuable additions: the text of the Charter of the United Nations, including the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and a chart showing the membership of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies. It is to be hoped that future volumes will follow this example.—LELAND M. GOODRICH, Columbia University.

The central purpose of constitutions is the formalization of the basic beliefs upon which the functioning of society is to rest. The successful operation of a constitution, when it calls itself democratic, depends upon a broad consensus among the people; in default of it there are very severe limitations on the possibilities of the mechanics of government. Here lies in brief the central difficulty that has confronted the French body politic since 1791. Of constitution making the French have had extensive experience, but the measure of their success is attested by the number and variety of regimes that have ruled them since. Their last attempt, in 1958, though not accompanied by violent upheaval, presents some very unusual aspects. The Fund for the Republic is responsible for this discussion, *France, the new Republic,* by Raymond Aron (New York, Oceana Publications, 1960; 144 pp. $2.95). The generosity, often lavish, of American foundations caused M. Aron to be invited to lead the proceedings, which consisted of an opening presentation by himself followed by questions and answers. The participation of M. Aron is warrant of lucidity and sharpness of perception. He emphasizes the overwhelming importance of General de Gaulle, for whom the constitution was tailored, while in the introductory remarks Mr. Brogan rightly points out that "France in 1958 was not Germany in 1932 or even Italy in 1923" (pp. 14-15); but the

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precariousness of the combination of "complete liberty with absolute monarchy" (p. 44) is also properly stressed. The Algerian situation was at the root of the events of 1958, and the fate of that problem remains of crucial importance; much has been written on this, of highly variable quality, not least in the United States, and the judgment is refreshing that "the French colonial record will be judged in history by what the people do after they get independence" (p. 57). Perhaps the most important single feature of the new French constitution is the decadence of the parliamentary institution, an inevitable twentieth-century phenomenon, according to Aron, but also the key to future developments. The discussion, allowing for some oddities of style and punctuation, is a useful one, but the fact that it took place as early as October, 1958, precluded the possibility of analyses such as have come recently from the pens of Dorothy Pickles *(The Fifth French Republic)* and Philip M. Williams *(De Gaulle's Republic);* the structure alone could be analyzed and its possibilities speculated upon. The text of the French constitution is also reproduced.—RENÉ ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ, Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale, Milan.

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WALTER LOUIS DORN

1894-1961

Born in mid-western America, Walter Dorn was a good European, and all the better an American for that. Far more clearly than most Americans, he saw that this country had grown and flowered out of Europe, and especially out of the Europe of the eighteenth century; he did not simply *know* this; he *felt* it and he *lived* it. There is no hope of understanding Walter Dorn in any other terms than these.

Graduating at Concordia College and then at Concordia Seminary, in Illinios, he moved on to the Doctorate in history at the University of Chicago. He taught at Chicago, Wisconsin, and Ohio State, and just before World War II he came to Columbia as a Visiting Professor of History for one year. Then in 1956 he accepted a permanent appointment at Columbia.

For most of the decade of the 1940's, Dorn was engaged in the service of the government. First, he carried important responsibilities in the Office of Strategic Services in Washington. Then, from 1944 to 1947, and again in 1949, he was deeply involved abroad in the preparation and the fulfilment of American plans for the occupation and administration of Germany. In November, 1945, the American Medal of Freedom was awarded to him, in recognition of his "exceptionally meritorious achievement" in aiding the prosecution of the war, and "his efforts and outstanding attention to duty" in connection with the establishment and operation of American military government in Germany. Subsequently he was for a time Personal Adviser to General Lucius D. Clay, in problems of Denazification, and in 1949 he served the Secretary of the Army as Visiting Expert on German Affairs.

During the period of his government service, Walter Dorn wrote many reports for official use, but contrary to press comment, he had nothing to do with the drafting of the Denazification Law of March, 1946, for the American Zone. However, in May, 1947, he submitted to General Clay a major report recommending modifications in this law; Dorn himself believed that he "never wrote anything better than this study." These and other reports helped to give him a major rôle as adviser to General Clay and to other high American authorities in Germany.

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For several years following his government service, he devoted a great deal of time and effort to the writing of a detailed book on American Occupation Policy in Germany—a major task that had been very largely completed at the date of his death.

As an officer of the American Committee on War Documents, he was very active in making captured German materials available to historians. After the War, he also served for three years on the Council of the American Historical Association.

Except for his major study of American occupation policy, and the various reports prepared during his government service, Dorn concentrated his research and writing very largely on the history of Europe, and especially of Prussia, in the eighteenth century. He published a number of authoritative articles in this field, and those on the Prussian bureaucracy were rated by some historians as his most original and important historical contribution. For the Langer series on "The Rise of Modern Europe," he wrote a volume on *Competition for Empire, 1740-1763* (New York, 1940), an outstanding work that was highly commended by other historians for its able scholarship and its lively style.

At intervals for many years, Dorn worked away at a detailed study of Frederick the Great and the Prussian Monarchy. He planned to complete this project, as soon as his book on American occupation policy in Germany was "off the table."

Among the courses that he offered at Ohio State University and at Columbia, his favorite was the one on historiography. As his colleagues always knew, and his students soon learned, Dorn felt that the work of every historian was bound to embody, consciously or unconsciously, that historian's philosophy of history—his conception of the place and destiny of man in the universe; a superficial view of life was bound to express itself in the writing of superficial and journalistic history. In our age of profound crisis around the globe, when every principle of philosophy and religion, and every value of life, is a subject of violent conflict, Dorn's course in historiography and the philosophy of history was a deeply rewarding experience for every student on his rolls, and Dorn's conversation, turning naturally to the most fundamental of issues, was a splendid source of stimulation and enlightenment to his colleagues.

In his mind and spirit—even in his courtly manner and his very presence—Dorn was in many ways a man of the eighteenth century that he loved—a man of the Enlightenment. The glow that played from his rich mind will not fade from the minds of those who knew him, and cannot let him go.

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